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The principle aim of this thesis is to investigate J.M. Coetzee’s presentation of 
corporeal frailty, in the forms of illness, torture, and death, which drives subjectivity to 
dissolve individual identity and thereby to become an impersonality, drawing on Gilles 
Deleuze’s theory of the self-affective and associative power of corporeality. As a South 
African-born writer, Coetzee’s oeuvre has frequently been examined in terms of the ethical 
and political contexts of (post)apartheid South Africa. Recently, with Coetzee’s move to 
Australia, the transpositions of corporeality relating to animals, physical disability and 
dying bodies have received a greater focus than the foregrounding of the politicized and 
historicized body. However, commentators on the issues of responsibility and corporeality 
tend to draw on the theoretical writings of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida and 
thus address the body as a site of “Otherness” located in a transcendental position, featuring 
a “traumatic” or “internally split subject” divided between itself and a demand for the Other. 
However, these theories have not sufficiently dealt with Coetzee’s presentation of the self-
dissolving and synthetic power of corporeal frailty, which offers the potential for 
interactions between the subject and the Other. Deleuze’s conception of corporeality 
engages with the non-organic and collective forces of the body without resorting to 
dualistic negation or dialectical materialism. Specifically, drawing on Deleuze’s theories of 
“masochism”, “exhaustion”, “impersonality”, “the sublime”, “meat”, “sympathetic 
imagination” and “becoming”, this thesis attempts to articulate how Deleuze’s theories 
break the Otherness of the body and thereby pose the possibility of a dynamic self-
differentiating and transformative processes of corporeal frailty. To investigate the issue of 
corporeal frailty, my thesis aims to explore six of Coetzee’s novels through Deleuze’s 
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theories: Waiting for the Barbarians, Life & Times of Michael K, Age of Iron, The Master 
of Petersburg, Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello. By analyzing Coetzee’s six novels, I will 
demonstrate that the subject’s corporeal frailty generates a sense of self-dissolution and 
thereby its transformation into the becoming-impersonal. Thus, an encounter between 
Coetzee’s and Deleuze’s corporeal frailty creates a new configuration of impersonality 
rather than an “identification” or “resemblance” between the subject and the Other, 
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This thesis aims to investigate the power of corporeal frailty, as presented in J.M. 
Coetzee’s works, drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s theory of corporeality. Both Coetzee and 
Deleuze seek to create new configurations of corporeal frailty and its transformative forms 
of embodied experience, whilst challenging the representation and recognition of the body 
as a marker of race, sexuality and species. Drawing on Deleuze’s theories, this thesis 
attempts to examine the ethical and political needs produced by (post)colonial contexts and 
to highlight the dissolution and differentiation of corporeal subjectivity in Coetzee’s novels. 
Corporeal frailty offers the power to invent a new configuration of subjectivity and its 
interactions with the Other for the community to come. The goal of this thesis is thereby to 
articulate ethical and political as well as ontological approaches towards corporeal frailty, 
thus radically breaking from the given frames of power, discourse and practice surrounding 
(post)colonial situations, and accordingly exploring the potential of triggering 
transformative and interactive forces between the subject, the Other, and the community. 
Subsequently, this thesis will demonstrate how corporeal frailty generates a new figuration 
of subjectivity characterized by becoming impersonal or the inhuman being.  
The oeuvre of the South African writer, J.M. Coetzee has frequently been examined 
in relation to ethical and political questions “about colonial history and accountability, 
about power and powerless, about representation and alterity, about sympathy and 
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forgiveness”, 1  in (post)colonial and (post)apartheid contexts. 2  Since his first novel, 
Dusklands (1974), Coetzee’s concerns have been inextricably linked with the 
(post)colonial circumstances in which racial, sexual and socio-economic “minorities”3 
have been humiliated and exploited and the colonizers have been forced to take 
responsibility for their suffering. These explorations explicitly and implicitly bear close 
links with an alternative foundation for the ethical and political pitfalls of (post)apartheid 
South Africa. Apartheid South Africa was, as Susan VanZanten Gallagher in A Story of 
South Africa describes, “a country in which discourse itself has contributed to oppression, 
a country whose history has been deliberately constructed to maintain white supremacy”.4 
Gallagher goes on to assert that Coetzee’s response to the oppressive regime of apartheid 
in his novels has been to “expose and subvert national myths of history, as well as to create 
alternative narratives, stories to hold up against the nightmare of South African history”.5 
Criticizing the practices and theories of apartheid, Coetzee notes in his essay “Apartheid 
                                           
1 Jane Poyner, “Materials”, Approaches to Teaching Coetzee’s Disgrace and Other Works, eds. 
Laura Wright, Jane Poyner, and Elleke Boehmer (New York: The Modern Language Association of 
America, 2014), 3.  
2 See David Attwell, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993). Sue Kossew, Pen and Power: A Post-Colonial Reading of J.M. Coetzee 
and André Brink (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996). Dominic Head, J.M. Coetzee (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). Jane Poyner, J.M. Coetzee and the Paradox of Postcolonial Authorship 
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2009).  
3 Gilles Deleuze defines a minority in terms of its level of power in the community rather than its 
number or quantity. According to Deleuze, “The opposition between minority and majority is not 
simply quantitative. Majority implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard 
measure by which to evaluate it”. Deleuze also explains that “majority assumes a state of power and 
domination”. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brain Massumi (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 105. As 
Susan VanZenten describes, during the apartheid regime, “five million whites lead a life of privilege, 
owning most of the land, receiving the best education, managing the nation’s industries, and 
dictating the country’s political and social policies. In contrast, twenty-eight million people—who 
have varying proportions of African, Indian, and white ancestry—do not have fully voting privileges, 
must live in specified areas, receive a vastly inferior education, possesses only 13 percent of the 
land, and are denied the rights of free speech, assembly, and lawful trial”. Susan VanZanten 
Gallagher, A Story of South Africa: J. M. Coetzee’s Fiction in Context (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 1. I draw on the Deleuzian terms of “minor” and “major” in this context.   
4 Gallagher, A Story of South Africa, x.   
5 Ibid.  
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Thinking” that apartheid “demanded black bodies in all their physicality in order to burn 
up their energy as labour. In its anxiety about black bodies, it also made laws to banish 
them from sight”.6 In this regard, Coetzee claims that “In South Africa it is not possible to 
deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body … Its power is undeniable”.7 
Coetzee’s figurations of suffering bodies in his novels thus evidence his critical inquiries 
into colonial practices, which exploit and abuse the bodies of the colonized, and into 
colonial discourses, which focus on neutralizing their suffering in South Africa. However, 
Coetzee’s presentations of suffering bodies are not merely of racial minorities, but also of 
the colonizers who are conscious of and sensitive towards their authority over suffering in 
(post)colonial contexts.  
However, Coetzee’s reflections and presentations of suffering bodies in 
(post)colonial situations could be critiqued, insofar as the style of his writings is non-
realistic and even allusive in dealing with the ethical and political issues involved. Rather 
than focusing on the realistic representation of the suffering body of the colonized in South 
African situations, Coetzee highlights the corporal frailty of all living beings including the 
colonizer and vulnerable subjects, such as children and animals by using the narrative 
techniques of allegory, intertextuality, fragmentary forms, and the narrator without 
authority. 8  However, Laura Wright argues that “Coetzee’s novels never exclude this 
                                           
6 J.M. Coetzee, “Apartheid Thinking”, Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1996), 164.  
7 J.M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 248.  
8 Drawing on the genre of historiographical metafiction, Linda Hutcheon characterizes Coetzee’s 
novel, Foe as an example of “postmodernism”. Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: 
History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 1988), 107-8. Yet, Dereck Attridge describes 
Coetzee’s fiction as “an instance of ‘the late modernism’ or ‘neomodernism’”, on the grounds that 
his fiction “follows on from Kafka and Beckett, not Pynchon and Barth”. Dereck Attridge, J.M. 
Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading: Literature and Event (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 4. Attridge further claims that “within what is called modernism, technical resources—and a 




historical reality from which they are drawn; instead, Coetzee’s rhetorical choices simply 
deny that there is merely one way to tell any story, including the stories of colonization, 
apartheid, and democracy in South Africa”.9 In a similar context, Coetzee, as Anthony 
Uhlmann claims, reflects political and historical reality through both allegory and realism: 
“While it is clear that works such as Dusklands, Life & Times of Michael K, Waiting for 
the Barbarians and others in Coetzee’s oeuvre, have allegorical overtones, it is equally true 
that Coetzee has taken a strong interest in ‘realism’ and the potential of this mode, and that 
this interest has informed much of his work”.10 More convincingly, David Attwell, in J.M. 
Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (1993), describes Coetzee’s works as a 
“situational metafiction” “with a particular relation to the cultural and political discourses 
of South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s”. 11  Foregrounding “the relationship between 
reflexivity and historicity” in Coetzee’s works, Attwell goes on to claim that “Coetzee’s 
figuring of the tension between text and history is itself a historical act, one that must be 
read back into the discourses of South Africa where one can discern its illuminating 
power”.12 In this regard, despite Nadine Gordimer’s famous criticism that “Coetzee’s 
heroes are those who ignore history, not make it”,13  Coetzee’s historical attention to 
(post)colonial circumstances can be read as a form of metafictional writing. The suffering 
bodies presented in Coetzee’s works undoubtedly refer to his political and ethical 
involvement with the (post)colonial contexts of South Africa.  
                                           
9 Laura Wright, Writing “Out of All the Camps”: J.M. Coetzee’s Narratives of Displacement (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2006), 2.  
10  Anthony Uhlmann, “Realism and Intertextuality”, Strong Opinion: J.M. Coetzee and the 
Authority of Contemporary Fiction, eds. Chris Danta, Sue Kossew and Julian Murphet (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2011), 81.  
11 David Attwell, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 3.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Nadine Gordimer, “The Idea of Gardening”, The New York Review of Books (February 2, 1984). 
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In response to the questions of how Coetzee presents suffering bodies, it is 
necessary to consider the issue of narrators with physical weaknesses, such as ageing and 
illness. According to Chris Danta, Coetzee’s narrators, who are “blind, disabled, 
disqualified, without authority”, reflect his political response to the South African 
situation.14 Danta elaborates on this by quoting Coetzee’s interview with David Attwell in 
Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews. Specifically, in this interview, Coetzee explains 
his use of a narrator with physical weakness:  
 
In the first half of this story—a story spoken in a wavering voice, 
for the speaker is not only blind, but written as he is as a white South 
African into the latter half of the twentieth century, disabled, 
disqualified—a man-who-writes reacts to the situation he finds himself 
in being without authority, writing without authority.15  
 
Concerning the narrator without authority, Danta further explains: “But it is not just that, 
since it persists in Coetzee’s Australian novels. Not simply a political use of the literary, 
the withdrawal of authority is also for Coetzee constitutional to the act of writing itself”.16 
More specifically, Danta asserts that “To write without authority is rather to make authority 
a question in and through one’s writing”.17 Danta’s mention of the “act of writing” needs 
to be further discussed, since he positions Coetzee’s “writing without authority” in the 
“paradox of literary authority”18 by quoting JC’s remark in A Diary of a Bad Year: “Learn 
to speak without authority, says Kierkegaard. By copying Kierkegaard’s words here, I 
make Kierkegaard into an authority. Authority cannot be taught, cannot be learned. The 
                                           
14 Chris Danta, “Introduction”, Strong Opinion, xii.  
15 J.M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point, 392.  
16 Danta, “Introduction”, xii.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.   
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paradox is a true one”.19 From this, Danta explains Coetzee’s writing without authority as 
being positioned in a space between the social and the transcendental. However, my 
contention here is that Coetzee’s writing of the narrators without authority is rather 
associated with the process of self-dissolution through experiencing their corporeal 
weakness. The narrators, who suffer from physical illness, push back against the limits of 
subjectivity, which force them to transform their positions of race, sexuality and species 
and then their relationships with the Other in their respective (post)colonial contexts.  
Coetzee’s presentation of corporeal subjectivity marks bodies with suffering, in the 
forms of torture, mutilation, disability, ageing, illness, and death. The figurations of 
suffering bodies not only constitute “bio-politics”,20 but also a personal experience of 
illness, life and death. Hania A.M. Nashef’s discussion of the humiliation presented in 
Coetzee’s works provides a useful approach for examining the political forces of suffering 
bodies. As Nashef writes, “In Coetzee’s earlier novels, the individual’s humiliation is 
primarily induced by a political situation or an external force generally larger than the 
                                           
19 J.M. Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year (London: Vintage Books, 2007), 123-4.  
20 Michel Foucault describes a transition from sovereign power to biopower and biopolitics in the 
modern age. Foucault observes that life has been overtaken by regulations and technologies that 
seek to control the bodies of human beings, rather than merely the power to kill: “For the first time 
in history, no doubt biological existence was reflected in political existence; the fact of living was 
no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of 
death and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere of 
intervention. Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate 
domain was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them 
would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the 
threat of death, that gave power its access even the body” (142-3). However, as Foucault also points 
out, “It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it 
constantly escapes them” (143). In other words, from Foucault’s perspective, life has been the object 
of biopolitics, but it has also escaped the techniques of biopower. In this context, Foucault concludes: 
“But what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the 
species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for 
Aristotle; a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an 
animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (143). Michel Foucault, 
The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 142-143. 
Coetzee’s novels demonstrate the biopolitics involved in the regulation and controlling of the bodies 
and the lives of the subjects in (post)apartheid South African contexts, but also describe how bodies 
and lives may escape from biopower.     
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person is, but in the later novels, the instigation becomes more personal, arising from a 
physical disability or the undesired process of aging”.21 Since Coetzee’s move to Australia 
in 2002, his description of suffering bodies has become increasingly more focused on 
personal weaknesses such as ageing, disability and blindness. This is evident in novels such 
as Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man (2005) and Diary of a Bad Year (2007). 
Nevertheless, my contention is that the corporeal frailty of the characters in Coetzee’s 
earlier novels, as well as his later ones, involves both political and personal forces and even 
goes beyond the domain of human beings. For instance, Coetzee’s novel, Disgrace (1999) 
describes how a white professor David Lurie has a sexual relationship with his coloured 
student Melanie Isaacs during the post-apartheid era. In the novel, Lurie’s personal act is 
regarded as a public and political crime relating to white people’s exploitation and abuse 
of the bodies of black people, which is, in turn, linked to the history of South Africa. In 
Diary of a Bad Year, six eminent writers put forward their opinions on political issues, such 
as George W. Bush, Guantanamo Bay, and terrorism, while an ageing South African 
immigrant writer JC writes a collection entitled Strong Opinions in a separated band of text, 
one that divides and simultaneously connects political opinions and personal stories.   
In order to argue my position on the issue of corporeal frailty in Coetzee’s novels, 
it is necessary to provide here an outline of the relationship between subjectivity and 
corporeal frailty in his oeuvre. As Coetzee’s works are set in (post)colonial backgrounds, 
corporeal frailty characterizes different aspects of suffering between the colonizer and the 
colonized or humans and non-human animals. Specifically, Coetzee in his earlier novels 
problematizes the suffering bodies of both the colonizer and the colonized in the prevalent 
violent and oppressive systems constituted by (post)colonial and (post)apartheid 
                                           
21 Hania A.M. Nashef, The Politics of Humiliation in the Novels of J.M. Coetzee (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 1.  
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circumstances. At first, the colonized in the novels are forced to experience their physical 
disabilities through the unequal relationships between the colonizer and the colonized. In 
Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), the nomads, who are called barbarians, are confined 
and tortured by the colonizer at the frontier of an unspecified Empire. Similarly, in Life & 
Times of Michael K (1983), the eponymous protagonist, as a racial and socio-economic 
other, is continually confined and is then enlisted to carry out forced labour in camps during 
the turbulent period of apartheid. In Foe (1986), a metafictional retelling of Robinson 
Crusoe, Friday labours for his master Cruso, while his tongue has already been mutilated 
on the desert island during the colonial period. Even though the mutilator is never known, 
Friday’s lost tongue and silence represent the victimization of colonial subjects in the 
history of colonialism.22 Age of Iron (1990) describes the plight of a group of young black 
revolutionaries and their deaths at the hands of the police during the State of Emergency in 
South Africa. From this, the death and physical impairment of the colonized are produced 
by the oppressive colonial regime, which is based on the extreme binary opposition 
between the colonizer and the colonized. In these historical contexts, ethical and political 
questions exist surrounding the limits to which the colonizer is capable of recognizing and 
empathizing with the suffering of the victims.  
In this thesis, I will argue that Coetzee’s works articulate the corporeal frailty of the 
colonizer, who is affected by the suffering of the colonized and experiences his own 
transformation in (post)colonial contexts. By gaining a perspective on corporeal 
weaknesses such as torture, illness and ageing, the colonizer is exposed to his own 
vulnerability and thereby comes to experience the dissolution of his self. This experience 
of the colonizer is activated by his affective interactions with the suffering of the colonized, 
                                           
22 Kossew explains that Coetzee’s Friday, as “the colonized Other”, is “literally and metaphorically 
silenced by having had his tongue cut out (a stage further on from Michael K’s harelip, which 
‘merely’ distorted his voice”. Kossew, Pen and Power, 161-2.  . 
15 
 
which offers the impetus for the radical shift in the relationship between the colonizer and 
the colonized. This is also why the colonizer’s corporeal suffering in Coetzee’s works 
creates ethical and political challenges for recognizing and representing (post)colonial 
subjectivity. For example, the Magistrate, an old colonizer in Waiting for the Barbarians, 
experiences similar torture and humiliation to the barbarians due to his perception of the 
pain of the tortured barbarian girl. Mrs. Curren in Age of Iron is dying from cancer, as a 
result of responding to the sickness of apartheid South Africa. In effect, the illness and 
humiliation that the colonizer suffers epitomize the symptoms of their political crimes and 
ethical responsibility, in the violent history of colonialism. The dissolution of corporeal 
subjectivity occurs at the point where the colonizer empathizes with the torment of the 
colonized. Accordingly, the corporeal frailty of the colonizer affects him/her in such a way 
that he/she is able to experience the plight of suffering bodies and differentiate his 
subjectivity from his ego, while the body of the colonized is already wounded.  
In the case of Disgrace, during the post-apartheid period, the relationship between 
the colonizer and the colonized has changed, which results in them experiencing altered 
aspects of such suffering. The body of the colonizer is weakened by additional external 
elements such as attacks or accidents. For instance, Lucy is raped by a group of black 
African men and Lurie is attacked by them. It is evident from this changing relationship 
between the colonizer and the colonized that Coetzee’s figurations of corporeal frailty 
articulate a (post)colonial history in which nobody can be free from their humiliation and 
sickness. As such, it follows that the corporeal frailties of the colonized and the colonizer 
in Coetzee’s oeuvre become transferable and indeterminable bodily states, formed through 
the interactions between their bodies. This characteristic of corporeal frailty is relevant to 
Coetzee’s presentation of suffering children and animals, who cannot be characterized and 
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determined in the same way as normal human bodies.23 Not only the collapse of the 
distinction between the bodies of the colonizer and the colonized, but also the 
dismantlement of the relationship between human and animal are presented in Coetzee’s 
exploration of corporeal frailty. This is the potential of corporeal frailty, which is available 
for the subject to break with his/her position and to ultimately bring about what Deleuze 
terms “revolutionary-becoming”.24    
There is another important element to consider in Coetzee’s presentation of 
corporeal frailty, with relation to the dimensions of life and death. Through the process of 
time, corporeal subjectivity has to encounter its own physical frailty and ageing. This can 
be identified in the Magistrate’s and Mrs. Curren’s corporeal weaknesses derived from their 
ageing as an inescapable force. Ageing, for the Magistrate and Mrs. Curren, is seen as a 
self-dissolving and self-affective process. Interestingly, the personal weakness produced 
through the processes of ageing and dying also interweave with political sickness in 
Coetzee’s novels. The corporeal weakness of ageing and dying in their political and 
personal dimensions are also iterated in the different context of Russia in The Master of 
Petersburg (1994). The fictional figure Dostoevsky, returns to St. Petersburg in order to 
mourn his dead stepson Pavel. The Tsarist regime of Russia resembles the oppression of 
apartheid South Africa. In addition to this, an exploration of how to mourn and memorialize 
the dead is personally and politically offered in the novel, since the deaths of people are 
                                           
23 The child in Coetzee’s works signifies corporeal frailty. For example, black children in Age of 
Iron and Matryona in The Master of Petersburg are more affected and victimized by the political 
violence than adults. Yet, rather than focusing on the victimization of children’s bodies at the hands 
of adults, the corporeal frailty of the child is often associated with the symptom that the subject 
experiences as he/she is split from his or her self. For example, Susan Barton’s child is described as 
being lost or unborn in Foe. The Magistrate also dreams that the child is being beaten in Waiting for 
the Barbarians, because of his guilt related to the tortured barbarian girl.   
24 Paul Patton explains Deleuze’s conception of revolutionary-becoming: “This new concept of 
revolutionary-becoming sought to encompass the multitude of way in which individuals and groups 
deviate from the majoritarian norms that ultimately determine the rights and duties of citizens”. Paul 
Patton, “Deleuze’s political philosophy”, The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, eds. Daniel W. 
Smith and Henry Somers-Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 202.     
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directly related to the oppressive regimes. This allows for an extended and associated 
subjectivity as mourners, who are the living dead when viewed as people who memorialize 
the dead within the living. Thus, the corporeal frailty of ageing, dying and death presented 
in Coetzee’s novels does not solely relate to political and ethical fields, but also to the 
ontological dimensions of life and death.  
Following his emigration to Australia, Coetzee portrays immigrants as “flawed, 
maimed and dying white heroes”.25 The characters are, according to Elleke Boehmer, 
“double-sided figures who gesture back at colonial nostalgia for Europe, yet also signify a 
desire to regenerate as Australian through their suffering and dying”.26 However, rather 
than there being a disconnection between his earlier and his immigrant novels, Coetzee’s 
figurations of white heroes in the Australian background replicate the corporeal frailty (and 
its connection to the Other and the community) found in his earlier fictions. In Elizabeth 
Costello, the eponymous protagonist is dying, because of her sympathy with the mass 
killing of animals. Slow Man describes the disability of the old man Paul Rayment, who 
was once a photographer with a valuable collection of early pictures of Australian settlers, 
and who has subsequently been hit by the lorry of a young driver named Blight. In Diary 
of a Bad Year, a white male South African-born writer, JC, suffers from fading eyesight as 
a result of Parkinson’s disease and constantly thinks of his death. Yet, the physical illness 
of these characters enables them to connect to human and non-human others such as 
immigrants, refugees and animals. Additionally, the physical weakness of the characters 
associated with their ageing is presented with regard to precarious life. Nevertheless, the 
characters do not seek to be healed but rather choose to accept their fragile bodies. As such, 
it follows that Coetzee engages in an ethical and political exploration of personal and 
                                           
25 Elleke Boehmer, “J.M. Coetzee’s Australian Realism”, Strong Opinion, 10.  
26 Ibid.  
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political predicaments and their relations to corporeal frailty in (post)colonial 
circumstances. Above all, corporeal frailty in Coetzee’s works breaks the subject position, 
thereby activating its transformative and associative power.  
In this thesis, I will draw on Deleuze’s theories of the majoritarian and minoritarian 
subjectivity, to argue that Coetzee’s presentation of corporeal frailty triggers the subject’s 
transformation into an impersonal and inhuman being, in its ethical, political and 
ontological dimensions. The issue of the corporeal frailty explored by Coetzee and Deleuze, 
can be examined by considering Deleuze’s definition of illness and its relation to literature 
in terms of a “symptomology”. This term is available for the diagnosis of personal and 
social disease. Deleuze develops this concept of symptomology relied on the works of 
Nietzsche. Ronald Bogue articulates Deleuze as “a Nietzschean physician of culture, both 
a symptomologist who reads culture’s signs of sickness and health and a therapist whose 
remedies promote new possibilities for life”.27 In literature, according to Deleuze, the 
illness or weakness that a writer suffers can produce “health” in a Nietzschean sense:  
 
Neuroses or psychoses are not passages of life, but states into 
which we fall when the process is interrupted, blocked, or plugged up. 
Illness is not a process but a stopping of the process, as in ‘the Nietzsche 
case’. Moreover, the writer as such is not a patient but rather a physician, 
the physician of himself and of the world. The world is the set of 
symptoms whose illness merges with man. Literature then appears as an 
enterprise of health: not that the writer would necessarily be in good 
health … but he possesses an irresistible and delicate health that stems 
from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him, too strong for 
him, suffocating things whose passage exhausts him, while nonetheless 
                                           
27 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Literature (New York: Routledge, 2003), 2. 
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giving him the becomings that a dominant and substantial health would 
render impossible”.28  
 
As Deleuze notes above, illness brings an individual into the states of body, mind and life 
that involve blockage and disruption. However, through illness, it is still possible for a 
writer to experience “health” as “something in life” that takes him/her beyond his/her 
personal dimension. For Deleuze and Nietzsche, the concept of health does not necessarily 
mean “robust health”, but rather “frail health, a weak constitution, a fragile personal life” 
that artists like philosophers often have “(Spinoza’s frailty, D.H. Lawrence’s hemoptysis, 
Nietzsche’s migraines, Deleuze’s own respiratory ailments)”.29 From this point, it can be 
said that it is not necessarily important to distinguish illness from health, but rather to focus 
on the transformation from a personal illness to an impersonal dimension. It is through the 
“becoming of the writer”, gained through the experience of illness, that a writer is able to 
invent new possibilities for life beyond the personal limit of biological and psychological 
contents. This can be seen as the “power of an impersonal—which is not a generality but a 
singularity at the highest point: a man, a woman, a beast, a stomach, a child … It is not the 
first two persons that function as the condition for literary enunciation; literature begins 
only when a third person is born in us that strips us of the power to say ‘I’ (Blanchot’s 
‘neuter’)”.30 Thus, Deleuze’s account of health propels us to discover a new figuration of 
the subject: “Health as literature, as writing, consists in inventing a people who are missing. 
It is the task of the fabulating function to invent a people”.31 Through his experience of 
illness as a blockage, a writer invents “a minor people, eternally minor taken up in a 
                                           
28 Gilles Deleuze, “literature and life”, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael A. Grace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3.  
29 Daniel W. Smith, “Introduction”, Essays Critical and Clinical, xv. 
30 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 3.  
31 Ibid., 4.  
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becoming-revolutionary”. 32  Accordingly, Deleuze claims that “the ultimate aim of 
literature is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health or this invention of a people, 
that is, a possibility of life”.33 It follows that Deleuze’s approach to illness does not involve 
negative connotations but rather the creative power to trigger a new figuration of the subject 
in the impersonal dimension. Likewise, from the perspective of a writer, illness is not 
merely actualized as his/her personal experience, but also as his/her impersonal experience, 
producing a new mode of life. This vision of corporeal frailty clearly diverges from the 
approaches of psychoanalysis towards the vulnerability and pain of the subject and the 
Other.34 Rather than the psychoanalytic view of illness, which sees it as being caused by 
the repression of pain, Deleuze’s conception of corporeal frailty posits that pain can be 
transformed into a creative power by connecting to something more than the personal in 
life.    
From this brief look at the relationship between illness and health, it is evident that 
Deleuze’s theory of corporeal frailty is connected to a creative power in the impersonal 
dimension. This creative power is specifically related to Deleuze’s theory of the body, 
which contains its frailty as an affective and interactive entity. In terms of its frailty, the 
body concerns itself with dynamic and sensitive forces, which allow for its encounter and 
                                           
32 Ibid. 
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34  See Gabriele Schwab, “Introduction: Derrida, Deleuze, and the Psychoanalysis to Come”, 
Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis, ed. Gabriele Schwab (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008). Branka Arsić, “The Rhythm of Pain: Freud, Deleuze, Derrida”, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Gabriele Schwab (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). As Schwab 
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formation contains and undermines desire and establishes a fundamental lack in the subject as 
constitutive, Deleuze and Guattari proclaim the revolutionary power of desire and its resistance 
against social and psychic repression” (3-4). Concerning the issue of pain that I explore in my thesis, 
Arsić claims that Deleuze resists any Freudian notion of the “spiritualization” or the “becoming 
metaphor” of pain (147). Rather than being translated or transformed into its sense of trauma or guilt, 
Deleuze’s conception of pain refers to the way that it is able to flow between the subject and the 




connection with other bodies. My further exploration of this concept of corporeal frailty 
needs to specify the term of the body in a Deleuzian sense, given that Deleuze does not 
offer a coherent conception of the body. As Joe Hughes asserts, “not only is the concept of 
the body nearly everywhere we look in Deleuze’s work”, but “it has also gone on to inform 
some of the most influential conceptions of the body in contemporary critical debate”.35 
Recent years have seen an increase of interest in Deleuze’s concepts of corporeality, with 
particular relation to affects, animals and life. In this context, I will describe Deleuze’s 
theory of corporeality and its affective and associative power, which I will draw upon to 
analyse the aspects of corporeal frailty as presented in Coetzee’s works. Deleuze and 
Guattari discuss the generative features of corporeal subjectivity involving the dynamic of 
autopoiesis. “Autopoiesis” refers, here, to the capacity to produce oneself in living systems, 
as suggested by H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela in Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realization of the Living (1980).  
 
Autopoiesis in the physical space is necessary and sufficient to 
characterize a system as a living system. Reproduction and evolution as 
they occur in the known living systems, and all the phenomena derived 
from them, arise as secondary processes subordinated to their existence 
and operation as autopoietic unities.36  
 
Guattari expands upon Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis beyond living systems, 
developing Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of machines as being connected to social, 
                                           
35  Joe Hughes, “Introduction”, Deleuze and the Body, eds. Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 1. Hughes adds that “Elizabeth Grosz, Moira 
Gatens, Patricia Clogh and Rosi Braidotti, to name only a few, have engaged with Deleuze’s writings 
on the body”. In addition to them, a range of important critics such as Keith Ansell Pearson, John 
Protevi, Claire Colebrook and Manuel DeLanda have substantially explored Deleuze’s idea of 
corporeality or materialism in diverse domains such as philosophy, politics, biology and technology.  
36  H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), 113.  
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linguistic and aesthetic components. According to Guattari, “Autopoietic machines 
undertake an incessant process of the replacement of their components for the external 
perturbations to which they are exposed”.37 The autopoietic machines are considered as 
the corporeal subjectivity of undertaking self-transformative processes by interacting with 
the social and political circumstances.  
Deleuzian commentators such as Keith Ansell Pearson, Claire Colebrook and John 
Protevi have used this idea of “autopoiesis” (or similar biological conceptions) to 
emphasize Deleuze and Guattari’s biological or vitalistic notions of viral subjects, living 
systems and life.38 In Maturana and Varela’s account of autopoiesis, the body as a living 
system tries to maintain itself in relation to outside variables. Colebrook complicates this 
when she asserts that “life is autopoietic because a living being maintains its own internal 
relations; a living system must be able—through interaction with its milieu—to sustain 
itself”.39 Thus, the conception of autopoiesis, as Colebrook explains, refers to the system 
of “relative closure” so that “a body at once maintains itself but also adapts to changing 
external perturbations”. 40  The tension between self-sustainability and adaptability 
produces self-modification or self-creation. Thus, Colebrook further articulates that the 
ideal body requires two contrary elements: “A body must complete itself in order to 
maintain itself: it must not remain as some detached fragment but must be united or coupled 
with a world, open to what is not merely itself”.41 In Colebrook’s account of autopoiesis, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the body can be rethought in relation to the double 
                                           
37 Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 39.  
38 Keith Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze (New York: 
Routledge, 1999). Claire Colebrook, “Time and Autopoiesis: The Organism has no future”, Deleuze 
and the Body, eds. Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 
John Protevi, “Laval subjects, Atonomous Systems and E. Coli Chemotaxis”, Deleuze and the Body, 
eds. Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 
39 Colebrook, “Time and Autopoiesis”, 20.  
40 Ibid., 17.  
41 Ibid., 16-7. 
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movements of autopoiesis: self-maintained movement and the self’s openness to a world 
that is not itself. In this context, the conception of autopoiesis is considered as Deleuze’s 
concept of the self as a modification: the “self does not undergo modification, it is itself a 
modification—this term designating precisely the difference drawn”.42  
Deleuze’s conception of the body has an obvious relevance to the power of 
corporeal frailty. In his reading of Spinoza’s Ethics, Deleuze explains the body as a “mode” 
of complex relations:  
 
A body, of whatever kind, is defined by Spinoza in two 
simultaneous ways. In the first place, a body, however small it may be, 
is composed of an infinite number of particles; it is the relations of 
motion and rest, of speed and slowness between particles, that define a 
body, the individuality of a body. Secondly, a body affects other bodies, 
or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being 
affected that also defines a body in its individuality.43  
 
Deleuze’s definition of the body can be defined kinetically as a “composition of an infinite 
number of particles” in relation to “motion and rest” rather than its forms (such as being 
human or animal) or its organs. The body can also be defined dynamically as its affects and 
its capacities for affecting and being affected. Deleuze refers explicitly to the body in terms 
of affects produced in and by its encounter with other bodies. This is explored in my thesis 
in relation to the power of corporeal frailty in Coetzee’s novels. From this, the conception 
of affect and its characteristic of modification need to be clarified. By harnessing Spinoza’s 
definition of affects, Deleuze distinguishes affects or “feelings” (affectus) from affections 
                                           
42 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 79.  
43 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988), 123.  
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(affectio): “The affectio refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of 
the affecting body, whereas the affectus refers to the passage from one state to another, 
taking into account the correlative variation of the affecting bodies”.44 In other words, 
affections denotes an experience generated by the encounter between affecting bodies and 
between one’s own body, while affects refer to dynamic forces passaging through changing 
bodies. Thus, Deleuze asserts: “By affect I understand affections of the body by which the 
body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained. . . .  (Spinoza, 
Ethics, III, def.3)”. 45  As the dynamic passages between bodies, affects denote non-
personal or impersonal feeling or sensation, and this implies that we never comprehend 
affects but their effects in a way of affected experience between bodies. In this respect, the 
body is inextricably linked with its frailty, and it is this frailty which forces the body to 
become an affective and associative power.  
In order to explore Coetzee’s presentation of corporeal frailty, I will further 
consider Deleuze’s concept of corporeal frailty and its relations to affective and impersonal 
processes by focusing on the affective and associative characteristics of the body: the body 
without organs and the synthetic subject of time. Firstly, as I have explained earlier, the 
body involves the dynamic processes of composing and decomposing its parts or organs 
through its capacities to affect and be affected by other bodies. However, through 
suppressing its capacities, the body is regarded as an organism or organization of a whole 
that is given an identity in advance, for example, images of race, sexuality and species 
constituted in language and power (or social norms). In exploring ways of dissolving the 
organization of the body, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of the body without 
organs in opposition to the organism or the organizations of the body. In their work, A 
                                           




Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe the “body without organs” as one that 
is available for intensities or waves to pass through.46 The organization of the body binds 
us to the organism, its significance and subjectification, in such a way that the body is 
organized, articulated and interpreted. The body without organs is thereby related to 
dismantling its organism, signification, and subjectification, opening the body to 
connections that presuppose forces and affects as non-personality. There is another account 
of the body without organs in Deleuze and Guattari’s description of a masochist in A 
Thousand Plateaus: “the masochist has made himself a BwO [body without organs] under 
such conditions that the BwO can no longer be populated by anything but intensities of 
pain, pain waves”.47 Thus, Deleuze and Guattari describe the masochist as “a type of BwO 
that only pain can fill, or travel over”,48 as a rejection of the Freudian masochist that looks 
for pain in order to gain pleasure. Deleuze in his own work, The Logic of Sense, also 
describes how the body of a schizophrenic can be produced as an instance of the body 
without organs: “For the schizophrenic then, it is less a question of recovering meaning 
than of destroying the word, of conjuring up the affect, and of transforming the painful 
passion of the body into a triumphant action”.49 Through destroying words and losing their 
sense, the body becomes an intensive body, or the body without organs, which also 
indicates its relation to affects. This is relevant to the creation of language in literature 
through pushing back against the limit of subjectivity. This is not to say that Deleuze and 
Guattari deny the existence of organs such as the body, eye, ear, skin, etc., but rather that 
it opposes the organism of organs.50 In all the instances above, corporeal subjectivity 
                                           
46 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 153.  
47 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 152.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. 
Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 88.  
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implies the ability to intersect with other bodies through affects, when it is constituted as 
the body without organs.  
Secondly, according to Deleuze’s theory of time in Difference and Repetition, there 
are possible ways for the corporeal subject to connect to the past, opening to the future. 
Deleuze’s theory of time is synthetic, since the present contracts the past and the future 
upon it, which provides the subject with a reflection of its relations to multiple times. 
Deleuze’s assertion of a “passive self” with time indicates the essential condition of living 
things, which can generate changes over time. To put it another way, against the active 
syntheses of time based on thought and intention, Deleuze suggests the subject’s experience 
of multiple times in terms of the passive synthesis of time. As Henry Sussaman points out, 
Deleuze’s concept of the body “is not a corpus or a corpse but a marker or placeholder in 
an assemblage that would presume to encounter the temporality of flow”.51 Deleuze’s 
conception of the body affirms corporeal and incorporeal times, producing three passive 
syntheses that generate differences: habit (the living present), memory (the pure past) and 
the eternal return of difference (the future). The first passive synthesis of time generates 
habits by contracting present instances with past instances. The subject in time is passive 
and corporeal as a result of the thousands of habits, or contractions. Yet, at the same time, 
the “habit draws something new from repetition—namely difference”. 52  The second 
synthesis of time is a more profound synthesis of memory, which causes the present to pass 
and constitutes the “pure past” in time, or “memorial time”.53 The present is always split 
from itself in order to pass, which allows for the arrival of another present. Likewise, 
because of the passing present and its relation to the past, the synthesis of memory does not 
                                           
51 Henry Sussman, “Deterritorializing the Text: Flow-Theory and Deconstruction”, MLN, 115:5 
(December 2000), 982-3. 
52 Deluze, Difference and Repetition, 73.  
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simply recollect the past but rather undergoes a process of changing the past. In other words, 
memorial time is virtual, since it enables the coexistence of the passing present with the 
past. In doing so, the subject reflects the past or history in the present. James Williams 
explains that “History necessarily changes the past, not through some kind of subjective 
input that could be countered thanks to pure objectivity, but because the past only exists 
through processes in the present that make the past a changing event in the present”.54  
We can further consider how the third synthesis of time—the eternal return of the 
present—involves an impersonal and incessant process of becoming by expelling the 
visceral time of habit and the reflective time of memory. This third synthesis of time 
concerns only the future. The eternal return is not only related to the incessant return of 
difference, but it is about the death that it is not possible to die. Drawing on Maurice 
Blanchot’s theorization, Deleuze describes two aspects of death: the personal and the 
impersonal. “One is personal, concerning the I or the ego, something which I can confront 
in a struggle or meet at a limit, or in any case encounter in a present which causes everything 
to pass. The other is strangely impersonal, which has no relation to ‘me’, neither present 
nor past but always coming, the source of an incessant multiple adventure in a persistent 
question”.55 The latter is concerned with death as the eternal return of difference, of which 
subjectivity is not part. Thus, Deleuze says that “there is always a ‘one dies’ more profound 
than ‘I die’”.56 The impersonal death cannot be considered as a return of living beings to 
“an indifferent inanimate matter”, but rather it is present in the living in the pure form of 
time.57 William explains this: “Death is in the pure form of time as it makes all forms of 
the same perish”. In this context, as Williams asserts, the relation between death and life 
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cannot be separated: “Deleuze counters any definition of death as negation or opposition: 
death is not against life, it is in life. Death isn’t non-being, it is being”.58 From this, 
Deleuze’s theory of three passive syntheses of time provides the subject with multiple 
opportunities to transform the past and open the future into the present. This enables the 
subject to interact with the Other in the personal and impersonal dimensions of life and 
death.   
The characteristics of inorganic, affective and synthetic corporeality in Deleuze’s 
theory can be distinguished from the conceptions of contemporary critical theorists such as 
Judith Butler 59 and Jacques Derrida60. Specifically, Butler asserts that corporeality exists 
‘outside’ discourse, as the body is “constitutive” and “performative”—produced by social 
norms and language. 61 For his part, Derrida attests that corporeality is divided ‘within’ 
and by “openness to the other”.62 As Martin Hägglund observes, corporeality “divided 
within” is associated with Derrida’s conception of “autoimmunity”: “His notion of 
autoimmunity spells out that everything is threatened from within itself, since the 
possibility of living is inseparable from the peril of dying”.63 Catherine Malabou relates 
this to “heteroaffection” found in Derrida’s theory. According to Malabou, Derrida admits 
“an unmovable autoaffective dimension of subjectivity” since the subject is affected and 
altered by itself. 64  Yet, as Malabou details, Derrida’s theory of subjectivity can be 
understood as “heteroaffection” rather than “auto-affection”. “Heteroaffection”, 
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accordingly to Malabou, means “the affect of the other”, “in the double sense that (1) the 
one who is affected in me is always the other in me, the unknown “me” in me, a dimension 
of my subjectivity that I don’t know and don’t perceive, and that (2) what affects me is 
always somebody other than myself, something else than the feeling of my ownness”.65 In 
the sense of ‘heteroaffection”, Derrida’s concept of subjectivity is affected and altered 
through his own otherness within himself. Malabou thereby proclaims that “There is always 
a third term, unknown instance between me and myself” in Derrida’s theory.66 The third 
term refers to difference within subjectivity: “The difference that lies at the heart of the ‘I’ 
is the difference between me and an ‘intruder’, the other of me in me, ‘the heart of the 
other’”.67 This space of difference in Derrida’s theory leads the subject to an ethics of the 
Other by opening to the Other. In this regard, there is an affinity between Derrida and 
Deleuze in their later works, via the concept of life that opens to auto-affection or hetero-
affection. 68  However, Butler’s and Derrida’s radical theories of corporeality are still 
trapped within the distinction between language and corporeality and between the subject 
and the Other. Additionally, Derrida’s thought of “divided within” embodies a 
transcendental dimension beyond our experience and knowledge.69 Compared to Butler’s 
and Derrida’s theories, Deleuze’s conception of corporeality engages with the non-organic 
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and collective forces of the body without involving dualistic negation or dialectical 
materialism.70  
A range of political and ethical readings of Coetzee’s works has been taken up in 
the fields of literature and philosophy. These include: Nadine Gordimer (body politics), 
Gayatri Spivak (marginality), David Attwell (situational metafiction) and Paul Patton 
(becoming-minority). 71  Ethical approaches to Coetzee’s works have also been 
conceptualised by Derek Attridge (unlimited responsibility), Cary Wolfe (exposures), 
Chris Danta (sacrifice) and Mike Marais (hospitality).72 These commentators, who focus 
on ethical reading on Coetzee’s works, draw on the theoretical writings of Levinas and 
Derrida, and address the body in terms of its relationship with an “Otherness” located in a 
transcendental position or else as a “traumatic or “internally split subject” 73  divided 
between itself and a demand for the Other. However, although these ethical and political 
readings of Coetzee’s works have undoubtedly been illuminating and influential, their 
approaches to Coetzee’s corporeality have focused on the relationship between the 
colonizer and the colonized or the subject and the Other. When one considers Coetzee’s 
later novels from Slow Man (2005) onward, it is noteworthy that issues of corporeality 
relating to animals, the dying body, physical disability and life have received a greater 
focus than the foregrounding of the body politicized and historicized in (post)colonial 
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contexts. Recently, Brian May (featureless body)74, Laura Wright (performance of the 
body)75 and Alice Hall (physical disability)76 have problematized the representation of the 
body in Coetzee’s works by narrating the transpositions of corporeal subjectivity rather 
than its fixed positions concerning sexuality, race and species. However, neither of these 
approaches has sufficiently dealt with Coetzee’s presentation of the affective and 
associative power of corporeal frailty. My thesis attempts to articulate how Deleuze’s 
conception of corporeal frailty breaks the Otherness of the body and the Other, and thereby 
offers the potential to view the body as a dynamic entity, characterized by self-affection 
and synthesis. Specifically, drawing on Deleuze’s theories of “masochism”, “exhaustion”, 
“impersonality”, “the sublime”, “meat”, “sympathetic imagination” and “becoming”, this 
thesis attempts to articulate how Deleuze’s theories highlight the body’s dynamic 
relationship with the affective and collective processes of corporeal frailty.  
To investigate the encounter between Deleuze and Coetzee, my thesis concentrates 
on six areas. In the first chapter, through Deleuze’s conceptions of “pain and masochism”, 
I will examine the flow of pain between the colonizer and the colonized in Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1980). The pain of the barbarians marks the limit to which the colonizer is 
capable of sharing the pain of the victims. In this context, I will assert that, rather than 
experiencing abstractive guilt or pity, the Magistrate becomes a masochist through his own 
torture and humiliation, which resembles that experienced by the barbarians. The 
Magistrate’s experience of torture and humiliation forces him to dismantle his subjectivity 
as the colonizer. In turn, I will demonstrate that the Magistrate becomes neither the 
colonizer nor the colonized, but rather a nomad.  
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In the second chapter, I will investigate the eponymous protagonist’s escape from 
his subjectivity as the racial and socio-economic Other in Life & Times of Michael K (1983) 
in terms of Deleuze’s theory of “movement-image” and “exhaustion”. K continues to be 
confined in camps because he is recognized as his representative image, or the Other in 
South Africa. However, K endlessly escapes from the camps and also refuses to eat food. 
In this context, I will explore how his refusal to eat exhausts the logic of the apartheid 
regime and thereby enables him to regain his movement. Ultimately, I will demonstrate the 
ways in which K’s movements and refusals force him to transform his physical deformity 
into the imperceptible in Deleuze’s sense.  
The third chapter will explore the interactions between personal and social illness 
in Coetzee’s Age of Iron (1990) in terms of Deleuze’s conceptions of “illness” and “the 
impersonal death”. Apartheid South Africa is described as a dying country in which the 
police massacre young black revolutionaries, but white people are not capable of 
empathizing with the suffering of black people. Thus, I will examine how Mrs. Curren’s 
experience of dying and ageing embodies a process of dis-identification with her position 
as a white liberal humanitarian and thereby enables her to develop an inter-subjective 
relationship with black people in the dimension of impersonal death.   
The fourth chapter will examine how the suspended mourning in The Master of 
Petersburg (1994) creates interactions between the mourner and the dead in terms of 
Derrida’s theory of “impossible mourning”. Resting on Derrida’s perspective, the role of 
ethical mourning is to preserve both the memory and the alterity of the Other. In this regard, 
I will investigate how Dostoevsky’s mourning of his dead stepson is impossible, and how 
this marks him as a representative of the living-dead, a position that dissolves his self. Thus, 
instead of focusing on the “Otherness” of the dead Pavel as a transcendental position, this 
chapter attempts to illustrate the intersections between the mourner and the dead in the form 
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of betrayal in their memories. I will engage with this, through exploring the affinity 
between Derrida’s and Deleuze’s theories. In doing so, I will produce a reading, which is 
different from those of Attridge and Marais.  
In the fifth chapter, I will examine the protagonist David Lurie’s decline and 
transformation in post-apartheid South Africa, in Coetzee’s novel, Disgrace (1999), 
through Žižek’s and Deleuze’s theories of the “sublime”. Analysing the limitation of 
Lurie’s literary imagination in the changed world, I will examine his experience of sublime 
sensation of formless fear by the violent attack by black Africans. Drawing on Žižek’s work, 
I will explore how Lurie’s traumatic experience gradually produces its ridiculous effect, 
recognizing the affinity between his sexual exploitation of Melanie and the black men’s 
rape of his daughter, Lucy. Ultimately, I will examine how Lurie becomes inhuman by 
interacting with the suffering of animals in a Deleuzian sense of the sublime.  
In the sixth chapter, I will investigate the configuration of self-differentiating 
difference as suggested in The Lives of Animals (1999) and Elizabeth Costello (2003) in 
terms of Deleuze’s accounts of “sympathy”, “imagination” and “becoming”. The 
protagonist Elizabeth Costello, in her lectures, refers to the limit of our sympathetic 
imagination to think of animals, whilst creating a controversial analogy between the 
extermination of the Jews and animals. From Costello’s debatable remark, I will examine 
how her analogy and sympathetic imagination enable her to generate corporeal interactions 
between humans and animals. Additionally, I will show how Costello’s sympathetic 
imaginative engagement with Kafka’s ape, Red Peter, provides her with a self-
differentiating difference, or becoming-inhuman. As a result, I will demonstrate how 
Coetzee minoritizes the major configurations of literature, through the figurative character 
of Costello.  
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Subsequently, my thesis will explore how a Coetzean and Deleuzian vision of 
corporeal frailty neither involves an insurmountable binary opposition between 
corporeality and language or between weakness and health, nor assumes a dialectical 
materialism that is achieved by corporeality or materialism, via constantly changing 
processes in the ethical and political contexts in which it engages. The role of corporeal 
frailty in both Coetzee’s and Deleuze’s works is rather to affirm its weakness and pain as 
an affective and associative power in (post)colonial circumstances. Thus, I will argue that, 
by escaping from the ethical and political logics of sacrifice and trauma, Coetzee’s and 
Deleuze’s notions of corporeal frailty unfold multiple transfigurations of the subjectivity 
in their interconnections with the Other in a cognitive mode and thereby trigger new ethical, 









In J.M. Coetzee’s novel, Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), an undetermined 
Empire seeks to conquer new territory during an unspecified time period. The narrator, a 
Magistrate, lives an idle and quiet life, waiting for his retirement at the outpost. However, 
once the interrogator, Colonel Joll of the Third Bureau, visits the outpost following a 
rumour of the barbarians’ impending threat, the frontier becomes imbued with the suffering 
and humiliation of the barbarians. The barbarians, as “nomads”, “pastoralists”, and “tent-
dwellers”,1 used to move across the frontier, but their bodies are now relentlessly confined 
and tortured by Colonel Joll. Evoked here is a figuration of the barbarians as the enemy of 
the Empire. The technique of torture is thereby effectively used to colonize the barbarians 
at the outpost by constructing a visible boundary between the bodies of the colonizer and 
the colonized. The act of torture, conducted by the infliction of violence on the body, is 
built into the dichotomy of pain between them. As Elaine Scarry remarks in her work, The 
Body in Pain, pain is characterized by “unsharability”, since “physical pain has no voice”.2 
Yet, torture, which inflicts pain on a prisoner, aims to make the pain visible, while 
producing the victim’s scream. As Scarry argues, the visibility of pain, during the act of 
                                           
1 J.M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians (London: Vintage Books, 1980), 16.  
2 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 3.  
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torture, entails a sense of incommunicability between the torturer and the prisoner.3 In 
contrast to Scarry’s theory, Deleuze conceptualizes pain in terms of the interactions 
between bodies. In this chapter, drawing on Scarry’s theory of torture, I will, on the one 
hand, explore how torture provides a foundation for the Empire to colonize the barbarians 
by denying their pain. On the other hand, I will also examine how the Magistrate, in a 
Deleuzian view of masochism, becomes a masochist affected by the pain of the barbarians, 
and in the process transforms into a new man.      
The novel, according to Susan VanZanten Gallagher, provides an “allegorical 
landscape that loosely suggests the Roman Empire on the verge of collapse but undoubtedly 
points to South Africa today”.4 Despite the allegorical description of the novel, this state-
approved torture is explicitly related to the brutal reality of apartheid in 1970s South 
Africa.5 Coetzee, in an interview, describes Waiting for the Barbarians as a novel about 
“the impact of the torture chamber on the life of a man of consciousness”.6 Coetzee goes 
on to note that “torture has exerted a dark fascination on many other South African writers” 
and explains the reasons why:  
 
                                           
3 Ibid., 27.  
4 Susan VanZantern Gallagher, “Torture and the Novel: J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians”, 
Contemporary Literature, 29:2 (Summer, 1988), 281.  
5  Susan VanZanten Gallagher, A Story of South Africa: J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction in Context 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 112-3. As Gallagher describes: “Ever since the 
National Party gained control in 1948, there have been accusations of state-sponsored torture in 
South Africa. But the public outcry and debate over the issue of torture reached new heights in the 
late 1970s. At that time the issue of torture in South Africa filled public discourse of all kinds—from 
government reports to protest poems, from United Nations declarations to novels” (112). Gallagher 
further explains that the spark igniting the discourse concerning torture was the “death of Stephen 
Biko”, a young leader of the Black Consciousness. After the “Soweto uprising in June 1976, unrest 
spread throughout South Africa townships” (112). During the sixteen months of the Soweto uprising, 
almost 1,000 school pupils were shot by police, and the majority of protesters and many leaders of 
the Black Consciousness movement were arrested. Among the arresters, Biko died mysteriously 
after a month in detention (113).  
6 J.M. Coetzee, “Into the Dark Chamber: The Writer and the South African State”, Doubling The 




The first is that relations in the torture room provide a metaphor, 
bare and extreme, for relations between authoritarianism and its victims. 
In the torture room, unlimited force is exerted upon the physical being 
of an individual in a twilight of legal illegality, with the purpose, if not 
of destroying him, then at least of destroying the kernel of resistance 
within him.7  
 
Thus, torture and the torture chamber that Coetzee describes epitomize the strategy of 
apartheid, which seeks to produce and perform the pain of tortured victims, through the 
extreme polarity between the oppressor and the victim. In the South African contexts, 
Coetzee evokes the inability of writers to fully represent the victims’ suffering and 
destruction at the hands of the torturers.  
In the novel, like Coetzee’s confession surrounding the dark fascination with the 
torture room, the Magistrate as a first-person narrator becomes interested in what happens 
between the torturer Joll and the tortured barbarians in the prison. The Magistrate tries to 
witness and interpret the events related to torture. The truth surrounding the torture room 
thus occurs in the complex relationship between torturers, victims and witnesses. However, 
this novel is not merely a story of the Magistrate’s witnessing and testimony, but of his 
experience of torture and humiliation, like that experienced by the barbarians. The 
Magistrate’s indirect perception of torture thus shifts into his own experience of it. Within 
this context, my purpose is to trace the different ways in which torture impacts on the 
barbarians and the Magistrate respectively. I seek to trace the different processes by which 
the barbarians and the Magistrate become the victims of violence in the Empire. From René 
Girard’s perspective, a mechanism of sacrificial victimhood is evident in the victimhood of 
the barbarians. According to Girard, “The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community 
                                           
7 Coetzee, “Into the Dark Chamber”, 363.  
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from its own violence; it prompts the entire community to choose victims outside itself. 
The elements of dissension scattered throughout the community are drawn to the person of 
the sacrificial victim and eliminated, at least temporarily, by its sacrifice”.8 As Girard 
emphasizes, sacrifice is regarded as an act of violence inflicted on a surrogate victim, when 
violence threatens the community. The function of the sacrificial ritual is, as Girard insists, 
to “‘purify’ violence; that is to ‘trick’ violence into spending itself on victims whose death 
will provoke no reprisals”. 9  In Girard’s account, the barbarians become symbols of 
victimhood, as a means of helping the Empire to release its own violence without triggering 
a reprisal. In this way, while I argue that the barbarians are constructed as surrogate victims 
in order to produce a difference between the barbarians and the Empire, I will also trace 
the Magistrate’s empathy with the barbarians, which he achieves by denying and 
eliminating his likeness to the Empire and its violence. Yet, it is important to note that I am 
focusing on the denied pain of the barbarians and the Magistrate’s transformation into a 
masochist or “a new Man”10 through their suffering, drawing on the Deleuzian sense of 
masochism, rather than focusing on Girard’s concepts of sacrifice and scapegoats, which 
necessarily depend on physical violence as a means of resolving the violence of the Empire.  
Concerning the mechanism of victimhood, it is necessary to articulate the 
relationship between the torture, conducted by the bio-power of the Empire in the novel, 
and the pain of the victims, constructed through the technique of torture. Torture relies on 
the discrepancy between the torturer and the victim, and as a primary physical act, it inflicts 
pain on bodies. Yet, torture as a politics of pain displays the pain of the victim to 
demonstrate a spectacle of power in a Foucauldian sense. 11  Scarry characterizes the 
                                           
8 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1979), 8.  
9 Ibid., 36.  
10 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 100 
11 Foucault explains the technique of torture and its relation to a spectacle of power: “The term 
‘penal torture’ does not cover any corporal punishment: it is a differentiated production of pain, an 
39 
 
visibility of the pain produced by torture in terms of three dimensions:  
 
First, pain is inflicted on a person in ever-intensifying ways. 
Second, the pain, continuously amplified within the person’s body, is 
also amplified in the sense that it is objectified, made visible to those 
outside the person’s body. Thirdly, the objectified pain is denied as pain 
and read as power, a translation made possible by the obsessive 
mediation of agency.12  
 
In this regard, the physical pain of the tortured is simultaneously visible and denied, which 
results in the pain being translated as the power of the Empire. The enormity of the victim’s 
pain thus maximizes the discrepancy between the torturer and the tortured.   
Another mechanism through which the pain of the tortured is denied is found in the 
process of making invisible the pain of the victim, as evidenced in the torturer’s 
interrogation. This conflation of pain and interrogation inevitably occurs in part because 
the torturer and the prisoner each experience them as opposites. As Scarry explains:  
 
For the torturers, the sheer and simple fact of human agony is 
made invisible, and the moral fact of inflicting that agony is made neutral 
by the feigned urgency and significance of the question. For the prisoner, 
the sheer, simple, overwhelming fact of this agony will make neutral and 
invisible significance of any question as well as the significance of the 
world to which the question refers.13  
 
                                           
organized ritual for the marking of victims and the expression of the power that punishes; not the 
expression of a legal system driven to exasperation and, forgetting its principles, losing all restraint. 
In the ‘excesses’ of torture, a whole economy of power is invested” (34-5). Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979).  
12 Scarry, The Body in Pain, 28.  
13 Ibid., 29.  
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In this way, the interrogation of the torturer occurs alongside the intense pain of the prisoner, 
which makes the visible pain of the victim invisible. The confession of the tortured victim 
is, according to Scarry, “falsified by an idiom built on the word ‘betrayal’: in confession, 
one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world—friend, family, cause—that the self 
is made up of”.14 As Scarry observes, the inappropriateness of this idiom is accounted for 
in the prisoner’s feeling of “absence” in the world. In this sense, Scarry claims that “intense 
pain is world-destroying”,15 and occurs alongside the dissolution of the self. In short, 
physical and verbal acts of torture destroy the self and world of the victim, whilst denying 
his/her pain.   
Despite Scarry’s insightful reflections on the mechanism of torture and its relation 
to denied pain, it is necessary to question whether the denied pain can affect the torturer 
and other people, since pain is transferable between bodies. In the novel, the torturer, Joll, 
denies the pain of the barbarian prisoners, but the Magistrate becomes empathetic towards 
the victims and eventually experiences their victimhood, humiliation and torture. As such, 
an important question arises: how is the Magistrate as the oppressor able to empathize with 
his victims and how is his attitude to be distinguished from the torturer Joll? Drawing on 
Deleuze’s conception of the body, it can be argued that the Magistrate’s body interacts with 
the pain of the victim instead of his morality, since the body is capable of affecting and 
being affected by other bodies.16 In light of a Deleuzian theory of the body, the pain of the 
tortured, as an integral element can be intensively transformed into the bodies of other 
people and even animals. The pain of the Other, in Deleuzian ethics, is not just a negative 
passion that the subject should avoid, but could be seen as an act of exchange, or as a 
                                           
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light 
Books, 1988), 123.  
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commonality with the body of the subject. In this context, Rosi Braidotti highlights that 
pain, in a Deleuzian theory, is premised on the “conditions of possibility of ethical 
transformation”, which is clearly “an antithesis of the Kantian moral imperative to avoid 
pain or to view pain as the obstacle of moral behavior”. 17  Basing his idea on the 
transformation of pain, Deleuze proposes the possibility of resisting the bio-power that 
abstracts and denies the pain of victims.  
Nevertheless, Deleuze does not insist that pain always enables us to resist bio-power. 
Through the spiritualization and internalization of pain, pain could be reconfigured as “pain 
transformed into feeling of guilt, fear and punishment”.18 In relation to Deleuze’s criticism 
of spiritualized pain, Branka Arsić explains that “the translation of pain into the feeling of 
guilt (‘second masochism’) is its becoming metaphor”.19 This feeling of guilt, as Arsić 
expresses, has a strong relation with the Freudian conception of “moral masochism”, by 
which masochists do not suffer their symptoms but enjoy their suffering.20 In a Freudian 
account, a masochist can be considered to enjoy his pain as an act of self-punishment rather 
than as a method of empathizing with the corporeal pain of the sufferer. Thus, instead of 
moral masochism, it is important to reflect on a corporeal way of empathizing with the pain 
of the tortured.  
Yet, an important question remains: in what ways can one experience a sense of 
empathy with the pain of the tortured? Deleuze’s conception of sensation, defined as the 
vital power of rhythms and forces produced by the subject’s synthesis of sensation, is a 
useful concept to draw on in attempting to answer this question. Sensation is a bodily 
                                           
17 Rosi Braidotti, “Nomadic Ethics,” The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, eds. Daniel W. Smith 
and Henry Somers-Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 189.  
18  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Huge Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 129.  
19 Branka Arsić, “The Rhythm of Pain: Freud, Deleuze, Derrida”, Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis, 
ed. Gabriele Schwab (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 146.  
20 Ibid., 142-4.  
42 
 
process and is intensively transmitted to the body of the Other, rather than being represented 
by a concept. Thus, sensation also aggregates variations, because it is “in direct contact 
with a vital power that exceeds every domain and traverses them all”.21 Deleuze describes 
this power as a “rhythm,” such as “diastole-systole”: “the world that seizes me by closing 
in around me, the self that opens to the world and opens the world itself”.22 In terms of 
Deleuze’s conception of sensation, the body of the subject accesses and aggregates the pain 
of the Other without the abstraction and representation of pain. In Deleuze’s view of 
masochism, this can be linked to a masochist’s pain of transforming into a great wave of 
pain, one that affects people regardless of time and place, like “the wave of Cain, wanderer, 
whose destiny is forever suspended, mixes times and places”, through his own experience 
of suffering.23  
In this chapter, the blockage and flow of pain between the oppressor and the tortured 
victim will be investigated by focusing on the Magistrate’s transformation into a masochist. 
Firstly, by exploring Scarry’s insights on torture and its relation to pain, I will examine how 
both physical torture and verbal interrogation deny the pain of the tortured barbarians, 
producing their pain as an abstractive and calculated object in the process of colonization. 
Secondly, by examining various scholars’ discussions of the Magistrate’s position as a 
liberal humanist, I will investigate how the Magistrate’s limitation forces a disjunction with 
his likeness to the colonizer. Thirdly, drawing on Deleuze’s concept of masochism, I will 
examine how the Magistrate’s suspended pain creates a great wave of pain in a community. 
This is accompanied by his transformation into a free man through his suffering, rather than 
remaining a subject entangled with the consciousness of his guilt.    
                                           
21 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 37.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Gilles Deleuze, “Re-Presentation of Masoch”, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 





II. The tortured body and its denied pain 
 
In order to examine the blockage of pain between the colonizer and the colonized, 
it is necessary to reflect on the mechanism through which the pain of the tortured is denied 
in the process of colonization. The frontier in the novel is a site that demonstrates the 
biopolitics of the Empire, which exerts sovereign power over the lives of the barbarians 
through the technology of torture. In Giorgio Agamben’s view, the Empire politicizes the 
barbarians as “bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and 
yet not sacrificed” in the process of producing their bodies as the enemy of the Empire.24 
As the colonial territory of the Empire, the frontier is relatively quiet under the 
administration of the Magistrate. The sentry is asleep at the gate and no prison exists at the 
outpost, since, from the Magistrate’s perspective, there is not much crime. Yet, Colonel 
Joll’s arrival at the frontier transforms its lazy and quiet landscape into a space of fear 
fraught with the tortured barbarians and their anguish. My contention here is that, through 
pain, Colonel Joll’s torture demarcates and strengthens the opposition between the bodies 
of the colonizers and the barbarians, which has been obscured at the frontier. Thus, I will 
examine how the pain of the tortured barbarians becomes diametrically divergent from that 
of the colonizers, which reduces their bodies to images of brutality.  
At the frontier, a division exists between the officials of the Empire and the 
barbarians, but there are also the settlers, who are distinguishable from the barbarians, since 
they are nomads. Before Joll’s arrival at the outpost, the barrier between the settlers and the 
                                           
24 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8.  
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barbarians is not clearly drawn in the dimensions of practice and discourse. In relation to 
the issue of this barrier, Sue Kossew describes the “paradoxes and ambivalence involved 
in the colonizer/colonized relationship” in the novel, by referring to the theme of the pre-
text, C.P. Cavafy’s poem of the same title.25 From Kossew’s perspective, the boundary 
between the colonizer and the colonized, or the Empire and the barbarians, cannot be drawn 
distinctively, but their relationship is rather ambivalent and paradoxical, as shown in both 
the novel and the poem. It is, according to Kossew, evident in the way that “the poem, like 
the novel, explores the self-justifying myth of potential invasion by ‘barbarians’ which is 
used by the Empire to maintain credibility”.26 Kossew goes on to argue: “The fact that the 
threat does not materialize leads to ‘uneasiness’ and ‘confusion’, and the last two lines of 
the poem encapsulate the paradox: ‘And now, what will become of us without barbarians? 
/ They were a kind of solution’”.27 The myth of the invasion, as Kossew states, is neither 
realized in the novel nor in the poem, which implies an ambivalence in the relationship 
between the colonizer and the colonized. The borderline between the Empire and 
barbarians is not merely ambivalent, but is also necessary to demonstrate the paradox at the 
heart of the Empire’s functioning. In essence, the Empire constitutes itself by harnessing 
the opposite concept to the barbarians, which equates to the Hegelian dialectic of the master 
and the slave. On the other hand, in Agamben’s view of the relationship between bare and 
political life, the Empire separates and opposes its own barbarous aspects at the same time 
as it maintains itself in relation to the barbarians through an “inclusive exclusion”.28 In this 
way, a decisive binary opposition does not exist between the civilized and the savages at 
the frontier, but rather an ambivalent relationship exists between the cultures of the Empire 
                                           
25  Sue Kossew, Pen and Power: A Post-Colonial Reading of J.M. Coetzee and André Brink 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 86. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. See Lois Parkinson Zamora, “Allegories of Power in the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee”, Journal 
of Literary Studies 2:1 (March), 1-14.  
28 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8.  
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and the nomads. Yet, the discourse of the barbarians and their threat is used to establish this 
dichotomy. The rumour of barbarian unrest and a potential attack is prevalent among the 
settlers, but the Magistrate cannot identify it. Thus, he asserts: “Show me a barbarian army 
and I will believe” (9).  
Similarly, the point of my inquiry is the process of differentiating between the pain 
of the colonizer and the colonized. I also seek to question how the pain is ignored and 
denied by other people like the Magistrate, soldiers and settlers. The Magistrate’s and 
Colonel Joll’s attitudes towards the barbarians’ suffering are quite different. In the past, 
having encouraged commerce between groups of nomads and settlers, the Magistrate felt 
pity towards the barbarian victims. In contrast to the Magistrate, Colonel Joll instead 
inflicts a bloody attack and torture on the barbarians as a pretext for defending the Empire 
against their potential threat. Joll’s dark glasses symbolically demarcate the boundary 
between the colonizer and the barbarians: “The discs are dark, they look opaque from the 
outside, but he can see through them. He tells me they are a new invention. ‘They protect 
one’s eyes against the glare of the sun’, he says” (1). The opaqueness of the Empire from 
the outside indicates Joll’s blindness to the pain of the barbarians. Yet, the Magistrate has 
never seen dark glasses like these at the outpost, which is reflected in Joll’s words: “At 
home everyone wears them” (1). In this regard, Colonel Joll’s dark glasses signify a 
blockage in his sympathy for the barbarians.  
The barrier between Colonel Joll and the barbarians is explicitly related to his 
torturing of them. In the novel, a raid occurs during which animals are stolen, before 
Colonel Joll’s arrival at the frontier. As the Magistrate explains, “this so called banditry 
does not amount to much” (4). As a result of the raid, the old man and the sick boy, as 
barbarians, are picked up and are imprisoned in the storeroom by the Magistrate. However, 
Colonel Joll brutally tortures the two prisoners, even though they insist on their innocence 
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concerning the raid. The old man dies and his tortured corpse becomes deformed. The 
brutality of torture is pictorially described: “The grey beard is caked with blood. The lips 
are crushed and drawn back, the teeth are broken. One eye is rolled back, the other eye-
socket is a bloody hole” (7). The boy’s face is puffy and bruised, while one eye is swollen 
shut. The tortured bodies of the old man and the boy accordingly become deformed and 
dehumanized. Thus, the pain of the tortured prisoners is visible, but the torturer Joll does 
not show any pity towards the victims.  
Drawing on Scarry’s theory, we can specify the processes through which Colonel 
Joll denies the pain of the two prisoners. As I mentioned earlier, Scarry explains that torture 
consists of a physical act—the infliction of pain, and a verbal act—the interrogation. Based 
on the great discrepancy between the colonizer and the colonized, Colonel Joll inflicts pain 
on the prisoners and makes their pain and wounds visible. The prisoners’ agony is made 
invisible and neutral through Colonel Joll’s interrogation as an act of torture. Based on his 
belief that “Pain is truth: all else is subject to doubt” (5), Colonel Joll produces and 
interprets the pain of the victims. However, Colonel Joll’s belief in the connection between 
truth and pain, from the Magistrate’s perspective, seems doubtful, since Colonel Joll reads 
the pain of the barbarians as a metaphor rather than as a sensation. It is evident that the 
barbarian boy is compelled to make a confession concerning his clan’s involvement in the 
raid, following which Colonel Joll and the soldiers take and torture more barbarians. Yet, 
the barbarians are, from the Magistrate’s view, fishing people who live on the bank of the 
river, and appear to have no relation to “thieves, bandits, invaders of the Empire” (18). 
Moreover, being transformed into a piece of dead flesh through Colonel Joll’s torture, the 
victim is not able to resist the torturer and instead experiences Scarry’s assertion of 
“betrayal” and “world-destroying”. Regardless of its truth, the boy’s confession betrays his 
people and brings about his own dissolution. Doubting the boy’s confession, the Magistrate 
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tells him:  
 
“They say you have admitted that you and the old man and other men 
from your clan have stolen sheep and horses. You have said that the men of 
your clan are arming themselves, that in the spring you are all going to join 
in a great work what this confession of your will mean?” (11).  
 
In the Magistrate’s account, through losing his power to resist against the torture, the boy 
is forced to falsify his confession concerning the raid. The conflation of interrogation and 
torture is thus involved in the process of denying the victims’ pain and of destroying their 
world.     
However, it is important to question whether torture might prevent the possibility 
of a barbarian attack. Concerning this possibility, it is useful to rethink Slavoj Žižek’s 
discussion of Sam Harris’s defense of torture. In his work, The End of Faith (2005), Harris 
argues that “we run the risk of advertently killing far greater numbers of innocent men, 
women, and children”, but that “the misapplication of torture should be far less troubling 
to us than collateral damage”.29 In these words, Harris’s belief is clearly shown: the pain 
inflicted on a large numbers of people should be counted as more valuable than the pain of 
a few innocent victims. This utilitarian ethics of pain is applicable to Joll’s torture, although 
the rumour of the barbarians’ raid seems unreliable. In the Magistrate’s view, the rumor is 
more like an episode of “hysteria” (9) surrounding the barbarians, which is deeply ingrained 
in the cultural imaginary, since the colonizer has never seen a barbarian army. However, 
this utilitarian ethics of pain is caught in what Žižek calls “a kind of ethical illusion”. The 
settlers’ and soldiers’ ignorance of the barbarian victims, according to Žižek, is grounded 
in “our abstract knowledge of mass suffering” instead of our instinctive reactions to 
                                           
29 Sam Harris, The End of Faith (New York: Norton, 2005), 194.  
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“witnessing the torture or suffering of an individual with our own eyes”.30 From Žižek’s 
vantage point, there is a profound gap between the abstractive knowledge of and the 
witnessing of the victims’ reaction to their suffering. Thus, based on the abstractive 
calculation of mass suffering, the pain of the tortured barbarians is denied by the soldiers 
and the settlers.  
Nevertheless, we should think of a crucial outcome arising from Žižek’s criticism 
of torture. According to Žižek, torture eventually leads to “the abolition of the dimension 
of the Neighbour”: “The tortured subject is no longer a Neighbour, but an object whose 
pain is neutralized, reduced to a property that has to be dealt with in a rational utilitarian 
calculus (so much pain is tolerable if it prevents a much greater amount of pain)”.31 In this 
way, the pain of the tortured could be viewed as a minor act of cruelty within the biopolitics 
of the Empire. Concerning this issue, we can question why the barbarians are regarded as 
the enemy of the Empire. In fact, it is important to consider that there is no reasoning given 
for why the nomads are regarded as barbarians, other than the fact that their nomadic life 
is distinguished from that of the settlers at the frontier. In addition, by trading with these 
settlers, the barbarians rather “fall victims to the guile of shopkeepers, exchanging their 
goods for trinkets, lying drunk in the gutter” (41). They become beggars and vagrants on 
the fringe of the town, thus “confirming thereby the settler’ litany of prejudice: that 
barbarians are lazy, immoral filthy, stupid” (41). As the Magistrate observes, the barbarians’ 
virtues become “corrupted” by the settlers, who render them dependent. The barbarians can 
be regarded as what Žižek calls the “neighbours”, as settlers who can sometimes be 
contacted at the borders of the Empire.  
However, Joll’s inscription of the word ‘enemy’ on the barbarians’ backs whilst 
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being watched by spectators, literally demarcates the distance between the barbarians and 
the settlers: “The Colonel steps forward. Stooping over each prisoner in turn he rubs a 
handful of dust into his naked back and writes a word with s stick of charcoal. I read the 
words upside down: ENEMY … ENEMY … ENEMY … ENEMY (115)”. The tortured 
barbarians are excluded from the community of humans (like the settlers with “rich inner 
life filled with personal stories”), and are ultimately produced as the bodies of strangers or 
enemies vulnerable to violence. Subsequently, possible connections between the settlers 
and the barbarians are broken, and the barbarians are reduced to objects to be dealt with 
using “a rational calculus”. Without sympathy, the settlers watch the suffering of the 
barbarians with a sense of sadistic pleasure. Amongst the settlers, the Magistrate watches 
the eyes of a little girl:  
 
Her eyes are round, her thumb is in her mouth: silent, terrified, 
curious, she drinks in the sight of these big naked men being beaten. On 
every face around me, even those that are smiling, I see the same 
expression: not hatred, not bloodlust, but a curiosity so intense that their 
bodies are drained by it and only their eyes live, organs of a new and 
ravening appetite. (115) 
 
When tired of the beating, the soldiers give their canes to bystanders and a girl comes to 
beat the barbarians: “She lifts the cane, brings it down smartly on the prisoner’s buttocks, 
drops it, and scuttles to safety to a roar of applause” (116). In this way, the division between 
the bodies of the settlers and barbarian victims is made visible through torture, which 
renders the pain of the victims invisible. The tortured barbarians are reduced to inhuman 
bodies, ones that can no longer be neighbours of the settlers. In this regard, the settlers, as 
if they are torturers, are not able to feel pity for the tortured, which leads to their denial of 
the pain of the tortured. In this context, the colonization of the Empire is processed by 
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inflicting pain on the barbarians, followed by producing their bodies as the visible enemies.   
 
   
III. The limits of liberal humanism  
 
In contrast to the apathy of Colonel Joll, the soldiers and the settlers, the Magistrate 
is continuously conscious of the barbarians’ vulnerability. The Magistrate’s pity towards 
the barbarians is generated by his liberal humanism rather than his political position. The 
Magistrate’s humanism makes his position oscillate between that of the colonizer and that 
of the victims. Nevertheless, the Magistrate is not able to understand their languages and 
nomadic life, which drives him to interpret their nomadic culture through the use of the 
imagination. This is explicitly shown by the Magistrate’s hobby, archaeology, involving the 
excavation of ruins and the interpretation of fragments of maps that remain from olden 
times. He also lays out the characters and imagines various combinations and arrangements 
(17). In this distance between the Magistrate and the barbarians, my question here is 
concerned with to what extent the Magistrate’s positioning between the torturer and the 
barbarians, enables him to be affected by and to empathize with the pain of the victims. I 
will argue that the Magistrate’s pity for the victims provides him with a force to escape his 
position as a colonizer.  
Unlike Joll’s atrocity, the Magistrate’s humanism generates his pity towards the 
victims. Yet, with regards to his pity towards the tortured boy in the prison, the Magistrate 
experiences a sense of ambivalence, seeing himself as an interrogator who “can wear two 
masks, speak with two voices, one harsh, one seductive” (8). However, witnessing the 
tortured body, the Magistrate feels distant from the torturer Joll: “There is nothing to link 
me with torturers, people who sit waiting like beetles in dark cellars” (48). His reflection 
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on the disjuncture between himself and the torturer, thus, signals his gradual turning away 
from the regime of the Empire. Moreover, as I have explored, the Magistrate also feels 
distant from the settlers who have apathy towards the suffering of the barbarians. Despite 
his sensation of his distance from Joll’s and the settlers’ apathy, the Magistrate can neither 
find any virtues ostensibly in the lives of the barbarians, nor become assimilated with them. 
In spite of his pity towards the barbarian victims in the prison, the Magistrate often sees 
them as unfamiliar idlers “in a state of nature”: “For a few days the fisherfolk are a diversion, 
with their strange gabbling, their vast appetites, their animal shamelessness, their volatile 
tempers” (20). However, by living with the barbarian girl tortured by Colonel Joll, the 
Magistrate is internally waving between the torturers and the victims, while attempting to 
rid himself of his likeness to the torturer or the Empire.  
The barbarian girl that the Magistrate takes into his space enables us to question the 
extent of his empathy. The girl is not just a vulnerable victim whom he pities, but also an 
enigmatic one whom he desires. After seeing her distorted body as she sits begging in the 
shade of the barracks wall, he cannot avoid the girl. He then takes her to his room and 
shares his bed with her. As I argue here, this act is acquired by his humanism towards the 
wounded bodies in the prison. As I have asserted, his pictorial account of the tormented 
bodies in the prison is brutally detailed, but does not create much empathy within him. His 
distance from the tortured victims gets narrower through his sympathetic gaze. Specifically, 
seeing the girl’s tormented body, the Magistrate arrives at a sudden recognition that the 
distance between himself and the torturers is “negligible” (29).  
 
“This is not what you think it is,” I say. The words come 
reluctantly. Can I really be about to excuse myself? Her lips are clenched 
shut, her ears too no doubt, she wants nothing of old men and their 
bleating conscious. I prowl around her, talking about vagrancy 
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ordinances, sick at myself. Her skin begins to glow in the warmth of the 
closed room. She tugs at her coat, opens her throat to the fire. The 
distance between myself and her torturers, I realize, is negligible; I 
shudder.  
“Show me your feet,” I say in the new thick voice that seems to 
be mine. “Show me what they have done to your feet.” (29) 
 
The girl’s clenched lips and ears are alert to the Magistrate, who realizes that his excuse 
does not comfort her. In this regard, the distance between the Magistrate and the torturer 
that he imagines is shattered. The barbarian girl’s clenched lips imply that she does not 
distinguish between the Magistrate as the colonizer and Joll as the torturer. His “new thick 
voice” signifies a shift in his recognition of himself as the torturer. It is the Magistrate’s 
awareness of his position as the torturer that forces him to experience a transformation. 
Accordingly, the Magistrate becomes a victim of the Empire like the tortured barbarians—
he viscerally experiences the humiliation of imprisonment and torture.  
However, the Magistrate’s sympathy for the barbarian girl needs more 
consideration for this analysis. The Magistrate’s recognition of himself as the torturer is 
followed by his soothing of the girl’s pain through the contradictory gestures of his washing 
her feet and of his desire for the truth relating to her tortured body. In fact, the washing of 
her feet ironically gives him satisfaction: “I knead and massage the lax toes through the 
soft milky soap. Soon my eyes close, my head droops. It is rapture, of a kind” (31). Without 
words or physical intimacy between them, he washes and massages all of her body parts. 
The Magistrate’s washing of her feet could be seen as either a ritual of his hospitality 
towards her, like Christ’s washing of his disciples’ feet, or an act of contrition, which 
enables him to empathize with the suffering of the victimized barbarians. However, this 
ritual cannot provide her with any comfort. His washing of her rather seems to be a 
fetishism related to the tortured body, merely serving as a reminder of the torture inflicted 
53 
 
on the bodies of the barbarians at the hands of the Empire. There are two reasons why we 
can consider the ritual as an example of the Magistrate’s fetishism rather than his hospitality 
towards the victim. Firstly, no description is provided of her response to his massaging of 
her body, other than her passive acceptance of it. Secondly, the bodily connection between 
them is replaced by his questions concerning how the torturer Joll has inflicted pain on her 
body. Initially, he is not able to know why he desires the girl and her body. This may be an 
answer that he continues to seek. The girl was just one of the barbarian prisoners whose 
body the Magistrate’s gaze passed over so that “she was still unmarked (36)” in his memory. 
“His first image remains of the kneeling beggar-girl” (36). He goes on; “‘I have been trying 
to remember you as you were before all this happened’, I say. ‘I find it difficult. It is a pity 
you can’t tell me.’ I don’t expect a denial, and it does not come” (52). For the Magistrate, 
the girl’s wounded body becomes a metaphor that he desires to interpret. In this sense, his 
and Joll’s goal, as Laura Wright observes, is “essentially the same, to gain access to the 
‘truth’ through the body of the other”.32 In this way, the Magistrate regards the tortured 
body as a source of “mystery” or “blankness”. As he asserts: “I slump on the couch, 
drawing her a mystery of it, pain is only pain; but words elude me. My arms folds around 
her, my lips are at the hollow of her ear, I struggle to speak; then blackness falls” (34). 
Despite the Magistrate’s reflection that “pain” is only pain”, his desire to access the truth 
seems to resurface her pain through a metaphor to be interpreted.  
However, it is imperative to question whether the Magistrate’s access to the truth is 
really the same as his interrogation of Colonel Joll. In his quest for the truth, the Magistrate 
suddenly realizes that he is dealing with her suffering body “as if there is no interior, only 
a surface across which I hunt back and forth seeking entry” (46). In this process, he once 
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again finds his likeness to the torturer. It is yet clear that his recognition of this similarity, 
as Wright claims, “ironically saves him from being like Colonel Joll, because he seeks 
another mode of signification”.33 This acknowledgment also causes him to revise the 
question, “Is this how her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought it was?” 
From this, he proceeds to feel “a dry pity for them”: “how natural a mistake to believe that 
you can burn or tear or hack your way into the secret body of the other!” (46). Like his 
perception of his volatile pity, he continues to find his quasi-love in his massaging of her 
body by creating a parallel with the acts of a torturer in a torture chamber: “I behave in 
some ways like a lover—I undress her, I bathe her, I stroke her, I sleep beside her—but I 
might equally well tie her to a chair and beat her, it would be no less intimate” (46). 
However, even though he thinks of a commonality between his hospitality and Joll’s torture, 
he once again denies his proximity to the torturer Joll: “I must assert my distance from 
Colonel Joll! I will not suffer for his crimes!” (48). Unlike Joll’s act of macabre torture, his 
quest for the wounded body comes through his self-estrangement from his status as the 
oppressor, a privileged position from which he may turn away. As such, it is actually his 
self-estrangement that plays a pivotal role in forcing him to transgress the law of the Empire 
by taking the barbarian girl as part of his own clan and then suffering from his torture and 
humiliation.   
In order to explore the Magistrate’s transgression, it is helpful to now discuss Mike 
Marais’s, David Attwell’s and Derek Attridge’s arguments concerning his position and its 
relation to the tortured body. Firstly, with reference to the tortured body in the novel, Marais 
divides the suffering body into the body marked and the body unmarked. According to 
Marais, because the girl’s body is inscribed by the Empire, the Magistrate unconsciously 
and unintentionally wants to see her body “before it was named and therefore ‘known’ by 
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Empire”.34 In this way, Marais maintains that his desire is to see “beyond the visible marks 
that Empire has inscribed on the girl’s body in its attempt to render it invisible.”35 Marais 
stresses here that the Magistrate’s attempt to make the marks invisible is acquired by his 
ethical responsibility towards the girl. From this brief look at Marais’s claims, it can be 
deduced that the tortured body is denied, and that the Magistrate desires only the unmarked 
body of the girl. However, my question here is to what extent this attempt generates an 
ethical act towards the tortured girl. Specifically, if the Magistrate’s ethical action is, as 
Marais claims, to attend to the body without its scars, then this would also relate to the 
question of how he can make the scars invisible in the present and of how his attempt could 
be helpful in alleviating the pain of other victims. With this in mind, it may be more fitting 
for him to face the suffering body itself, instead of rejecting the pain of others. To explain 
the Magistrate’s desire and its connection to his responsibility, Marais proposes a 
dispossession of self: “Under the burden of a form of responsibility”, he is forced to “act 
against his conscious intentions” and “becomes a stranger to himself”, which is 
accompanied by a “dispossession of self”.36 In this context, Marais points out that the 
Magistrate sees himself as a “servant” of “responsibility” in the moment that he lights a 
candle in order to massage the girl’s tortured foot: “I light a candle and bend over the form 
to which, it seems, I am a measure enslaved” (46). In this moment, the Magistrate, from 
Marais’s perspective, binds himself to an ethical responsibility towards the tortured: “The 
Magistrate, it would appear, is a servant not of sexual desire, but of responsibility”.37 In 
support of Marais’s account, the Magistrate repeatedly denies his sexual desire for the girl: 
“I have no desire to enter this stocky little body glistening by now in the firelight (32).” In 
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this regard, the Magistrate’s accountability is not limited to the girl, but rather is linked to 
an ethical response to those who have suffered, which, as Marais articulates, “extends well 
beyond this character’s relationship to the girl”. 38  However, Marais’s account of this 
responsibility risks rendering the pain and the body of the oppressed invisible and 
unknowable. As I discussed earlier, this is achieved through the effects of torture, which 
render the pain of the victim invisible. Given Marais’s assumption of the “dispossession of 
self”, it is also problematic that the Magistrate’s responsibility should be beyond his 
intention and knowledge, which implies his inability to account for his ethical actions. 
Marais’s account of his responsibility for the girl thus risks positioning the body and its 
pain beyond the corporeal dimension.  
Attwell’s discussion of the Magistrate’s humanistic morality towards the tortured 
girl needs to be further considered in order to fully examine his transformation. Attwell 
importantly stresses that the Magistrate’s washing of her feet has a “parodic link with the 
moral framework of South African liberal humanism”.39 The washing of the girl’s feet, as 
Attwell observes, seems to emphasize a liberal Christian component—inherited from Alan 
Paton’s insistence on “the liberal Christian path of social justice through forgiveness and 
reconciliation”.40 This reveals “a critique that repoliticizes and eroticizes it, displaying 
liberalism’s fetishization of victimhood and revealing it as a more humane but still 
essentially self-validating and dominating form of “soul-formation”.41 From this, liberal 
humanism seems to be limited by being neither relevant to a reciprocal reconciliation, nor 
a political resistance to the power of Empire. Yet, it is worth noting that the “parodic link” 
with liberalism’s fetishization of victimhood has an effect, as it leads to the desexualization 
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of the ritual rather than its eroticization, as evidenced by the fact that the Magistrate does 
not have a sexual desire for the girl’s body: “There is no link I can define between her 
womanhood and my desire. I cannot even say for sure that I desire for (46)”.  
With reference to liberalism’s fetishism, it is necessary to further discuss Attridge’s 
observations on literalism’s self-deception. The Magistrate’s attitude towards the girl is, 
according to Attridge, rooted in “the self-deception of the liberal conscience in the thinness 
of the dividing line between overt repression achieved by violent methods and the subtler 
forms of oppression produced by laissez-faire attitudes, the pursuit of personal gratification, 
and an unwillingness to rock the boat”. 42  In Attridge’s account, the Magistrate’s 
ambiguous and questionable desire for the girl is dependent on a self-deceptive attitude, as 
a subtler form of oppression. This deceptive humanism rather serves to erotically abuse and 
colonize the body of the Other for the oppressor’s satisfaction. Even though Attridge 
describes the Magistrate’s self-doubt as an ethical “hesitation” in which “he is sick at 
himself both for his making of excuses, and for his obscure and unnamed desire”, Attridge 
states that the scene is ultimately tied up with “a history of sexual exploitation (of women, 
of servants, of subordinate faces)”, which tends to make it “little more than the repetition 
of a host of previous such scenes”.43 However, Attridge’s overarching sense of liberalism’s 
self-deception as a form of sexual exploitation and colonization seems to be achieved by 
diminishing the transformative factors led by the Magistrate’s estrangement of himself 
from the torturer and his desexualization of the process of washing her feet. From Deleuze’s 
perspective of masochism, the Magistrate’s ritual can be understood as a masochist’s 
disavowal and suspension of the reality, which represents a personal ideal.  
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…on the one hand the subject is aware of reality but suspends this 
awareness: on the other the subject clings to his ideal. There is a desire for 
scientific observation, and subsequently a state of mystical contemplation. 
The masochistic process of disavowal is so extensive that it affects sexual 
pleasure itself; pleasure is postponed for as long as possible and is thus 
disavowed. The masochist is therefore able to deny the reality of pleasure at 
the very point of experiencing it, in order to identify with the “new sexless 
man”.44  
   
As we have seen above, the disavowal and suspension of reality postpones sexual pleasure 
for as long as possible and this affects the masochist’s identification with a “new sexless 
man” who is awaiting pain. In Deleuze’s conception, the Masochist’s ritual can be seen as 
a process of disavowal and suspension of his identity as a torturer presented by the Empire. 
This purpose of this is to postpone the Magistrate’s pleasure in expectation of pain.  
Before further arguing that the Magistrate’s pain can best be analyzed through the 
prism of Deleuze’s conception of masochism, it is important, then, that we critically rethink 
the Magistrate’s self-deception constructed within the colonial discourse of the Empire. 
The nomads, in this novel, are called barbarians in order to starkly divide them from the 
meaning of civilization. However, as Marais points out, there are no barbarians, only native 
inhabitants: “the Magistrate knew that the barbarians do not exist, that words “barbarians” 
and “enemy” with which Empire identifies them do not fit the native inhabitants of the 
region”.45 In this way, Attwell astutely observes that “It is only outside the limits of Empire 
that he can present her with a free choice”, the choice of returning with him or going to her 
people in the mountains, but she “naturally” declines because “she knows that this freedom 
would be undermined the minute she accepts”. 46  Despite Attwell’s insight into the 
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Magistrate’s act of presenting her with a free choice outside the Empire, it is vital to point 
out that the choice of returning with the Magistrate is expected to be declined by the girl. 
This is because he has taken the decision of returning her to her clan through a realization 
that he has failed to be affected by her pain. When the girl asks him if he wants to have sex 
with her: “Wouldn’t you like to do something else? (59)”, the Magistrate no longer 
continues to massage her tortured body: “I am abstracted, lost in the rhythm of rubbing and 
kneading the swollen ankle (59)”. What the Magistrate expects is thus an intense experience 
of pain rather than any source of gratification from the girl.   
By drawing on perspectives from the Western liberal humanist tradition, as 
discussed by Marais, Attwell, and Attridge, the Magistrate’s empathy with the colonized is 
shown to be deceptive and his transformation is instead set in motion. It is useful to consider 
here Grant Hamilton’s exploration of the Magistrate’s transformation, since Hamilton finds 
in this Deleuzian act of resistance against the Empire. In contrast to the critique of the 
Magistrate’s liberal humanism, presented by Marais, Attwell and Attridge, Hamilton 
conceptualizes the Magistrate’s resistance against the Empire, as entering into a process of 
“becoming-nomad”, which “ultimately casts him in opposition to the colonial power that 
serves”.47 This becoming is, from Hamilton’s perspective, caused by “his love for a girl 
beyond the town’s borders—a ‘barbarian girl’”.48 Hamilton’s account of the Magistrate’s 
“love” implies something more than his erotic desire for the girl. Through his intensive 
relationship with the barbarian girl, the Magistrate, according to Hamilton, undergoes a 
“metamorphosis” that “slowly allows him access to this fundamentally different way of 
perceiving and understanding the world”.49 The Magistrate thereby moves beyond the 
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colonial gaze towards the barbarian that the Empire identifies as the enemy. As Hamilton 
suggests, his movements, “via the barbarian girl” ultimately reach “elsewhere”, a “place 
that is beyond the ideological and physical space territorialized by the State”.50 Yet, the 
Magistrate’s movement is available, only after he takes the barbarian girl to her tribe. 
Hamilton claims that “the force of deterritorialization is not realized until he returns to the 
frontier town after escorting the barbarian girl back to ‘her own people’”.51 By releasing 
the girl without the permission of the Empire, the Magistrate becomes a prisoner and a 
nomad like a barbarian. From Kossew’s perspective, the Magistrate himself “becomes 
labelled as ‘other’ and as ‘the enemy within’ because of his resistance to the fixity of 
imperial discourse and practices, as shown in his crossing of the boundary (both literally 
and metaphorically), drawn between the Empire and the barbarian Other”.52 In lines with 
Hamilton’s and Kossew’s theories, I focus on the Magistrate’s expectation of pain and 
punishment in order to explore his metamorphosis. Thus, I will examine the Magistrate’s 
transformation into a new man, with regard to Deleuze’s conception of masochism in order 
to comprehend the question of his pain.     
 
 
IV. A masochist’s waiting for pain  
  
As noted earlier, the Magistrate’s desire for the girl is related to the truth 
surrounding the tortured body. Nevertheless, regardless of his consciousness and intention, 
the Magistrate’s body is affected by her pain and scars, for example, her “large puffy 
shapeless ankles and its scarred purple skin (31).” From Deleuze’s perspective, her 
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wounded body can be sensed as “forces” or “pressures” that act on the Magistrate, rather 
than merely being represented as scared or distorted. To put it another way, Deleuze’s 
conception of force is “closely related to sensation: for a sensation to exist, a force must be 
exerted on a body, on a point of wave”.53 Importantly, both the Magistrate’s and the girl’s 
bodies and faces are not described. Rather, only the movements and sensations of his 
touching and massaging are repeatedly depicted. Even when the girl looks at him, his look 
is perceived through sensations: “When she does not look at me I am a grey form moving 
about unpredictably on the periphery of her vision. When she looks at me I am a blur, a 
voice, a smell, a centre of energy that one day falls asleep washing her feet and the next 
day feeds her bean stew and the next day—she does not know” (31). Moreover, his ritual 
of washing and massaging her feet generates the rhythms of rubbing beyond his self. He 
loses himself in the rhythm of the rubbing (32). Thus, her pain reaches him in the form of 
desubjectification, even though his consciousness intends to decipher the marks of her 
tortured body. In this context, it is important to question how the Magistrate experiences 
his transformation in relation to the tortured victims, rather than just drawing on a Freudian 
conception of the masochist’s guilt.  
Masochism, derived from the name of the novelist, Sacher-Masoch, is the search 
for pain to gain pleasure. The masochist’s noneconomic attitude towards pain provides the 
subject with ways of experiencing a victim’s suffering. The figure of the masochist, who 
suffers torture, offers the potential to subvert the relationship between the master and the 
slave or the torturer and the victim. Moreover, as Deleuze explains, Masoch (as redefined 
by Kraft-Ebing) is “a clinical entity not merely in terms of the link between pain and sexual 
pleasure, but in terms of something more fundamental connected with bondage and 
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humiliation”.54 When we think about masochism in this way, it provides a possible lens 
through which we can read the Magistrate’s torture and humiliation. Returning to the 
outpost from the mountains to take the girl to her barbarian clan, the Magistrate suffers 
humiliation by means of imprisonment and torture. The Magistrate becomes a body marked 
by torture, and his body is reduced to that of a tortured barbarian. From Joll’s perspective, 
the Magistrate becomes a powerless and vulnerable old man. From this degradation, we 
can question whether the Magistrate’s humiliation and torture are regarded as self-
punishment because of his guilt for the suffering barbarians. In the Freudian account of 
masochism, pain is diffused into pleasure in the form of self-punishment or guilt. However, 
as Arsić says, drawing on Deleuze’s idea of masochism, pain is non-representable, as it 
“takes place as a literal pain that cannot be metaphorized into enjoyment of pain”.55 Pain 
is found in intensities or waves that pass from body to body rather than in the subject’s 
appropriation of pain for its own pleasure. With the exploration of non-representable pain, 
I will examine how the Magistrate might legitimately be considered as a masochist, who 
“displaces the question of suffering”56 and thus subverts the structure of the law.    
In order to explore the Magistrate’s displacement of suffering through Deleuze’s 
conception of masochism, it is useful to begin with Freud’s conception of masochism. 
Freud, in “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, defines three types of masochism: 
erotogenic, feminine and moral masochisms. While erotic and feminine masochisms imply 
pleasure gained through physical pain and submission, moral masochism is concerned with 
a “conscious sense of guilt,” which implies “a need for punishment at the hands of a 
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parental power”. 57  Thus, according to Freud, the masochist “creates a temptation to 
perform ‘sinful’ actions” that must then be atoned for by the reproaches of the “sadistic 
conscience”.58 In order to get the desired punishment, the masochist has to carry out non-
economic acts: “the masochist must do what is inexpedient, must act against his own 
interests, must ruin the prospects which open out to him in the real world and must, perhaps, 
destroy his own real existence”.59  
As I mentioned earlier, according to the Freudian notion of moral masochism, the 
Magistrate’s humiliation may be understood as his self-punishment, brought about through 
the manufacturing of his pain. Drawing on Freud’s theory of masochism, it may be asserted 
that the Magistrate’s conscious and unconscious guilt produces his physical and 
psychological suffering, which ultimately saves him from a sadistic consciousness. One of 
his recurring dreams is that “Somewhere, always, a child is being beaten (88)”, which has 
a conceptual overlap with the barbarian girl in Coetzee’s novel, who is hurt before her 
father’s eyes. In the Magistrate’s dream, she also watches him being humiliated before her, 
and sees that he knew what she saw. After this condemnation, the father dies. Reflecting on 
this dream, he feels guilty for her suffering and also identifies himself with the girl’s father, 
who wanted to protect her but could not stop the torturers’ atrocities. Thus, his realization 
of impotence and guilt requires his punishment as an act of penance. However, this guilty 
consciousness, if viewed through a Freudian account of masochism, becomes a reactive 
force that encourages a retreat into his own internal world, waiting for pain under the power 
of the Empire, like the blow of the sadistic father. However, from a Deleuzian perspective, 
his internalization of pain, constructed in the name of morality, also serves to block the 
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affective flows of his body. While waiting for the wave of pain, the Magistrate transforms 
the pain of the victim into his own pain, through torture and humiliation. In Deleuze’s view 
of masochism, the resulting suffering of the Magistrate displaces the masochist’s relation 
to a sadistic father: “what is beaten, humiliated and ridiculed in him is the image and the 
likeness of the father, and the possibility of the father’s aggressive return”.60 Accordingly, 
it can be said in Deleuze’s account of masochism that “It is not a child but a father that is 
being beaten” (original emphasis).61 In short, if the Magistrate desires to be punished and 
waits for pain, it is because he seeks to punish himself for his likeness to the Empire. This 
is relative to the Magistrate’s degradation, which is forced by his awareness of his likeness 
to the torturer Joll.    
Another displacement in the Magistrate’s suffering can be found in the relationship 
between the torturer and the victim. Instead of relying on the moral law of convention, 
Deleuze argues that the perverse structure of masochism troubles the relationship between 
the torturer and the victim. Above all, Deleuze criticizes the assumption of the pathological 
unity between sadism and masochism. In Deleuze’s conception, sadism and masochism are 
“different modes of being with differing logics”. 62  According to Deleuze, “the 
fundamental distinction between sadism and masochism can be summarized through the 
contrasting processes of negation on the one hand and suspense on the other”.63 As Branka 
Arsić observes, such incommensurability suggested by Deleuze’s redefinition of 
masochism generates an “idea of the ‘literality’ of pain, which is opposed to what in Freud’s 
theory functions as its interiorization (its becoming metaphor)”.64 Deleuze’s interpretation 
of masochism is thus concerned with the corporeality of pain between the quasi-sadist and 
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the masochist, removed from a sense of internalized guilt. The quasi-sadist is a woman-
torturer who plays the role of transmitting pain to the masochist through the method of 
suspension. Specifically, Deleuze argues that Masoch displaces the structure of suffering. 
The self-inflicted suffering of a masochistic hero depends upon a contract or agreement 
with the torturer-woman. This contract is, according to Deleuze, about a masochist’s 
“submission” to the woman, which constitutes the essential element of masochism. 65 
Deleuze’s account of a masochistic contract focuses on a subversion of the law which has 
produced a master and slave relationship or a torturer and victim structure. By making 
himself a victim, the masochist mocks and reverses a “master-slave relationship” as well 
as the status of man and woman.66 As Branka Arsić asserts, a masochist’s contract, in a 
Deleuzian sense, is “the very resistance to the law”.67 However, a masochist’s desire still 
remains enigmatic, because his desire for masochism is separated from pleasure. Deleuze 
attests that pleasure interrupts his desire so that “the constitution of desire as a process must 
ward off pleasure, repress it to infinity. The woman-torturer sends a delayed wave of pain 
over the masochist, who makes use of it, obviously not as a source of pleasure, but as a 
flow to be followed in the constitution of an uninterrupted process of desire”. 68 
Masochistic desire flows and connects with others.   
In line with Deleuze’s account of masochism, the relationship between the 
Magistrate and the girl can be reconsidered as that of the quasi-sadistic woman and the 
masochist with reference to the suspension of pain. This is not necessarily to suggest that 
for the Magistrate, the barbarian girl is either a torturer or a sadistic woman with a whip. 
Yet, without sadistic pleasure, the girl allows him to experience the suspension of pain 
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during the massaging ritual in a masochistic world in which the masochist does not desire 
to gain power over the victims. As Deleuze asserts, “the woman torturer of masochism 
cannot be sadistic precisely because she is in the masochistic situation, she is an integral 
part of it, a realization of the masochistic fantastic fantasy”. Through the masochistic ritual, 
the Magistrate does not search for pleasure, but rather for the intense expectation of pain. 
However, it is important to note that, via a quasi-sadistic woman, a masochist does not 
desire pain itself, but the delayed wave of pain, as in Deleuze’s account of masochism. 
Deleuze’s account makes possible the flow of pain between the masochist and the woman. 
It is here that Deleuze displaces the question of pain through the process of suspension. As 
I explained in the Introduction, this process is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, related 
to “a body without organs” where “the masochist has made himself a BwO [a body without 
organs] under such conditions that the BwO can no longer be populated by anything but 
intensities of pain, pain waves”. 69  In other words, the body without organs can be 
constituted through pushing back against the limits of subjectivity, which enables the body 
to be filled with intensities of pain and to interact with other bodies. This is why waiting 
for pain is already “impersonal”, since it suspends the “I”.70   
Deleuze discusses the conventional assumptions of sadism and masochism and their 
relations to pain before deploying his conception of masochistic pain: “The sadist derives 
pleasure from other people’s pain and the masochist from suffering pain himself as a 
necessary precondition of pleasure”.71 Deleuze stresses that “if pain and suffering have any 
meaning, it must be that they are enjoyable to someone”.72 Pain itself is pleasurable only 
in the perverted relationship between a sadist and a masochist. Torturers such as Colonel 
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Joll and Mandel are presented as sadistic figures who inflict pain on other people and 
achieve their desired aims through these means. Thus, the scenes involving the torture of 
the barbarians are rendered obscene when Colonel Joll writes the word “enemy” on the 
barbarians’ naked backs and beats them in front of people until their backs are washed clean. 
As I have discussed earlier, the torture seems to voyeuristically and theatrically provides a 
sense of enjoyment for the spectators as well as the torturers. The sadistic power of Joll 
seduces the spectators and exposes them to the suffering of the tortured. In the process, 
they become perverts of obscene pleasure. However, it is clear that the tortured barbarians 
never enjoy their humiliation and suffering, while the spectators are bound up with sadistic 
or perverted power because they feel apathy towards the others’ pain. This is why Deleuze’s 
discussion of masochism has political implications. Deleuze problematizes the strategy of 
violent power, since he denies sadomasochism, or the conflation of sadism and masochism. 
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, it is important to consider that the spectators 
become a masochist body to be waved with the pain of barbarians rather than a 
sadomasochist body through the suffering of the victims.  
However, unlike the spectators of torture, the Magistrate, who becomes a masochist 
body through the limitation of his subjectivity as a colonizer, interrupts Colonel Joll’s 
torturing of the barbarians, rather than engaging with the spectacle of torture. During this 
exemplary spectacle of torture, the Magistrate bursts out with the words, “No!”, when 
Colonel Joll holds a hammer to the barbarians.   
 
‘No!’ I hear the first word from my throat, rusty, not loud enough. 
Then again: ‘No!’ this time the world rings like a bell from my chest. 
The Soldier who blocks my way stumbles aside. I am in the arena holding 
up my hands to still the crowd: ‘No! No! No!’ 
When I turn to Colonel Joll he is standing not five paces from me, 
his arms folded. I point a finger at him. ‘You!’ I shout. Let it all be said. 
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Let him be the one on whom the anger breaks. ‘You are depraving these 
people!’ (116).  
 
After pointing out that Joll is depraving the people, the Magistrate also shouts at the 
bystanders, and asserts that the tortured barbarians are equally men like them: “We are the 
great miracle of creation! But from some blows this miraculous body cannot repair itself! 
How--!’ Words fail me. ‘Look at these men!’ I recommence. ‘Men!’” (117). His sudden 
interruption of the torture displays his ethical and political transformation in that he is able 
to resist Joll’s barbarous torture. Yet, it is noteworthy that his resistance is available only 
after his suspended pain, which was affected by the girl’s suffering and his own degradation. 
His radical break with the torturer Joll results in his atrocious torture and agony. He 
ultimately becomes an inhuman body: “What I am made to undergo is subjection to the 
most rudimentary needs of my body; to drink, to relieve itself, to find the posture in which 
it is least sore” (127). Eventually, the torturer Mandel abuses his body, forces him to strip 
naked and to run around the yard whilst being watched. Mandel also makes him dress in a 
woman’s frock with his neck and wrists tied to a tree and then orders him to fly. The 
Magistrate’s body as a male colonizer is dismantled and is thereby transformed into a 
masochist body filled with pain in the suspension of his identity. Moreover, Mandel’s 
theatrical mockery of the Magistrate’s extreme humiliation ironically suspends the law. The 
Magistrate says, “A scapegoat is named, a festival is declared, the laws are suspended: who 
would not flock to see the entertainment? (131)”. From the Magistrate’s assertion of 
“scapegoat”, we can consider the Magistrate’s suffering as a process of scapegoating that 
purifies the violence of the Empire. Like the victimhood of the barbarians, the Magistrate, 
from Girard’s perspective, seems to become a scapegoat who submits to violence without 
provoking a reprisal. There is yet a distinction between the barbarians and the Magistrate 
as scapegoats. With his recognition of his sin as the colonizer, the Magistrate, in Girard’s 
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view, undergoes “a pattern of transgression and salvation” as presented in Sophocles’s 
tragedies, Oedipus the King and Oedipus at Colonus: “the hero appears as a redeemer as 
soon as he has been eliminated, invariably by violent means”.73 In other words, as Girard 
observes, Oedipus, “while remaining a transgressor, is cast primarily as a destroyer of 
monsters” (87) such as Sphinx. Similarly, the Magistrate can be seen as a scapegoat who 
commits a transgression by taking the barbarian girl to her people and is thereby a destroyer 
of the unanimous and reciprocal violence of the Empire. The Magistrate thus has an affinity 
with Oedipus, as he engages in a suspension of the “I”, becoming a monster as both a 
transgressor and a redeemer in the community.  
However, in Deleuze’s view of masochism, it is the downward movement of 
humour and the suspension of the law in masochism that differentiate it from the effect of 
the scapegoat in Girard’s sense. Concerned with Deleuze’s conception of masochism, 
“humor—in contradistinction to the upward movement of irony toward a transcendent 
higher principle—is a downward movement from the law to its consequences”.74 Rather 
than rendering the law and the victim sublime through irony, humour seeks to demonstrate 
the absurdity of the law. The Magistrate’s extreme torture leads to the subversion of the law 
of the Empire, through “humor”. For Deleuze, “the masochist aims not to mitigate the law 
but on the contrary to emphasize its extreme severity”,75 by directly performing the social 
contract that results in our enslavement. Yet, through this ritual, the masochist reveals that 
the law based on our contract is artificial and subversive. The masochist humorously 
accelerates the law in order to reveal its extreme severity, as well as the slavery of the 
subject. Moreover, the acceleration of the law also reveals its arbitrariness, since it is based 
on documents and contracts. The Magistrate says to Mandel that “I am a prisoner awaiting 
                                           
73 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 86-7. 
74 Deleuze, Masochism, 88.  
75 Ibid., 91.  
70 
 
trial. Prisoners awaiting trial are not required to work for their keep. That is the law. They 
are maintained out of the public coffer” (137). However, Mandel responds, “But you are 
not a prisoner. You are free to go as you please” (137), since Mandel and Joll do not have 
a record of him. Mandel adds that he must be a “free man”, as a means of freeing himself 
from the boundaries of the law. This is the logic of masochism: the law is implicitly 
challenged through the Magistrate’s pain and punishment, remaining in a state of 
suspension. As Deleuze observes, “Even guilt and punishment do not tell us what the law 
is, but leave it in a state of indeterminacy equally only by the extreme specificity of the 
punishment. This is the world described by Kafka”.76 After having freed himself from his 
humiliation, the Magistrate becomes a wanderer, waiting for the barbarians “outside the 
history that Empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost subjects” (169). Through the 
suspended pain of the barbarians, the Magistrate is thereby transformed into a nomad like 
“a man who lost his way long ago but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere” 
(170). Like the wandering of Cain punished by God, the Magistrate, as a result of abolishing 
his likeness to the Empire, becomes a new man, entering into an impersonal realm of fate. 
Subsequently, the Magistrate experiences the pain of the barbarians through suspension and 
becomes a wanderer, rather than living with consciousness of his guilt. This enables the 
Magistrate to experience his transposition into a body without organs filled with pain and 





In this chapter, I have described the mechanisms of both blockage and the wave of 
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pain, drawing on Deleuze’s conception of masochism. In the process, I have disputed the 
techniques of torture produced by biopolitics and masochism, via flows of pain and the 
suspension of the law. In Coetzee’s novel, Waiting for the Barbarians, the act of torture 
represents a pivotal strategy for colonizing the barbarians at an outpost in the Empire, 
where the boundary between the barbarians and the settlers, or between nomadic and 
civilized life is obscure. As I have examined, Scarry’s theory of torture and pain is useful 
for conveying the biopolitics of the Empire, which takes sovereign power over the 
barbarian bodies, as a method of reducing them to the enemies, visibly distinguished from 
the bodies of the soldiers and settlers. What is noticeable in the biopolitics of the Empire is 
the way that it produces a blockage of pain between the victims and the colonizers by 
making invisible the visible pain of the victims as an effect of conflating violence and 
language or torture and interrogation. The tortured bodies of the barbarians become 
inhuman bodies, which cannot be regarded as neighbours. This results in the torturer Joll’s 
and the settlers’ apathy towards the pain of the barbarians. In this ethical and political 
context, it is thus crucial to examine how the pain of the victims could flow into the bodies 
of the colonizers in a corporeal way.   
As the biopolitics of the Empire produces an insensitivity towards the victims, I 
have examined the potentialities of the flow of pain for radically changing the relationship 
between the barbarians and the colonizers in a Deleuzian sense. The Magistrate’s pity for 
the barbarian victims diverges from the torturer Joll’s denial of their pain. However, 
because of his pity, the Magistrate ironically finds himself identifying with the torturers, 
when he offers his hospitality towards the barbarian girl tortured by Colonel Joll. It is his 
self-recognition as a torturer that pushes him to return the girl to her barbarian people and 
subsequently to undergo his own torture and humiliation. Nevertheless, given David 
Attwell’s and Derek Attridge’s arguments concerning the limitations of liberal humanism, 
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the Magistrate’s washing and massaging of the girl’s feet could be understood as his 
fetishization of her victimhood, and his self-deception as a form of exploitation that abuses 
and colonizes the bodies of the colonized. However, Deleuze’s conception of sensation 
suggests that the Magistrate is affected by the girl’s pain in the form of rhythm, when he 
massages her tortured body. Moreover, Deleuze’s conception of masochism, distinct from 
that of Freud, offers a lens through which we may understand the Magistrate’s humiliation.  
In Deleuze’s theory of masochism, the perverse structure of masochism troubles the 
relationship between the torturer and the victims. Deleuze achieves this by stressing the 
incommensurability of sadomasochism. From Deleuze’s perspective, the Magistrate does 
not desire pleasure, but rather the intense expectation of pain, when he massages the girl’s 
feet. Moreover, it is important to note that the Magistrate does not search for pain itself, but 
rather a suspension of pain, which brings up a flow of suffering between himself and the 
victims. This is related to what Deleuze and Guattari call a body without organs, or a 
masochist body that passes the wave of pain. Accordingly, the Magistrate’s waiting for the 
pain of the tortured body forces him into a masochist body without organs to pass the pain 
of the victims, which is not achieved by his liberal humanism or his morality of guilt but 
through the suspension of pain. Relating to the logic of colonialism taken by the Empire, 
the Magistrate’s extreme humiliation subverts the law of the Empire by revealing its cruelty 
and arbitrariness. Thus, in a Deleuzian logic of masochism, the Magistrate is able to 













In this chapter, I will explore the issue of the subject’s escape from categorization, 
confinement and signification as a racial minority in J.M. Coetzee’s novel, Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983), drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s theories of “movement-image” and 
“exhaustion”. Categorized as a social and economic minority such as a vagrant or a 
“parasite”,1 the eponymous Michael K is interned in labor camps, but he continues to 
escape and move beyond the boundaries of an imagined dystopian civil war in South Africa. 
According to Deleuze, “to leave, to escape, is to trace a line”.2 “To escape proliferates 
movements to new terrains, creating an experience of “deterritorialization”.3 However, in 
Deleuze’s account in Cinema 1 (1983), movement does not merely imply a geographical 
space traversed, but it triggers a qualitative, “heterogeneous and irreducible” 
transformation.4 This qualitative movement is also related to Deleuze’s question about the 
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extinction of subjectivity: “How can we rid ourselves of ourselves, and demolish 
ourselves?”5 Drawing on Deleuze’s theoretical account of movement, I will argue in this 
chapter, that K’s escape generates a qualitative leap to trigger his transformation rather than 
just movement within a homogeneous space. My contention here is that K’s escape 
indicates an active heterogeneous movement rather than simply a passive evasion of the 
power of apartheid. In this context, drawing on Deleuze’s reading of Samuel Beckett’s 
works, I will firstly investigate the ways in which K’s escape is intrinsically related to a 
movement towards extinguishing his representative image or subjectivity. Secondly, I will 
explore how K’s absolute refusal to eat consumes and exhausts the logic of the apartheid 
regime, thereby making the representative image mobile.  
The life of K is, from Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical perspective, “bare” which 
means that it is divided from political and qualified life during a time when the turbulence 
of this imagined dystopian civil war brings individual lives into a state of crisis.6  In 
comparison with the precision of its geographical background, the temporality of the novel 
is indefinite, depicting a future South Africa, extrapolating the effects of the current 
political predicament. To be more specific, in the year 1983, when the novel was published, 
the politics of segregation produced a situation not unlike an undeclared civil war. Coetzee 
has made this situation more visible. As David Attwell explains, the scenario of the civil 
war in the novel is “not strictly apocalyptic; rather, it anticipates accelerated militarization 
in response to sporadic but growing insurrection and guerrilla activity”. 7  In these 
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circumstances, K’s mother, Anna wishes to escape from “the careless violence, the packed 
buses, the food queues, arrogant shopkeepers, thieves and beggars, sirens in the night, the 
curfew” (8). However, as Dominic Head points out, the novel is not merely a “future 
projection”, but rather, through that projection, “evokes the social breakdown of post-
Soweto South Africa in the 1980s, just as the novel’s themes represent the governing fears 
and concerns of the time”.8 The novel represents a current violent circumstance through 
its future projection, based on a situation where an individual’s movement is restricted by 
the regime’s policy, and its control over people’s lives.  
In particular, although the racial segregation seems to be down-played in the novel, 
the lives of racially and economically oppressed groups are strategically confined by a 
range of regulations. In order to investigate individual life and its relation to the times, it is 
necessary to briefly look at K’s life, focusing on the politics of restriction and confinement. 
K, as a gardener in the municipality of Cape Town, has to leave, because his ailing mother 
wishes to return to her childhood hometown in Prince Albert. However, as they do not 
receive a permit from the police, K and his mother are not allowed to travel across the 
district. Because of the delay getting the permit, K and his mother start a trip to Prince 
Albert, crossing the district, with K transporting his mother in a wheel-barrow. Despite his 
mother’s sudden death in a hospital in Stellenbosch on the way to Prince Albert, K 
continues to move onward with his mother’s ashes. During his journey, K is interned in 
Jakkalsdrif camp, but he escapes and arrives at an abandoned farm in Prince Albert. At the 
farm, K distributes his mother’s ashes over the earth and then cultivates some patches of 
land. When the grandson of the farm’s owner, Visagie, a deserter, arrives, K escapes again 
and hides in a burrow above the farm. Nearly dying of starvation, K is captured by soldiers 
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and is imprisoned first in Kenilworth camp and then in a rehabilitation camp. In the camps, 
suspected as a supplier of food to the guerrillas and an arsonist, K refuses to eat and refuses 
to tell his story. After successfully escaping once again from the camps, K moves around 
Sea Point, and thinks of surviving by drinking only a teaspoon of water.  
Given the turbulent times in South Africa, which frame the novel’s plot, it is 
necessary to consider K’s flight and refusal in that political context. K’s escape could be 
regarded critically as a passive and individual retreat from political engagement rather than 
as an active resistance against the regime or as a preparation for political revolution. In this 
context, Nadine Gordimer’s critique of the novel and her view of K’s apathy towards the 
political predicament is worth noting: “the political statements are made implicitly through 
the situations and reactions of Michael K that have no obvious political meaning”. 9 
However, from Gordimer’s perspective, this leads to the judgement that “Coetzee’s heroes 
are those who ignore history, not make it”.10 The characters, for example, the white doctor 
and nurse in the ‘rehabilitation’ camp are “‘living in suspension’, while for both ‘history 
hesitated over what course it should take’”.11 Gordimer goes on to say that “No one in this 
novel has any sense of taking part in determining that course; no one is shown to believe 
he knows what that course should be”.12 In fact, confined in the rehabilitation camp, K 
seems to willfully ignore the political crisis, when he asserts that “I am not at war (138)”. 
In line with Gordimer’s critique, rather than being an act of political resistance, K’s escape 
could be considered to be an elusive flight from reality. Accordingly, Gordimer concludes 
that “beyond all creeds and moralities, this work of art asserts, there is only one: to keep 
the earth alive, and only one salvation, the survival that comes from her”.13 Subsequently, 
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Gordimer’s contention is that there is not any political or ethical signification to be found 
in K’s flight, but only an ecological concern for an earth left to be cultivated for the hope 
of salvation.  
However, in contrast to Gordimer’s position, it is possible to rethink K’s flight and 
its ethical and political transposition. Thus, many critics find in K’s escape political and 
ethical as well as literary implications for resisting the classification and normalization of 
apartheid. Among these critics, Dominic Head regards K’s elusiveness as a political 
challenge against the oppressive regime, arguing that it is “a way of resisting the 
classifications of apartheid, specifically the Population Registration Act (1950) (which 
required the population to be classified by race)”.14 When he is arrested in Prince Albert, 
K is recorded as “CM”, or “coloured male” (70) in the charge sheet. This evokes his 
internment in the camps, but it is also the first explicit acknowledgement of racial 
categorization. In this context, Head convincingly highlights the potentiality of K’s escape, 
by asserting that it denotes resistance against the violent policy of classification under the 
regime. Derek Attridge similarly finds “a profoundly ethical awareness”, in K’s thought 
and behavior, since K resists “the urge to apply preexisting norms and to make fixed moral 
judgement”.15 Attridge refers to this as “one form of allegorizing reading”.16 From this 
perspective, K’s thought and behavior are relevant to a literature that involves an “ethical 
response” to the Other, rather than having a relationship with allegory or dealing with “the 
already known” (Attridge’s emphasis).17 In line with Attridge’s reading, Attwell considers 
K’s “evasiveness” as a condition that “the novel itself enacts”. 18  However, the point 
Attwell makes is that, instead of his own transformation, K organically deconstructs the 
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dominant discourse he is imbedded in: “K is not a representative figure who models certain 
forms of behavior or capacities for change; rather he is an idea floated into a discursive 
environment that is unprepared to receive it”.19 From the differing perspectives of Head, 
Attridge and Attwell, we can understand K’s movement as a resisting force to the 
categorization and signification constructed by the regime.  
Despite theorizations concerning the political and ethical validity of K’s elusiveness, 
which a range of critics have engaged with, the active mobility of K has not been 
sufficiently discussed. In order to explore K’s movement, it is firstly useful to rethink a 
living being as a body or a source of matter that enables movement rather than as an 
abstraction of the self. This point is important for understanding how Deleuze’s conception 
of movement can be distinguished from the representation of K’s movement. This may also 
be related to the reason why K’s escape should be seen as inextricably linked with his body 
and movement. Grounded in Henri Bergson’s theory, in Matter and Memory (1912), 
Deleuze proposes a connection between image and matter, which is differentiated from the 
traditional concept of the image, or a false image as a representation of a thing.20 In short, 
for Deleuze, image is identified with matter and movement. In this regard, instead of the 
usual dualism between movement and image, consciousness and thing, Deleuze offers a 
new concept of the identification between movement and image, through which they 
produce their immediate actions and reactions. However, K’s movement in the novel is 
                                           
19 Ibid., 100.  
20 Deleuze proposes his version of materialism, following Bergson’s conception of image and 
matter. Yet, their positions on materialism are subtly different. Focusing on the issue of the image, 
both Deleuze and Bergson radically highlight its mobility and materiality, which is divergent from 
the traditional conception of the image as the representation of a thing. However, Deleuze, in Cinema 
1, supposes an identification between image and matter, while Bergson, in Matter and Memory, 
regards the image as an existence between a representation and a thing. According to Bergson, 
“Matter is in our view, an aggregate of ‘images’. And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which 
is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than which the realist calls a 
thing—an existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’. (the original 
emphasis) Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer 
(New York: Dover, 1912), vii-viii. 
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blocked by the power of apartheid that categorizes him racially and economically. For this 
reason, it is even more important to ask how K can move away from his representative 
image or subjectivity. 
In this chapter, drawing on Deleuze’s theory of movement, I will argue that K’s 
flight modifies his interactions with other bodies and articulates a connection with the 
variable nature of images, by extinguishing and exhausting his representative images of the 
Other. K’s flight can be considered in comparison to white intellectuals’ experiences of 
corporeal suffering, such as the Magistrate’s experience of torture and Mrs. Curren’s 
suffering through illness, in order to escape the violent political structure of exploiting the 
bodies of the colonized in an oppressive regime. In order to analyze this issue, I will firstly 
examine the false images surrounding K, notably the representation of his physical features 
as disfigured and his characterization as a “simpleton”, before examining how he escapes 
from the images of his false appearance. I will also show how K’s false images of the 
disfiguration and the simpleton are connected to his representation as a racial and economic 
other in the regime in South Africa. In order to elaborate on this issue, I will draw on 
Deleuze’s theories of faciality and movement-image. Secondly, through Deleuze’s reading 
of Beckett, the extinguished images of K will be explored in comparison with Gordimer’s 
and other commentators’ debates on the characteristics of K’s elusiveness. Thirdly, K’s 
refusal to eat and to speak will be examined through Deleuze’s theory of “exhaustion”. 
Consequently, I will demonstrate the ways in which K’s flight becomes a movement from 
the false appearance to the imperceptible.  
 
 




In terms of Deleuze’s reflections on movement and image, K’s body could be 
regarded as the “flowing-matter” of acting and reacting images.21 K’s body encounters 
images, proliferating connections with other bodies. However, as I have mentioned earlier, 
despite the apartheid state fraught with political problems, K’s escape does not seem to 
bring about any changes involving historical and political revolution. In this context, Stefan 
Helgesson argues that “the historical drama is unfolding around him”, but his life is “quite 
bare”; “If the times are unbearably full, K’s ‘life’ appears empty”. 22  However, my 
contention is that K’s escape can be seen as a movement created through fleeing from his 
false image, which is negatively represented by the power of language. In order to develop 
this argument about K’s movement, in this section, I will explore how K’s false image is 
constituted through a racial category, resulting in the suppression of his voice in South 
Africa. In addition to this, I will discuss how Coetzee effectively uses free indirect 
discourse in order to allow K’s muteness to be released like flowing matter.   
The world in which K lives is manipulated by the power of language, and K’s voice 
is oppressed in its personal and social dimensions. K’s silence is initially represented 
through his physical deformity and simple mind, which are marked by his lack of language. 
At birth, K’s hare lip is perceived by the midwife: “the first thing the midwife notices about 
K when she helped him out of his mother into the world was that he had a hare lip. The lip 
cured like a snail’s foot, the left nostril gaped” (3). Because of K’s deformed lip, his mother 
Anna does not like his mouth. This significantly forms a mode of his existence as a 
deformed figure in the earliest stage of his life. In addition, K’s mother keeps him to watch 
her work as a servant instead of allowing him to play with other children: “Year after year 
Michael K sat on a blanket watching his mother polish other people’s floors, learning to be 
                                           
21 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 59.  
22 Stefan Helgesson, Writing in Crisis: Ethics and History in Gordimer, Ndebele and Coetzee 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004), 182 
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quiet (3-4)”. As Head observes, in these circumstances, “his language acquisition is 
expressed in the negative, the cultivation of silence in the face of oppression”.23 Because 
of his deformed appearance and simple-mindedness, K is taken out of school after a short 
trial period and then becomes a municipal gardener in Cape Town. Gardening allows K to 
maintain his silent life. In this way, the image of K’s physical deformity constitutes his 
silence. 
In addition to his deformity, K’s representative image is also systematically 
classified and constituted in terms of a racial category. It is necessary to consider the 
classification of race, as articulated by the policeman, when K is captured in Prince Albert 
in order to examine this. The policeman records K as follows: “No one knew where he was 
from. He had no papers on him, not even a green card. On the charge sheet he was listed 
‘Michael Visage—CM—40—NFA—Unemployed’ and is charged with leaving his 
magisterial district without authorization, not being in possession of an identification 
document, infringing the curfew, and being drunk and disorderly” (70). Because K’s 
personal details are incorrectly recorded on the charge sheet in terms of his name and age, 
there are doubts also about the accuracy of his racial categorization: K’s race is identified 
with the initials “CM”, which refers to a “coloured male”. There have been debates 
surrounding K’s race, since the narrators (first and third narrators) never clearly describe 
his race. Gordimer, for example, describes K’s race as black because of his mother’s social 
and economic position. Attridge accepts K’s race as a coloured male (CM), but he 
emphasizes that “the absence or uncertainty of racial reference is typical of Coetzee’s 
novels: both Vercueil in Age of Iron and the Isaacs family in Disgrace can be said to be 
‘probably’ coloured, but to discern this the reader has to be familiar with the niceties of 
                                           
23 Head, J.M. Coetzee, 98.  
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South African racial groupings under apartheid”.24 Attridge goes on to claim that “the 
uncertainty of categorization exposes, of course, the groundlessness of the racial 
discrimination which determined all South African lives during the era of state racism, and 
which, regrettably, have not disappeared”.25 The uncertainty of race produced by Coetzee 
may thus effectively display the groundlessness of racism. However, it is important to note 
that, without any further specific references to K’s race, others, nevertheless, perceive him 
in a racial sense.  
Because I am concerned with the mechanism of perception, I raise the question of 
how K is seen by others to be a member of a specific racial and social group, in the absence 
of any specific reference to his race. This question can be rethought in terms of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conception of “faciality”. Deleuze and Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus, 
suggest that the face does not merely indicate “an envelope exterior to the person who 
speaks, thinks, or feels”, but it rather refers to “facial expressions” such as smiles and 
frowns producing signification.26 As Ronald Bogue expounds, the speech-acts performed 
in facial expressions are, for Deleuze and Guattari, “sorted, regulated and normalized in 
accordance with dominant systems of signification”.27 The facial expressions also form 
subjectivity or certain “loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make 
it conform in advance to a dominant reality”.28 In Deleuze and Guattari’s sense, the face 
functions in accordance with both “signification” and “subjectivation”, thus confirming 
and enforcing a given mode of reality. The face is thereby facialized and gains an identity 
by means of the dominant regime of signs in a society. In this way, Deleuze and Guattari 
                                           
24 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading, 59.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 167-8.  
27 Ronald Bogue, “The Landscape of Sensation”, Image and Text, eds. Eugen W. Holland, Daniel 
W. Smith and Charles J. Stivale (London: Continuum, 2009), 10.   
28 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 168.  
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assert that the face is a politics constructed by an “abstract machine of faciality”.29 As 
Simone Bignall recounts, for Deleuze and Guattari, “the facial system produces an abstract 
model of identity that is generalized and standardised; the face enables a ‘computation of 
normalities’”. 30  Bignall goes on to say that faciality corresponds with a politics of 
representative identity, in which the recognition of difference is achievable only in relation 
to that identity”. 31  Thus, the politics of the face is, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, 
associated with racism—which “operates by degrees of deviance in relation to the White-
Man face”.32  
In line with Deleuze and Guattari’s account of faciality, K’s disfigured face is 
recognized as a difference through the standardization and normalization of the White-Man 
face. As we have seen, the charge sheet functions through the generalization and 
normalization of the face, thus marking vagrants and the coloured as different. The faces 
of prisoners in the camps are also perceived as diverse negative images differentiated from 
the normalized face. As Robert, one of the prisoners says, prisoners are facialized as 
“disease”: “No hygiene, no morals. A nest of vice” (81). There are other ways in which this 
“difference” is asserted. The vagrants in the camps are also called a “parasite” by the police 
captain at Jakkalsdrif who thinks of the camp as “a nest of parasites hanging from the neat 
sunlit town, eating its substance, giving no nourishment back” (116). In this way, K’s race 
is not specifically described, but his face is recognized through racial and social categories. 
The faciality of K ultimately implies a signification of his body. Thus, from Deleuze’s 
theoretical perspective, it can be concluded that K’s negative and fixed images are formed 
by his deformed figure and faciality. This perception blocks K’s movement of image and 
                                           
29 Ibid. 
30 Simone Bignall, “Dismantling the White-Man Face: Racialisation, Faciality and the Palm Island 
Riot”, Deleuze and Race, eds. Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), 79.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 178.  
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body, causing the suppression of his voice.  
However, although K’s voice is oppressed and his movement is blocked, 
interestingly, we can hear his mind by means of a third-person narrator in the first and third 
sections of the novel. K does not speak directly, but his inner thought is described through 
free indirect discourse. In literature, free indirect discourse, as a narrative device, is used to 
describe the character’s speech and thought, and allows the character’s thought and feeling 
to emerge more directly. As Joe Hughes notes, free indirect discourse “gives the reader a 
sense of unmediated access to the consciousness of the character, and it is usually 
accomplished through a blurring of the first and third person”. 33  In Michael K, K’s 
consciousness and emotion are indirectly expressed by fusing with the thought of the 
narrator. In his works, Waiting for the Barbarian and Foe, Coetzee uses the characters of 
the Magistrate and Susan Barton as a first-person narrator to describe the suppressed voices 
of the colonial subjects, the barbarian girl and Friday. However, from the Magistrate’s and 
Barton’s points of view, the barbarian girl’s and Friday’s thoughts are obscure. In particular, 
because of his mutilated tongue, Friday’s voice is absolutely silent. Nevertheless, a third-
person narrator releases Friday from muteness in the last section of the novel.34 Similarly, 
in Michael K, Coetzee’s usage of free indirect discourse allows the reader to hear K’s 
silenced voice more effectively. Specifically, the first section of the novel is narrated by a 
third-person narrator, who gains access to K’s thought and feeling. For example, while 
waiting for a permit for Prince Albert, K and his mother come to the devastated flat where 
                                           
33 Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (London: Continuum, 2009), 15.  
34 Friday’s scream is oozing from his mouth and body, through a third person narrator. Although 
Friday’s scream is not distinctively articulated, his sound affects the reader and the narrator, and 
bring them to hear and sense his suffering, or the suppressed voice that Susan Barton cannot perceive 
and narrate: “His mouth opens. From inside him comes a slow stream, without breath, without 
interruption. It flows up through his body and out upon me; it passes through the cabin, through the 
wreck; washing the cliffs and shores of the island, it runs northward and southward to the ends of 
the earth. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it bears against my eyelids, against the skin of my face”. 
J.M. Coetzee, Foe (London: Penguin, 1986), 157.  
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she had formerly worked. When K pins the curtains to the gaping window frames in the 
flat, K’s inner thought is woven into the narrative: “I do what I do, he told himself, not for 
the old people’s sake but for my mother’s (15)”. By contrast, K’s thought is rarely revealed 
in the second section narrated by the first person narrator, in which K has a conversation 
with the medical officer of the rehabilitation camp. During this conversation, the medical 
officer continues to talk to him and tries to interpret the meaning of K’s behavior. The 
medical officer’s perception of K is limited, and this is suggested by the fact that he 
consistently calls K “Michaels” instead of “Michael”. In the final section, when K’s inner 
thought is more expressively released, the third-person narrator describes K’s drifting life 
in a suburb of Cape Town after his escape from the camp. In this part, K’s monologue 
frequently intersects with the third-person narration.  
Focusing on the abyssal distance between K’s inner mind and the description of the 
third-person narrator, Attridge argues that free indirect discourse is “most suited to 
conveying an individual’s inner mind while remaining in the third person”.35 However, the 
point Attridge emphasizes here is that this style ultimately reminds us of the Otherness of 
K: “the phrases like ‘he thought’ are frequently resorted to, continually reminding us that 
we are outside Michael K’s consciousness”.36 Attridge goes on to say that “this stylistic 
choice—altogether with the use of the past tense—allows Coetzee to sustain throughout 
the fiction the Otherness of K’s responses”.37 The following example, provided by Attridge, 
is taken from a passage where K’s inner world is described in the cave above the Visagie 
farm, as he thinks about pumpkins that are beginning to wilt.  
 
He thought of the pumpkin leaves pushing through the earth. 
                                           
35 Derek Attridge, “Against Allegory”, J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual, ed. Jane 
Poyner (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 73.  
36 Ibid., 74.  
37 Ibid.   
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Tomorrow will be their last day, he thought: the day after that they will 
wilt, and the day after that they will die, while I am out here in the 
mountains. Perhaps if I started at sunrise and ran all day I would not be 
too late to save them, them and the other seeds that are going to die 
underground, though they do not know it, that are never going to see the 
light of day. There was a cord of tenderness that stretched from him to 
the patch of earth beside the dam and must be cut. It seems to him that 
one could cut a cord like that only so many times before it would not 
grow again. (65-6) 
 
The sentences of this paragraph, according to Attridge, “lead from a simple thought about 
the distant pumpkin plants into an extraordinary conceptual and emotional realm that—at 
least for the duration of the sentences—we share, yet one that retains its foreignness”.38 
However, in the paragraph Attridge quoted, rather than a realm that retains “its foreignness”, 
we can find a connection between K’s thought, pumpkins and earth through the cord that 
stretches from him to the patch of earth. Moreover, we can also find a mixture and 
intersection between subjective (“I”) and objective (“his thoughts”) discourses in the 
quoted passage. This interaction can be understood in terms of Deleuze’s claim of “the 
double becoming” of free indirect discourse in which “The author takes a step towards his 
characters, but the characters take a step towards the author: double becoming”.39 K’s 
thoughts and feelings, which are presented as if they are “flowing-matter”, interplay with 
those of a third-person narrator. In fact, the “foreignness”, or “Otherness” of K can be more 
easily located in the distance between the narrator’s (and K’s) and other people’s 
perceptions (including the medical officer’s recognition of K). Before I further consider 
this distance, it would be useful for us to look at Sue Kossew’s discussion of this issue.  
                                           
38 Ibid.  
39  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: the time-image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 222.  
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Kossew, in Pen and Power (1994), stresses how K releases his voice via “the 
narrator’s supplying of details, contrasting with the way others see him”: “The contrast is 
drawn here between the way others respond to him and the way K responds to his 
surroundings, between his outward silence and his inward eloquence”.40 Consider the 
following passage that Kossew discusses.  
 
Because of his face K did not have women friends. He was easiest 
when he was by himself. Both his jobs had given him a measure of 
solitariness, though down in the lavatories he had been oppressed by the 
brilliant neon light that shone off the white tiles and created a space 
without shadows. The parks he preferred were those with tall pine trees 
and dim agapanthus walks. Sometimes on Saturdays he failed to hear the 
boom of the noon gun and went on working by himself all through the 
afternoon. On Sunday mornings he slept late; on Sunday afternoons he 
visited his mother. (4) 
 
In the above paragraph, Kossew argues that K “responds negatively to unnatural light, 
positively to natural light and shade; his internal time does not respond to the imposed time 
of society” while “his own simple routine and solitary life have a rhythm of their own”.41 
Accordingly, in contrast to K’s voicelessness in the city, Kossew claims that his voice is 
released by connecting with the earth at the farm in the later part of the novel. In relation 
to Kossew’s reflections on the difference between K’s voicelessness in the city and his 
voice at the farm, I want to focus on K’s body and its interactions with other bodies in the 
parks. Moreover, regardless of the spaces of the city and the farm, as I have discussed, K’s 
voice is released through the mobility of his body via a third-person narrator. However, 
although K’s body has the potential for mobility, it is perceived by other people and by 
                                           
40 Kossew, Pen and Power, 141.  
41 Ibid., 142.  
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society as a representation of disfigurement, which brings about his voicelessness. In this 
context, it is necessary to examine Deleuze’s theory of the mobility of the body.  
From Deleuze’s theoretical perspective, K’s body as an image has the potential to  
transform itself rather than having to remain as a representation of the deformed body, since 
the body and image are identified with movement. Yet, a question remains: How can an 
image be mobile? Firstly, for Deleuze, an image exists in itself like matter: “This in-itself 
of the image is matter: not something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the 
absolute identity of the image and movement”.42 On the basis of this assertion, Deleuze 
compares two different perspectives of consciousness taken by Husserl and Bergson: “all 
consciousness is consciousness of something (Husserl), or more strongly all consciousness 
is something (Bergson)”.43 On the basis of this comparison, Deleuze asserts that, rather 
than being a secondary or intellectual form of matter, consciousness is matter itself. Thus, 
in his reading of Bergson, Deleuze’s argument here is that the living being can be 
understood as matter, image and movement. Secondly, for Deleuze, an identification 
between image and movement is made available by the actions and reactions of images. 
Specifically, from Deleuze’s perspective, the body is an infinite set of images, which 
references the intersections between various images of bodies. In this way, the body as an 
image, is an aggregate set of actions and reactions, which also implies a variable flux of 
movements. In Ronald Bogue’s account, for instance, “the living image may be viewed as 
a system for relaying movements—for receiving movements from outside and generating 
its own movements from within”.44 Thirdly, the movement-image thereby constitutes an 
infinite set of images, which comprises a “world of universal variation, of universal 
undulation, universal rippling: there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high, 
                                           
42 Deluze, Cinema 1, 59.  
43 Ibid., 56.  
44 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 30.  
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nor low…”.45 This flux of images is associated with what Deleuze calls the “plane [plan] 
of immanence”. The plane of immanence is an open and changing whole, since the 
movement “is established between the parts of each system and between one system and 
another which crosses them all, stirs them all up together and subjects them all to the 
condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed”. 46  Thus, the plane of 
immanence, is “the machine assemblage of movements”.47 In line with Deleuze’s idea of 
mobility, I deduce that living beings are mobile, connecting to images, bodies and matters 
in the plane of immanence. 
However, in Deleuze’s account, a human being’s perception of the body and image 
is limited. In fact, from his grounding in Bergson’s theory, Deleuze suggests a potentiality 
for seeing the object as a movement-image in the cinema, producing the “machine 
assemblage of movement-images”. Yet, the societal humanistic perception of movement is 
a process of subtraction. 
 
In perception thus defined, there is never anything else or 
anything more than there is in the thing: on the contrary, there is ‘less’. 
We perceive the thing, minus that which does not interest us as a function 
of our needs. … Which is a way of defining the first material moment of 
subjectivity: it is subtractive. It subtracts from the thing whatever does 
not interest it. But, conversely, the thing itself must then be presented in 
itself as a complete, immediate, diffuse perception.48  
 
Within a Deleuzian framework, K’s movement can thus be perceived as a complete, 
immediate, diffuse process, but the other characters’ perception of K’s image is subtractive 
                                           
45 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 58-9.  
46 Ibid., 59.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 65.  
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and distorted, producing the signification of a racial category. As mentioned above, 
consciousness is related to the process of the perception of the image. K is recognized as 
various negative images such as a “simpleton”, a “parasite” and an “arsonist”. One example 
of K’s false images is that of a servant, which is also a replication of his mother’s social 
position. Visagie’s grandson as a deserter sees K as a servant on the farm, asking: “Do you 
work here? (60)”. The grandson adds that “My grandparents were lucky to find you”. He 
goes on to say that: “People have a hard time finding good farm servants nowadays (62)”. 
However, K laments the grandson’s recognition of him: “He thinks I am an idiot who sleeps 
on the floor like an animal and lives on birds and lizards and does not know there is such a 
thing as money (62)”. In this way, the grandson’s perception of K as a servant is 
immediately denied in K’s inner mind. Nevertheless, K’s mind is not audible to the 
grandson, since his false image causes him to lose his voice as well as his mobility. In this 
context, the question of K’s movement escaping from representative images needs more 
elaboration, as will be undertaken in the next section, by examining how K’s image gains 
its movement.  
 
 
III. The extinction of the image 
 
The question of how K flees from his representative identity, which is attached to 
the images of the simpleton, parasite and arsonist, is brought into focus through Deleuze’s 
discussion of image and movement. Deleuze’s reflection on Samuel Beckett’s Film (1964) 
provides us with an exploration of how we can demolish representative identity and 
extinguish our subjectivity by focusing on the relation between perception and image. 
According to Deleuze, taking up Bishop Berkeley’s familiar formula, the Beckett of Film 
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declares “Esse est percipi: to be is to be perceived”.49 To be perceived, for Berkeley, is to 
make a living being a perceptive centre or frame, which is related to the joy of perception. 
In contrast, Deleuze and Beckett problematize “the happiness of the percipere and the 
percipi”,50 by proposing the demolition of subjectivity and suggesting a frame through 
which we may perceive ourselves. The extinction of the image is thus related to the 
movement of erasing ourselves of our subjectivity as represented by the facial form, the 
body and space. Alongside this demolition of subjectivity, Deleuze tries to show a 
movement, or transformation from “one Irishman to another, from Berkeley who perceived 
and was perceived, to Beckett who had exhausted ‘all he joy of percipere and percipi’”.51 
In this section, drawing on Deleuze’s reading of Beckett, I will examine how K’s 
representative image is extinguished in the three dimensions of perception: the perceptions 
of action, perception and affection.  
Deleuze’s exploration of the extinguished image in Beckett’s Film is useful for 
thinking of ways of escaping perception in the three steps. The problem, for the character 
O, in Film, is caused by an unbearable perception, but there is not a particular person 
looking at him in the screen. In the first step of action, the character O flees horizontally 
along the wall and climbs a staircase. The character O escapes, or “acts”, from the 
perspective of the camera, which represents perceptions of people and society: that is, in 
terms of the perception of action or an action-image. Yet, the character O suddenly stops 
action, by “hiding the threatened part of his face”.52 As Deleuze asserts, the perception of 
action can be “neutralized by stopping the action”.53 In the second step of perception, the 
character O enters a room. The camera perceives the character in the room, and the 
                                           
49 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 66.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Gilles Deleuze, “The Greatest Irish Film (Beckett’s “Film”)”, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel 
W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 23.  
52 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 67.  
53 Deleuze, Critical and Clinical, 24.  
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character perceives the room: all perception becomes double. The character O subjectively 
perceives the things and the animals in the room, while the camera objectively perceives 
the character O perceiving them: this is the perception of perception or a perception-image. 
After that, the character O takes the animals out, and covers up “all the objects which can 
act as mirrors or even a frame”, in such a way that subjective perception is eliminated and 
only the camera perception remains.54  
In the third step, the character O sits on the rocking chair and looks at photos from 
the past. The photos of his family and himself are a kind of frame imposed on his identity, 
but the character O tears up the photos. He closes his eyes, while rocking in the chair. In 
this moment, there is only one perception surviving, what Deleuze calls the perception of 
affection: the perception of self by itself. The camera perception comes to face round and 
closer to him, and then the camera perception reveals itself to be the “double” of the 
character O. In this instant, the subjective perception of the character O is identified with 
the objective perception of the camera. The perception of self will also disappear when the 
movement of the rocking chair stops and the character O dies: “This is what the end 
suggests—death, immobility, blackness”.55 At last, the character O closes his eyes and the 
screen ends up empty and black. Through the extinction of the action-image, perception-
image and affection-image, the character O, as Deleuze claims, demolishes his self, while 
moving towards a zone of indiscernibility. Eventually, the character O no longer moves, 
but becomes an element that moves: “Becoming imperceptible is Life, ‘without cessation 
or condition’ . . . attaining to cosmic and spiritual lapping”.56 
In the light of Deleuze’s theory of the extinction of the image, we can better 
understand K’s escape and its affinity with the erasure of the character O’s identity. As we 
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have seen, K as a living being is movement in a Deleuzian sense, but his mobility is 
regulated and blocked under the regime of apartheid during the turbulent times of civil war. 
In this regard, it is necessary to examine K’s escape in relation to his suppressed mobility 
within the regime. K’s escape can then be rethought by linking to Berkeley’s formula of 
perception and Deleuze and Beckett’s subversion of that formula. Firstly, K’s endless 
movement is associated with the perception of action systematically worked on and 
controlled by the regime. As I have mentioned earlier, people’s movements are controlled 
and blocked by a range of regulations such as curfews and permits. These regulations 
ceaselessly function as inspections, which enact the surveillance of power everywhere. 
However, through his travels with his mother on the wheelbarrow, K begins to leave the 
permitted district and to cross prohibited spaces. This can also be seen as K’s movement to 
avoid the gaze of apartheid. Nevertheless, K is interned in the labor camp on the way to 
Prince Albert. The camp is, from Michel Foucault’s perspective, a space of the 
“Panopticon”, or an architecture for surveilling inmates. According to Foucault, the major 
effect of the Panopticon is “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power”.57 Foucault goes on to say that 
“To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly 
observed by an inspector: too little for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; 
too much, because he has no need in fact of being so”.58 In the enclosed and segmented 
camp, vagrants (including K) are visible to armed guards on the porch of the guard house. 
The formerly invisible vagrants of “No fixed abode” (80) are now fixed and imprisoned by 
the gaze of power. Nevertheless, K escapes from the camp and its surveillance, which, from 
Deleuze’s and Beckett’s perspective, can be seen as an escape from the perception of action.    
                                           
57 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979), 201.  
58 Ibid.  
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K thinks that the farm in Prince Albert may be an ideal place to escape from 
surveillance. At the farm, he finds his voice that he has previously suppressed: “It was the 
first time he had heard his own voice since Prince Albert. He thought: Here I can make any 
sound I like” (56). Thus, feeling “as insubstantial as air”, he “sang to himself and heard his 
voice echo from walls and ceiling” (58). After that, K distributes his mother’s ashes over 
the earth, thinking that his mother had grown up there. And then he immediately thinks of 
cultivating the farm rather than moving on: “This was the beginning of his life as a 
cultivator” (59). K goes on to think: “It is because I am a gardener, he thought because that 
is my nature” (59). However, as we have seen, when Visagie’s grandson turns up, K is 
perceived as a servant. This man also regards the farm as a hiding place. As if the grandson 
is the double of K, he escapes from the war and arrives at the farm. Yet, perceiving the 
perception of the grandson, K flees from his eyes. This is the “perception of perception” 
like the mirror of Beckett’s character O. K digs a burrow above the farm in order to hide 
his body, and thinks: “Now surely I have come as far as a man can come; surely no one 
will be mad enough to cross the plains, climb these mountains, search these rocks to find 
me, surely now that in all the world only I know where I am, I can think of myself as lost” 
(66). K’s digging of a burrow is an attempt to find a way out of perception, generating his 
transformation in a new environment: “He thought of himself as a termite boring its way 
through a rock. There seemed nothing to do but live. He sat so still that it would not have 
startled him if birds had flown down and perched on his shoulders (66)”. In this way, living 
in the cave, K transforms himself into a “different kind of man” (67). Nevertheless, K can 
no longer hide his body, since he is captured by solders, and is once again confined in the 
labor camp. His body is once more visible under surveillance. Subsequently, K’s movement 
within space is faced with the limit of escaping from the perception of the regime. This is 
also interconnected with a weakness of movement from the perception of action.  
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 In line with Deleuze’s account of both the perceptions of perception and affection, 
we can see how K extinguishes his subjectivity. Firstly, K renounces his affiliation with his 
family. K’s lack of a family name implies his ambivalent pedigree. His mother Anna, who 
alludes to his social and economic position, dies in the earliest part of the novel. His 
scattering of her ashes is comparable to O’s tearing of the family photos. His mother never 
told him about his father, but K rather perceives his father as “Huis Norenius”, namely “the 
list of rules on the door of the dormitory, the twenty-ones rules” (104-5). In this regard, K 
erases “the perception of affection” related to his family, distributing his mother’s ashes 
and escaping from the rules of his father. K also thinks about his own lack of progeny:  
 
How fortunate that I have no children, he thought: how fortunate 
that I have no desire to father. I would not know what to do with a child 
out here in the heart of the country, who would need milk and clothes 
and friend and schooling. I would fail in my duties, I would be the worst 
of fathers. Whereas it is not hard to live a life that consists merely of 
passing time. I am one of the fortunate ones who escape being called. 
(104) 
 
K’s affiliation with the family is thus disconnected from his escape from the perception of 
affection.  
Secondly, there is also the extinction of K’s identity in relation to the medical 
officer’s perception. The medical officer, as the first-person narrator, persistently tries to 
let K tell his story and attempts to interpret it. However, the medical officer’s quest to 
interpret K fails. Sympathizing with K’s starvation, the medical officer doubts the 
categorization of K recorded in the register: an arsonist, an escapee from a camp, an illegal 
runner of the abandoned farm and a supplier of food to the local guerillas. However, as an 
interrogator whose role is to interpret K and make him visible, the medical officer only 
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finds him indiscernible like a “stone, a pebble” (135). Thus, from the medical officer’s 
perspective, K remains obscure in relation to the expected categories of human being: “No 
papers, no money; no family, no friends, no sense of who you are. The obscurest of the 
obscure, so obscure as to be a prodigy” (142). From the medical officer’s perceptive, K 
comes to be indiscernible: “a human soul above and beneath classification, a soul blessedly 
untouched by doctrine, untouched by history, a soul stirring its wings within that stiff 
sarcophagus, murmuring behind that clownish mask” (151). He concludes: “You are 
precious, Michaels, in your way; you are the last of your kind, a creature left over from an 
earlier age … orphanage” (151). K is ‘a prodigy’, a relict, something that escapes 
classification. Yet, the extinction of K’s subjectivity needs further exploration, which can 
be achieved by discussing his refusal to eat in the camps, since his refusal signifies the 
demolition of his body and life. In the next section, drawing on Deleuze’s and Beckett’s 




IV.  The exhausted man 
 
Compared to Herman Melville’s character of Bartleby in “Bartleby, the Scrivener: 
A Story of Wallstreet”, who presents the extreme of immobility, Michael K can be seen as 
a figure of nomadic mobility. According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Bartleby is 
“immobile, almost petrified in his pure passivity”, whereas K is, “always on his feet, always 
moving”.59 More importantly, Hardt and Negri describe K as a “figure of absolute refusal”: 
                                           




K “does not keep moving just for the sake of perpetual motion. The barriers do not just 
block motion, they seem to stop life, and thus he refuses them absolutely in order to keep 
life in motion”.60 However, in spite of their praise of K’s mobility, Hardt and Negri believe 
that K’s refusal to eat has an affinity with Bartleby’s refusal on the grounds that their 
behaviors are passive, and not fully resistant against the regime. Thus, Hardt and Negri 
critically suggest that “The refusal certainly is the beginning of a liberatory politics, but it 
is only a beginning. The refusal in itself is empty”.61 Additionally, from Hardt and Negri’s 
perspective, it is more problematic that K’s and Bartleby’s refusal will end up with their 
biological death, as a kind of social suicide. As the medical officer in the rehabilitation 
camp says, K’s refusal to eat may be an act of freedom, but it will cause him to starve to 
death (146). However, I will propose here that this can be rethought by means of Deleuze’s 
conception of “exhaustion”, developed through his reading of Beckett, and that K’s refusal 
can be linked to the infinite movement through Deleuze’s conception of “exhaustion”.  
In order to explore K’s exhaustion as conceptualized by Deleuze, I want to begin 
with K’s diet as an ethical mode of bodily transformation. Before K lives on the farm in 
Prince Albert, his diet is not very distinctive. This is illustrated in a description of K’s desire 
for the luscious food shown in the photos of a magazine. Absorbed in the images of the 
food, K shows his mother “a picture of a gleaming flank of roast pork garnished with 
cherries and pineapple rings and set off with a bowl of raspberries and cream and a 
gooseberry tart” (16). However, K’s diet dramatically changes when he moves to Prince 
Albert. Because of his hunger, K hunts goats running on Visagie’s farm. Yet, K decides not 
to eat animal meat, following his distressing experience of killing the goats at the farm. 
Seeing the corpse that he had killed, K thinks: “The urgency of the hunger that had 
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possessed him yesterday was gone. The thought of cutting up and devouring this ugly thing 
with its wet, matted hair repelled him” (55). Thus, this killing of the goat brings about K’s 
feeling of repulsion towards eating meat.  
Another change in K’s diet comes about during his imprisonment in the forced labor 
camp, where K’s appetite gets smaller and smaller. Interned in the Jakkalsdrif camp that 
forces vagrants to work for food, K does not want to become a servant or to feel hunger 
again. Compared to the prison, the labor camp is regarded as a place set up to provide for 
vagrants who need food, jobs, and houses: “A camp is for people without jobs. It is for all 
the people who go around from farm to farm begging for work because they haven’t got 
food, they haven’t got a roof over their heads” (78). The logic of the camp is thus 
inextricably linked with both labor and hunger. However, K refuses food in the camp. When 
he hides his body in the cave, he thinks: “Hunger was a sensation he did not feel and barely 
remembered. If he ate, eating what he could find, it was because he had not yet shaken off 
the belief that bodies that do not eat die” (101). K’s sensation of hunger may be understood 
as his physical reaction to food, but it is also associated with his ethical way of dieting and 
its relation to the milieus that force him to be immobile. Significantly, his sense of taste is 
recovered when he grows and eats pumpkins: “He chewed with tears of joy in his eyes. The 
best, he thought, the very best pumpkin I have tasted. For the first time since he had arrived 
in the country he found pleasure in eating” (113). The pumpkins K grows could thus be 
seen as the “bread of freedom” (146). In this context, we could also think that, having fled 
again from the camp, he becomes an object of pity under the care of beach nomads in Sea 
Point, where he thinks of living on just a spoonful of water: “there would be water in the 
bowl of the spoon; and in that way he would say, one can live” (184).  
However, his refusal to eat cannot be seen merely as a resistance against the camp 
or as an act of freedom fleeing from the limits of his movement in space, but it can also be 
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associated with a stoppage of any movements related to the logic of the camps to achieve 
another kind of mobility, or a qualitative leap. In order to further explore this issue, it is 
necessary to rethink the medical officer’s question regarding K’s refusal to eat:   
 
Your body rejected the food we fed you and you grew even 
thinner. Why? I asked myself: why will this man not eat when he is 
plainly starving? Then as I watched you day after day I slowly began to 
understand the truth: that you were crying secretly, unknown to your 
conscious self (forgive the term), for a different kind of food, food that 
no camp could supply. Your will remained pliant but your body was 
crying to be fed its own food, and only that. Now I had been taught that 
the body contains no ambivalence. The body, I had been taught, wants 
only to live. Suicide, I had understood, is an act not of the body against 
itself but of the will against the body. Yet here I beheld a body that was 
going to die rather than change its nature. (163-4) 
 
From within the frame of the medical officer’s logic, it can be seen that K’s refusal is an 
act against his body and the survival instinct of the body, even if the refusal also embodies 
his will protesting against the violence of confinement. In other words, K’s will ignores his 
body’s need, in contrast to the medical officer’s belief that the hierarchy of the body over 
the will is unquestionable. Rather, K prioritizes another kind of need, as his appetite 
integrates and interplays with his will to eat his favorite food: pumpkins that he grows 
himself. Moreover, K clarifies the purpose of his refusal by not referencing the will to die 
but rather by stating that he cannot eat the camp food (146). From this, it can be concluded 
that there is a difference between K’s refusal and the medical officer’s understanding of his 
diet. Fleeing from the immobility arising from hunger, K stops his movements concerned 
with the needs of the body, opening up a zone of indeterminacy. This leads us to an 
ontological approach towards the issue of K’s refusal, as his refusal marks the impasse 
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between movements and meanings.  
Deleuze’s reference to “exhaustion” in his reading of Beckett’s works provides us 
with an ontological way of approaching K’s refusal to eat. According to Deleuze, “Being 
exhausted is much more than being tired”.62 With this claim, Deleuze further distinguishes 
an exhausted person from a tired person:  
 
“It’s not just tiredness, I’m not just tired, in spite of the climb”.63 
The tired person no longer has any (subjective) possibility at his disposal; 
he therefore cannot realize the slightest (objective) possibility. But the 
latter remains, because one can never realize the whole of the possible; 
in fact, one even creates the possible to the extent that one realizes it. The 
tired person has merely exhausted the realization, whereas the exhausted 
person exhausts the whole of the possible. The Tired person can no 
longer realize, but the exhausted person can no longer possibilize.64  
 
In this paragraph, Deleuze explains how a tired person exhausts the realization, while an 
exhauster exhausts the possible. One example of the realization described by Deleuze 
relates to the selection among possible variations and substitutions: “when one realizes 
some of the possible, one does so according to certain goals, plans and preferences; I put 
on shoes to go out, and slippers when I stay in”.65 Yet, the realization of the possibilities 
“always proceeds through exclusion, because it presupposes preferences and goals that vary, 
always replacing the preceding ones”.66 Thus, a tired person becomes tired of realizing 
these specific variations, substitutions and exclusions, but possibility as such always 
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However, instead of the selections and exclusions of a tired person, Deleuze 
proposes that an exhausted person exhausts the possible, and the exhaustion of the 
exhausted person expands the possibilities into the impossible circumstance. Exhaustion is, 
according to Deleuze, a state that combines the set of variables in a situation, “on the 
condition that one renounces any order of preference, any organization in relation to a goal, 
any signification”.67 Thus, the following statement becomes a combination of exhaustion: 
“shoes, one stay in; slippers, one goes out”. Yet, Deleuze clarifies that these combinations 
of exhaustion are neither used for contradiction nor for passivity, but instead as a method 
of remaining active for nothing. Deleuze goes on to say: “One was tired of something, but 
one is exhausted by nothing”.68 An example that Deleuze gives is Beckett’s “I gave up 
before birth”69, where the character is exhausted before birth, before realizing anything. 
Drawing on another example from Beckett’s Murphy, Deleuze recounts how the hero, 
Murphy multiplies the combinations of five small biscuits, yet “on the condition of having 
vanquished all order of preference, and of having thereby conquered the hundred and 
twenty modes of total permutability”. 70  In order to explain Murphy’s combinatorial 
exhaustion, Deleuze provides the following analysis:  
 
Overcome by these perspectives Murphy fell forward on his face in the grass, 
beside those biscuits of which it could be said as truly as of the stars, that one 
differed from another; but of which he could not partake in their fullness until 
he had learnt not to prefer any one to any other.71  
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69 Samuel Beckett, I Gave Up Before Birth, in Collected Shorter Prose: 1945-1980 (London: 
Calder, 1984), 197-8.  
70 Deleuze, “The Exhausted”, 153.  
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As a result, the movement of the exhauster is inaccessible to its realization. Instead it 
becomes the infinite in the realm of the possible.   
In his account of exhaustion, Deleuze’s view of K’s refusal is reflected in his affinity 
with Beckett’s characters, as they renounce and exhaust “all need, preference, goal or 
signification” (154). As we have seen, K’s refusal is absolute, as he attempts to flee from 
all categorization, confinement, hunger and care, and thereby to exhaust any significations 
concerned with his movements. This can be found in K’s exhaustion as an example of his 
preference for nothing, which can be seen as divergent from tiredness. Before excavating 
the issue of his preference for nothing, it is worth considering again K’s escape, or 
movement from the camps, in order to delve into K’s exhaustion. Fleeing again from the 
camps, K’s running away does not make him tired: “He walked all night, feeling no fatigue, 
trembling sometimes with the thrill of being free” (97). Passing the boundaries without a 
permit, he becomes “a trespasser as well as a runaway” (97) within a society. This is a point 
where K moves into a qualitative leap rather than involving a movement traveled in space. 
K’s flight neither just resists against, nor runs away from the rules of apartheid that 
dominate and block his movements, but rather it is a move into “nowhere”. In this way, K 
says “I live in the veld”, and immediately adds “I live nowhere” (120). K’s preference for 
“nowhere” displays his exhaustion as an unlimited movement towards utopia.  
 K’s refusal of a place of residence can also be linked to a motionless mobility by 
means of an exhaustion of any meanings and significations, and this is relative to Murphy’s 
development of a preference for nothing: “not to prefer anyone to any other”. K’s refusal 
is thus connected to what Deleuze calls “Bartleby’s Beckettian formula” of “I would prefer 
not to”.72 Indeed, K’s refusal to eat can equally be conceived as a Bartleby’s Beckettian 
formula of “I would prefer not to eat”. The issue here is the question of how this formula 
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is distinguishable from Deleuze’s account of tiredness. In his essay, “Bartleby; or, The 
Formula”, Deleuze suggests several variants of Bartleby’s formula, as if Beckett’s 
characters play with the combinations, producing their preference for nothing: “I prefer to 
give no answer”, “I would prefer not to be a little reasonable”, “I would prefer not to take 
a clerkship”, “I would prefer to be doing something else”.73 After these variations, Deleuze 
adds Bartleby’s phrases of “I am not particular” (Deleuze’s emphasis): “but I am not a 
particular case”, “there is nothing particular about me”. 74  In Deleuze’s reference to 
Bartleby’s formula, it is evident that its variants are not alternatives to or preferences among 
the combinations of possible selections. The formula instead exhausts all alternatives. 
Deleuze explains the concomitant effects of Bartleby’s formula:  
 
It implies that Bartleby stop copying, that is, he stops reproducing 
words; it hollows out a zone of indetermination that renders words 
indistinguishable, that creates a vacuum within language [langage]. But 
it also stymies the speech acts that a boss uses to command, that a kind 
friend uses to ask questions or a man of faith to make promises. If 
Bartleby had refused, he could still be seen as a rebel or insurrectionary, 
and as such would still have a social role. But the formula stymies all 
speech acts, and at the same time, it makes Bartleby a pure outsider 
[exclu] to whom no social position can be attributed.75 
 
As Deleuze suggests, Bartleby’s refusal generates a hole within language, constituting a 
zone of indetermination or indiscernibility. Deleuze does not make him become a rebel but 
“a pure outsider. In this regard, it is important to note Deleuze’s quotation of Mathieu 
Lindon’s remarks, “the formula ‘disconnects’ words and things, words and actions, but also 
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speech acts and words—it severs language from all reference, in accordance with 
Bartleby’s absolute vocation, to be a man without reference”.76  
As I have suggested, K’s refusal exhausts the variants of preference in accordance 
with Bartleby’s formula of “I prefer not to”. As a result of his refusal, K becomes “a pure 
outsider” as a man without reference rather than a rebel or a revolutionary. In line with 
Deleuze’s analysis of Bartleby’s formula, K also makes a hole in the logic of the medical 
officer and other people. K’s formula of “I prefer not to” causes the medical officer to create 
a hole within the logic of reason and the body that he relies on. As we have seen, while the 
medical officer thereby thinks that K’s refusal refers to an act of searching for the bread of 
freedom, he can never comprehend K’s refusal to eat when he faces starving to death. For 
the medical officer, K becomes an “albatross” around his neck (146). In this sense, K’s 
refusal is infectious for the medical officer. The issue of K’s refusal is thereby linked to the 
medical officer’s own matter. For this reason, the medical officer begs K: “I appeal to you, 
Michaels yield! (152)”. Nevertheless, it is here that I need to evoke Hardt’s and Negri’s 
argument relating to Bartleby’s and K’s absolute refusals and their effects of biological 
death in order to conclude my argument concerning K’s mobility. Similar to Hardt’s and 
Negri’s assertion of Bartleby’s immobility, K’s decision to live on a spoonful of water 
seems irrelevant to corporeal mobility. Rather it characterizes immobility. However, as 
Deleuze notes, Bartleby is “someone who is born to and stays in a particular place”,77 but 
his refusal contaminates others and proliferates their mobility, opening up a zone of 
indetermination:  
 
It is the attorney who broke the arrangement he himself had 
organized, and from the debris Bartleby pulls a trait of an expression, I 
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PREFER NOT TO, which will proliferate around him and contaminate 
the others, sending the attorney fleeing. But it will also send language 
itself into flight, it will open up a zone of indetermination or 
indiscernibility in which neither words nor characters can be 
distinguished—the fleeing attorney and the immobile, petrified 
Bartleby.78 
 
In this context, compared to Bartleby’s immobility and its contamination, K transforms his 
mobility into immobility through the dimension of geography. K, as a racial and social 
other in apartheid South Africa, searches for his endless mobility, but K’s flight is, as I have 
argued, eventually blocked by the logic of hunger. Thus, K stops moving and eating in the 
space of South Africa, in order to regain his mobility as matter and image. This is, as I have 
examined, relevant to K’s exhaustion of the possibilities concerning an oppressive society. 
Accordingly, the implausibility of Hardt and Negri’s claim that K’s refusal is empty, is 
shown, since K’s refusal actually makes impossible the structures of classification, 
confinement and signification under apartheid. This impossibility creates unlimited 
movements within the enclosed systems and logic of power, which proliferates a flow of 
movement in an oppressive society. Consequently, through the extinction of his 
representative identity as the racial and social other, K becomes the imperceptible in an 
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In this chapter, I have explored the protagonist K’s representative image and his 
movement towards extinguishing the image, drawing on Deleuze’s account of the 
“extinguished image” and the “exhaustion”. The novel demonstrates the strategies of power 
used to control the lives of the vagrants in apartheid South Africa, by means of both 
classification and confinement. K, as a nomad, is confined in labour camps, but he endlessly 
escapes. The escapee also refuses to eat or to speak in the camps. I have described how 
many commentators have been concerned with K’s escape and refusal, and the elusiveness 
of his categorization, confinement and signification. These commentaries have engaged 
with both the virtues and the weak points of his escape. On the one hand, although he 
escapes from the camps, K neglects the issue of political transformation under the apartheid 
regime. On the other hand, K’s escape has ethical and political implications, marking a 
limit to the logic of classification and confinement. In this context, I have argued that other 
theorists have not sufficiently explored K’s active movement grounded in the mobility of 
his image, the extinguished image, and the exhaustion, a deficit that has been addressed in 
my chapter.  
In order to examine K’s movement, firstly, I have discussed how K’s identity is 
constituted as a representation of his disfigured body and race. Rather than being seen as a 
mobility of matter and movement, K’s body is perceived as a negative image because of 
his deformed lips and more broadly through racial and social categories, which cause his 
internment in the camps. Drawing on Deleuze’s theoretical perspective of the identification 
between matter, image and movement, this chapter has also considered the process of the 
abstraction or representation of K’s face and body, through the subtraction of its movement. 
The representative image of K’s body is also relevant to Deleuze’s conception of faciality, 
or a signification of image. K’s face is facialized as a coloured vagrant or parasite, which 
blocks his movement. Secondly, I have put forward a theory of the extinction of K’s 
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representative image by means of Deleuze’s reflection on Samuel Beckett’s Film. In his 
analysis of Beckett’s work, Deleuze proposes the extinction of the three perceptions of 
action, perception and affection. From Deleuze’s perspective, K’s escape from the camps 
is related to the demolition of the surveillance of power that perceives action as taking place 
everywhere. Recognizing the negativity in Visagie’s grandson’s perception of him as a 
servant, K flees from the perception of perception. After that, K erases the categorization 
of self, extinguishing his affiliation with the family. Thirdly, I have delved into K’s refusal, 
drawing on Deleuze’s and Beckett’s perspectives on “exhaustion”. As Deleuze notes, an 
exhauster makes realization impossible, drawing the preference for nothing, rather than for 
selection and exclusion among the various combinations. K’s refusal to eat and speak 
involves an exhaustion of all needs, preferences and significations and thereby has an 
affinity with Bartleby’s absolute refusal—“I would prefer not to”. Because of his absolute 
refusal, K becomes a pure outsider and escapee, by creating the exhaustive terms within 
the dominant logic and power. As a result, K becomes indiscernible from the perception of 
power, whilst regaining the movement of his body and image. In this context, his becoming-
indiscernible can be seen as a demolition of his subjectivity constituted by the regime, 
which is similarly found in the Magistrate’s and Mrs. Curren’s dissolution of their 
subjectivity, despite the difference between their racial and social positions in the regimes. 
K’s escape, subsequently, becomes an ethical and political movement, by exposing the 
limits of power under the apartheid regime. Also, K’s refusal to eat displays an ontological 
movement that exhausts the possibilities concerning oppressive discourse in apartheid 





The impersonal power of illness in Age of Iron 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore the inorganic and generative power of illness that forces 
an individual into a collective and impersonal subjectivity in J. M. Coetzee’s epistolary 
novel, Age of Iron (1990), with particular reference to Gilles Deleuze’s conceptions of 
illness and death. Illness in our culture is viewed as life-threatening and destructive, and 
thus embodies negative connotations. However, the core of weakness or disease, in a 
Deleuzian vein, enables us to engage with the inorganic processes of self-dissolution and 
affectivity rather than with the self and body bounded as a unified whole, namely, organism. 
Yet, Deleuze and Guattari do not deny a conception of the body as an assemblage of organs. 
Rather, they attempt to criticize an organization of the organs of bodies into an entity called 
an organism. As I have discussed in the Introduction, the body is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
view, an assemblage of organs, with the capacity for motion and rest, as well as for affecting 
and being affected by other bodies. However, rather than its mobility and affectivity, the 
body can be organized or stratified as a centralized, hierarchized, self-directed form. From 
Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, the inorganic processes caused by physical weakness 
can provide us with an experience of cracking and fragmenting the organized body and self, 
which generates a state of impersonality or a non-personal mode of self. In this chapter, I 
will investigate the sickness of the protagonist Mrs. Curren in the novel as an example of 
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this impersonality, thus creating an associative link between her personal frailty and the 
societal illness of the apartheid regime in South Africa. I will suggest that Curren’s 
witnessing of the horrors of the regime generates the conditions of potentiality for an 
ethico-political transformation on a personal level. In this context, relating the inorganic 
nature of illness and death in the novel, I will explore the transformation of personal frailty 
and death into an impersonality that creates the potentiality for a new vision of the apartheid 
regime.       
Personal frailty and death in the novel are explicably caused and influenced by the 
growing risk and violence of the apartheid regime. Mrs. Curren, a retired Classics professor, 
is dying of terminal cancer in Cape Town, due to the “accumulation of shame she has 
endured”1 in living under the violent regime. Her sense of shame entails her “self-loathing”, 
and in response her body “turns malignant and begins to eat away at itself” (145). While 
she is dying, Mrs. Curren writes the letter describing her sickness to her daughter in 
America. However, she requires a homeless man, Vercueil to post the letter to her daughter, 
only after her own death. Around the same time as she is writing a letter, young black 
revolutionaries, who proclaim “liberation before education”, are massacred by the police. 
These events take place in the particularly agitated years of the second State of Emergency 
(1985-1989).2 David Attwell describes the South Africa that was at stake in the context of 
Coetzee’s novel:  
 
                                           
1 J.M. Coetzee, Age of Iron (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 145.  
2 Graham Huggan calls this novel an “elegy,” as Coetzee mourns the tragic deaths of his own family 
members and black people: “Written between 1986 and 1989, the novel is also set in that turbulent 
period of South Africa’s history; years which were to witness the tragic deaths of his family 
members—his mother Vera, his father Zachariah and his son Nicolas, to whose memory the novel 
is dedicated—but also, in violence of cataclysmic proportions, the deaths of thousands of blacks in 
the cities and townships of the embattled Republic”. Graham Huggan, “Evolution and Entropy in 
J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron”, Critical Perspectives on J.M. Coetzee (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1996), 191.   
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…the police have a free hand under emergency regulations to dispense casual 
injury or death at random, and they do so; on the other side, the young 
militants of the townships have resorted to a hardened rhetoric of absolutes, 
sacrificing their youth to the all-encompassing demands of the struggle.3  
 
In a dying country, which resembles a “sinking ship” (22), the pathological symptoms of 
Mrs. Curren’s emotional and intellectual anguish are detailed alongside black people’s 
torment and deaths. In particular, black people’s voices are directly heard, which is not seen 
in Coetzee’s earlier fictions: the eponymous protagonist in Life & Times of Michael K (1983) 
is compelled to silence, while the slave Friday’s tongue in Foe (1986) is already mutilated. 
In this way, Jane Poyner asserts that “for the first time in the oeuvre black voices are 
portrayed with tangible (political) agency”.4 Similarly, Dominic Head points out that the 
novel “seemed to represent a clear departure for Coetzee, his most ‘realistic’ novel evoking 
the Cape Town unrest of 1986”.5 Head goes on to assert that “There is certainly a brooding 
anger and immediacy in this novel”.6  Subsequently, through Mrs. Curren’s corporeal 
frailty, the novel responds to the suffering of black people beyond the personal domain, 
while embodying collective black voices and speaking out against the malignant regime.  
However, with regard to the political predicament in South Africa, it is critical to 
question why Mrs. Curren’s pain is able to function as an integral element. Taking Mrs. 
Curren’s position into account is an important point for characterizing her shame and illness 
in the particular years of the apartheid regime. As a white liberal English-speaking woman, 
Mrs. Curren’s position is located between the apartheid regime and the black people. As 
Patrick Hayes observes, in this context, at work are “two competing forms of a difference-
                                           
3 David Attwell, J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), 120.  
4 Jane Poyner, “Writing in the Face of Death”, J.M. Coetzee and the Paradox of Postcolonial 
Authorship (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 114.  
5 Dominic Head, J.M. Coetzee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.   
6 Ibid., 4-5.  
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based politics”7: the apartheid regime, which refuses equal recognition of the majority of 
the population, and the members of the fractured black family, whose lives are dominated 
by the need to resist this regime. Taking the position of a liberal humanitarian, Mrs. Curren 
strongly criticizes both these forms of politics: the apartheid regime and the acts of the 
black revolutionaries. While criticizing the racial discrimination of the regime, Mrs. Curren 
also blames the black revolutionaries, since black youths are forced to sacrifice their lives 
in the name of “comradeship” (150). Nevertheless, her criticisms of the revolutionaries 
often reveal her own limitations, since she has never observed or experienced black 
people’s struggles and deaths directly, but rather has heard of them from Florence, her black 
maid. For this reason, as Hayes rightly asserts, Mrs. Curren’s voice “is pointedly ignored, 
both by the South African police she encounters and by the black people she knows, and is 
without any practical influence in the events that unfold around her”.8 In this context, the 
limitations of Mrs. Curren’s liberal humanism for comprehending the suffering of black 
people in the apartheid regime has an affinity with that of the Magistrate in Waiting for the 
Barbarians, which I have discussed in the first chapter. The corporeal torments that both 
suffer enact their transformations, which enable them to develop an ethical relationship 
with the Other.  
However, with reference to Mrs. Curren’s illness, it is important to note that Mrs. 
Curren’s corporeal frailty is associated with self-dissolution, as she responds to the 
suffering of black people under the State of Emergency. As I have asserted in the 
Introduction, Coetzee, in an interview with Attwell, places an emphasis on the authority of 
the suffering body: “Not grace, then, but at least the body. Let me put it baldly: in South 
Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body. … the 
                                           
7 Patrick Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the novel (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
131.  
8 Ibid.  
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suffering body takes this authority: that is its power”.9 In this interview, Coetzee’s assertion 
of the suffering body is related to the bodies of black people exploited by white people in 
South African history. Compared to the suffering of black people, Mrs. Curren’s ailment 
seems to be personal, since her cancer does not lead to her activity against the apartheid 
regime. A question here arises surrounding the suffering of white people, especially in 
relation to whether or not Mrs. Curren’s ailing body could have an undeniable authority in 
the ethical and political dimensions that Coetzee suggests. My contention here is thus that, 
by coming to terms with her illness, Mrs. Curren is immanently capable of partaking in the 
shifting politics of South Africa and is also capable of transforming her shame into 
impersonal disease and death. In terms of Deleuze’s theories, illness provides Mrs. Curren 
with an experience of dis-identification, which ultimately brings her to revise her 
perceptions of the black revolution.    
In order to examine the impersonal power of illness and weakness, it is useful to 
draw on the Deleuzian conceptions of illness and death, as Deleuze describes them in The 
Logic of Sense and Critical and Clinical. An illness such as cancer is generally thought to 
be “intractable and capricious—that is, a disease not understood—in an era in which 
medicine’s central premise is that all diseases can be cured”. 10  However, Deleuze 
characterizes illness as the inorganic life of the body, which is available for the self to enter 
into a process of impersonal life. In this way, one “no longer has a Self by which it might 
distinguish itself from or merge with others”.11  Yet, it is also crucial to note that an 
impersonality “is not a generality but a singularity at its highest point”.12 Deleuze draws 
                                           
9 J.M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 248.  
10 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor & Aids and its Metaphors (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 
5.  
11 Gilles Deleuze, Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 26.  
12 Ibid., 3.  
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on an example of impersonality in Charles Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend to illustrate this: 
in the interval between life and death, the disreputable Rogue Riderhood’s life “gives way 
to an impersonal and yet singular life”.13 Deleuze goes on to explain this moment:  
 
… a “Homo tantum” with whom everyone empathizes, and who 
attains a sort of beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer an individuation but of 
a singularization: a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, 
for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made 
it good or bad. The life of such individuality fades away in favor of the 
singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be 
mistaken for no other. A singular life essence, a life …14 
 
Through a process of “im-personalization”, Riderhood, according to John Rajchman, 
becomes our “common friend” beyond good and bad. In a Deleuzian view, the process 
opens up a “‘virtuality’ in the life of the corresponding individual that can sometimes 
emerge in the strange interval before death”.15 As Clare Colebrook points out, an “anti-
Deleuzian Deleuze”16 emerges in his vision of “the virtual”, which has problematically 
been discussed by critics such as Alain Badiou.17 However, Deleuze’s conception of the 
virtual does not exist beyond a reality, but rather both composes reality and contains all 
possible realities. Specifically, Deleuze describes the virtual as “not something that lacks 
                                           
13 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman, intro. John Rajchman 
(New York: Zone Books, 2005), 28.  
14 Ibid., 28-9.  
15 John Rajchman, “Introduction”, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman, intro. 
John Rajchman (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 14.    
16 Clare Colebrook, “Anti-Vitalism: Kaufman’s Deleuze of Inertia”, Postmodern Culture, 23:1 
(September 2012), 1.  
17 Alain Badiou criticizes Deleuze’s conception of the virtual on the basis that it is a sort of 
Platonism: “I would readily state that, whereas my aim is to found a Platonism of the multiple, 
Deleuze’s concern was with a Platonism of the virtual. Deleuze retains from Plato the univocal 
sovereignty of the One, but sacrifices the determination of the Idea as always actual. For him, the 
Idea is the virtual totality, the One is the infinite reservoir of dissimilar productions” (46). Alain 
Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), 46.  
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reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that 
gives it its particular reality”. 18  Deleuze also highlights the reality of the virtual in 
Difference and Repetition: “The only danger in all this is that the virtual could be confused 
with the possible. The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible 
is therefore a ‘realization’. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a 
full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization”.19 In this context, the 
virtual enables us to experience our openness to the Other through the process of 
impersonalization. In Deleuze’s ontology, the virtual is composed of “the pre-individual 
singularities” that are not actualized by an individual. This conception of the virtual makes 
possible impersonal or non-personal singularity.  
A further example of illness as an impersonality can be found in Deleuze’s reading 
of Nietzsche. Deleuze, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, posits illness as an inorganic force that 
separates us from the organic action of the body and which may even act as a source of 
resilience:    
 
Illness … separates me from what I can do, as reactive force it 
makes me reactive, it narrows my possibilities and condemns me to a 
diminished milieu to which I can do no more than adapt myself. But, in 
another way, it reveals to me a new capacity, it endows me with a new 
will that I can make my own, going to the limit of a strange power.20  
 
Illness as a reactive force is thereby able to guide us to witness “something in life” beyond 
the personal domain. In particular, great authors, in literature and philosophy are, according 
                                           
18 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 31.  
19 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 211.  
20  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 66.  
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to Deleuze and Guattari, often fragile, “not because of their illness or neuroses” which 
causes them to escape from life, but because they have witnessed and experienced 
“something in life that is too much for anyone”.21 As a result, the authors may write of 
personal sickness, but what is diagnosed in their writings is less a personal affair than 
something impersonal. In the same way, Mrs. Curren’s writing of personal sickness offers 
the possibility for transforming her personal affairs into an impersonal dimension, drawing 
on a new mode of inter-subjectivity that the subject coexists and interacts with the Other in 
the corporeal and incorporeal dimensions. This mode of inter-subjectivity can provide 
ethico-political implications in South Africa where an interaction between black people 
and white people has been blocked.    
In this chapter, I will explore how Mrs. Curren’s sickness under the apartheid 
regime has ethico-political implications in terms of Deleuze’s theory of illness and death. 
Firstly, I will examine how Mrs. Curren’s terminal cancer provides her with an experience 
of being split in and through the Other, by drawing on Deleuze’s conception of corporeal 
and incorporeal cracks. Secondly, the deaths of the black revolutionaries will be examined 
in connection with Mrs. Curren’s state of dying, utilizing Deleuze’s theory of the dual 
natures of death: personal and impersonal deaths. Finally, Mrs. Curren’s epistolary form of 
writing will be discussed in terms of Deleuze’s conception of an impersonal writing. 
Subsequently, rather than reading her illness as a metaphor for the virulent regime in a 
turbulent age, my approach will be focused on Mrs. Curren’s corporeal frailty and its 
relation to an inorganic and generative power. In the process, I will thus suggest an 
impersonal singularity for apartheid South Africa, whilst providing an ontological vision 
for a new state.   . 
                                           
21 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 





II. Subjectivity as a crack 
 
Disease in the novel can be read, as Michael Neil and Mike Marais suggest, as a 
metaphor for the breakdown of South African society. Neil attests that Mrs. Curren’s 
sickness “appears as much metaphorical as medical”, because her disease ultimately 
represents an act as a “rehearsal for death rather than the real thing”.22 Relating Mrs. 
Curren’s personal frailty to the malignant regime, Mike Marais interprets disease as a 
metaphor that signifies the “deformation of the state’s power structures” that “deform and 
brutalize whoever is exposed to them”.23 Marais also points out that Age of Iron, as the 
title suggests, draws on the metaphor of the “classical myth about human decadences and 
anarchic self-destruction”.24 In relation to South African politics, Mrs. Curren’s disease 
can be thus metaphorically characterized as not only a personal pain, but also a political 
crisis. However, my argument here is that, rather than acting as a metaphor for political 
deformation, Mrs. Curren’s sickness is inextricably linked with the process of her corporeal 
dissolution and its transformation into an impersonality, which brings about a sense of 
cohesion between black people and white people within a racially segregated culture. Thus, 
I will show how Mrs. Curren’s disease produces a new figuration of subjectivity as a crack.  
                                           
22 Michel Neil, “The Language of the Heart”, J.M. Coetzee’s Austerities, eds. Graham Bradshaw 
and Michael Neil (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 90. Interestingly, Neil suggests the reason why Mrs. 
Curren’s illness can be read as a metaphor for her rehearsal of death: “in the closing sentence in the 
novel, she gives herself to the cold embrace of Mr. Vercueil”; “for to read it otherwise would be to 
destroy the novel’s foundational fiction—that it has been written as a letter from a living woman” 
(90). 
23 Mike Marais, Secretary of the Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee 
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2009), 98.  
24 As Mike Marais asserts, the title alludes to Hesiod’s description of the “age of the iron race,” in 
which “The father will quarrel with his sons, the sons with their / father, / guest will quarrel with 
host,” and “Might will be justice”. Marais, Secretary of the Invisible, 98.  
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The novel begins with Mrs. Curren’ sense of an unsavory smell from a vagrant man 
in her house and her acknowledgement of cancer within her body. Mrs. Curren thinks of 
these as “Two things, then in the space of an hour, the news, long dreaded, and this 
reconnaissance, this other annunciation” (5). The vagrant Vercueil haunts Mrs. Curren’s 
house, whilst she recognizes herself as an ailing and dying woman, living in a regime of 
death. Yet, it is her illness that leads to her thought of Vercueil’s unfamiliar and bad smell 
as an annunciation. Mrs. Curren’s perception of her cancer creates a pivotal moment where 
her identity shifts into what Deleuze calls a ‘crack’ in The Logic of Sense. As Aidan Tynan 
explains, the crack is, for Deleuze, “the line of separation which splits us from ourselves, 
which splits up the organic and personal unity with which health, in the popularly accepted 
sense, is identified”.25 Deleuze’s pathology of the crack is related to a phrase from F. Scott 
Fitzgerald’s The Crack Up: “Of course all life is a process of breaking down”.26 From this 
phrase, Deleuze articulates distinctive processes for the two different kinds of cracks in life: 
the corporeal (noisy) and the incorporeal (silent). With reference to the corporeal crack, the 
heroes and heroines in Fitzgerald’s novel, for example, see happiness as being embodied 
in looks, charm and riches, but “something happens that shatters them like an old plate or 
glass”.27 In contrast to this, the incorporeal crack is “another type of cracking”—“micro 
cracks, as in a dish”: The crack up “happens almost without your knowing it but is realized 
suddenly indeed” (Crack Up 69).28 This micro crack is silent and imperceptible, and it 
happens virtually. Put it another way, whilst the corporeal crack is related to a personal 
crack actualized within the body, the silent and incorporeal crack is processed through an 
                                           
25 Aidan Tynan, Deleuze’s Literary Clinic: Criticism and the Politics of Symptoms (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 42.  
26 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 154. The Crack Up, 69.  
27 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 155.  
28 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 198-9.  
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impersonal dimension.  
Drawing on Deleuze’s thoughts concerning the two different types of cracks, we 
can further examine how Mrs. Curren’s corporeal frailty triggers these cracks. As I have 
asserted earlier, Mrs. Curren suffers from the accumulated shame she has endured in the 
apartheid regime. The regime’s sickness has silently invaded both the inside and outside of 
Mrs. Curren’s body through an incorporeal crack, but her endurance of this shame is 
suddenly actualized as a corporeal crack in the form of cancer. Accordingly, Mrs. Curren’s 
sickness threatens and destroys her organic body, which causes a split between herself and 
her organic and healthy body. Mrs. Curren expresses her torment as follows:  
 
The sickness that now eats me is dry, bloodless and cold, sent by 
Saturn. There is something about it that does not bear thinking of. To 
have fallen pregnant with these growths, these cold, obscene swellings; 
to have carried and carried this brood beyond any natural term, unable to 
bear them, unable to sate their hunger: children inside me eating more 
every day, not growing but bloating, toothed, clawed, forever cold and 
ravenous. Dry, dry: to feel them turning at night in my dry body, not 
stretching and kicking as a human child does but changing their angle, 
finding a new place to gnaw. My eggs, grown within me. Me, mine: 
words I shudder to write, yet true. (64) 
 
Her mortification has become incarnated inside her body. With the spread of cancer, her 
body, similar to a pregnant one, also becomes swollen, creating unbearable pain every day 
in both corporeal and incorporeal dimensions. Her physiological deformation on the inside 
and outside of her body sets in motion a process of generating the unbearable other (or the 
malignant tumor). This is associated with the reason why her sickness could be seen as 
more desirable than her health. The cancer, although it invades her body, constructs an 
unfamiliar form: the body growing the eggs of death. Her body becomes a new figuration 
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through living with cancer: “I have a child inside that I cannot give birth to. Cannot because 
it will not be born. Because it cannot live outside me. So it is my prisoner or I am its prisoner” 
(82). Accordingly, Mrs. Curren’s body becomes “death in life” (86). In this context, 
Deleuze claims that “health does not suffice, but the crack is desirable” for particular people: 
“it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that 
anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exists through it, in people ready to 
destroy themselves—better death than the health which we are given”.29 Thus, by pushing 
herself to the edge of personal unity, Mrs. Curren becomes de-personalized, in a state of 
dying: “I am dying because in my heart I do not want to live. I am dying because I want to 
die (137).” In this sense, by cracking her body, Mrs. Curren’s sickness produces a new 
figuration of intersubjectivity that coexists with the unbearable other such as illness and 
death. Thus, bearing cancer in her body, Mrs. Curren embodies the living dead as a 
figuration of intersubjectivity.   
This new configuration of intersubjectivity in terms of illness has ethical and 
political implications under the apartheid regime. In order to examine this issue, Mrs. 
Curren’s illness as corporeal and incorporeal cracks can be rethought in terms of its relation 
with temporality. These cracks, through Mrs. Curren’s dying, are the fundamental 
conditions of subjectivity with time, because the “I” is in time and is constantly affective. 
In other words, the self is affective within time. It is a formal relation of time that splits the 
“I”. Specifically, for Deleuze, the “I” is bisected into two modes of time: a present time 
(Chronos) and a past-future conjunction (Aion). Deleuze in The Logic of Sense explains the 
opposition between Aion and Chronos:   
 
Chronos is the present which alone exists. It makes of the past and 
                                           
29 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 160.  
29 Ibid., 154. F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack Up (New York: New Directions, 1945), 69. 
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future its two oriented dimensions, so that one goes always from the past to 
the future—but only to the degree that presents follow one another inside 
partial worlds or partial systems. Aion is the past-future, which is an infinite 
subdivision of the abstract moment endlessly decomposes itself in both 
directions at once and forever sidesteps the present.30 
 
In other words, whilst Chronos is corporeal and present, Aion is incorporeal and unlimited, 
“stretching out in a straight line, limitless in either direction”.31 Thus, the time of Aion 
allows for an event that never actualized as the present, but which has: “always already 
passed and eternally yet to come”.32 The event is “always and at the same time something 
which has just happened and something about to happen; never something which is 
happening”.33 In this way, one lives dual times: one lives in the corporeal and present time 
and in the incorporeal and non-present time. In this context, in a crack such as “alcoholism”, 
it can be seen that the “I” loses the sense of the present moment. Deleuze claims that “the 
hardening of the present (I have) is now related to an effect of the flight of the past (drunk). 
Everything culminates in a ‘has been’”.34 However, Deleuze goes on to assert that “this 
effect of the flight of the past constitutes its depressive aspect, represented by the loss of 
the object or the present moment in every sense and direction”.35 Nevertheless, the effect 
that this flight yields is the greatest force of the eternal return. In other words, an alcoholic 
repeatedly returns to the past not to live only in the present moment, which produces 
multiple cracks inscribed in the body. Deleuze further articulates that “each time must 
double this painful actualization by a counter actualization, which limits, moves, and 
                                           
30 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 77.  
31 Ibid., 165.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 63.  
34 Ibid., 159.  
35 Ibid.  
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transfigures it”.36 In this way, Mrs. Curren’s loss of health like Gatsby’s loss of love in The 
Great Gatsby entails the alcohol-effect. Mrs. Curren’s cancer is actualized as a corporeal 
crack in her body, but it separates her from the moment in which she was healthy. With her 
loss of health in the present, Mrs. Curren is also able to experience the flight of the past and 
an eternal return from the past to the future. From Deleuze’s perspective, the actualization 
of Mrs. Curren’s cancer allows her to experience the incorporeal cracks of embracing the 
past and unfolding the future in South Africa.  
When receiving the news of her cancer from Dr. Syfret, Mrs. Curren thinks of her 
sickness as a sort of wall or blockage, which isolates her from the world, yet tries to accept 
her own sickness: “it was mine, for me, mine only, not to be refused” (4). However, 
although Dr. Syfret says that: “we will tackle this together” (4), Mrs. Curren finds her ailing 
body divided from the living: “His allegation to the living, not the dying” (4). Her physical 
pain undoubtedly indicates a limitation she cannot share with other people—not even her 
daughter. Perceiving an abyssal gap between the living and the dying, Mrs. Curren decides 
to endure her sickness without letting her daughter know: “The first task laid on me, from 
today: to resist the craving to share my death. Loving you, loving life, to forgive the living 
and take my leave without bitterness. To embrace death as my own, mine alone” (6). 
However, without betraying her willingness to deal with her illness on her own, Mrs. 
Curren exposes her desire to share her pain with her absent daughter:  
 
“How I longed for you to be here, to hold me, comfort me! I begin 
to understand the true meaning of the embrace. We embrace to be 
embraced. We embrace our children to be folded in the arms of the future, 
to pass ourselves on beyond death, to be transported. That is how it was 
when I embraced you, always. We bear children in order to be mothered 
                                           
36 Ibid., 161.  
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by them” (5).  
 
In the passage above, a synthetic subjectivity is evidenced as a form of “embrace”. Mrs. 
Curren’s personal dying paradoxically enables her to realize intersubjective relations with 
the Other in time, like a mother embracing her children folded into the past and unfolded 
into the arms of the future. Mrs. Curren’s self is fractured through temporality into the “I” 
of the present and a mother embracing her child in the past perfect as well as the future 
perfect. In this sense, Mrs. Curren comes to think of her sickness as a form of impersonal 
life: “Mommy should not be sad, for she would not die but live on in you” (6).  
Through her sickness, Mrs. Curren ultimately recognizes herself as an impersonal 
wound in relation to the oppressive history of South Africa. Thus, her illness is diagnosed 
as the collective and impersonal crimes that white people have committed:  
 
A crime was committed long ago. How long ago? I do not know. 
But longer ago than 1916, certainly. So long ago that I was born into it. 
It is part of my inheritance. It is part of me, I am part of it. … Though it 
was not a crime I asked to be committed, it was committed in my name. 
I raged at times against the men who did the dirty work—you have seen 
it, a shameful raging as stupid as what it raged against—but I accepted 
too that, in a sense, they lived inside me. So that when in my rages I 
wished them dead, I wished death on myself too”. (164)  
 
Mrs. Curren’s incorporeal wound is linked to the history of South Africa and is actualized 
by her corporeal illness or crack. In this regard, rather than personifying a sense of guilt for 
the victims in South Africa, Mrs. Curren embodies the crimes that white people have 
committed in history. As Deleuze notes, “my wound existed before me” on the grounds 
that “a wound is incarnated or actualized in a state of things or life: but it is itself a pure 
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virtuality on the plane of immanence that leads us into a life”.37 From this, it is important 
to note that Mrs. Curren’s wish to pronounce the crimes dead does not imply her suicide or 
corporeal death, but it rather refers to her state of dying, or living dead, since her body, 
which committed the crimes in the past will be folded and unfolded into the arms of the 
future. In this sense, in terms of the interactions between corporeal and incorporeal cracks, 
Mrs. Curren recognizes herself as a wounded woman in South Africa.  
 
 
III. From a sacrificial death to an impersonal death  
 
Despite her perception of an intersubjective relation between herself and her child, 
Mrs. Curren is not able to extend her embrace to black people and their children. Because 
of her position as a white liberal, Mrs. Curren still does not see the need to create something 
impersonal beyond her personal affairs. There are profound gaps between black poeple and 
white people in the apartheid regime. Grounded in a system of racial inequality, their great 
economic and political difference can be grasped in terms of the contrast between the 
residences of Mrs. Curren and the black families. Florence, as a servant, lives in Mrs. 
Curren’s house, which is big like a “boarding house” (10). The segregated residences for 
black people are represented by squatter shacks, which are burnt in the township of 
Guguletu. A majority of the black people are homeless, roaming and begging, thus 
demonstrating a great divide between their lives and those of white people:  
 
And on the other side of the great divide their white cousin’s soul 
stunted too, spinning themselves tighter and tighter into their sleepy 
cocoons. Swimming lessons, riding lessons, ballet lessons; cricket on the 
                                           
37 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 31.  
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lawn; lives passed within walled gardens guarded by bulldogs; children 
of paradise, blond, innocent, shining with angelic light, soft as putti. 
Their residence the limbo of the unborn, their innocence the innocence 
of bee grubs, plump and white, drenched in honey, absorbing sweetness 
through their soft skins. Slumberous their souls, bliss-filled, abstracted. 
(7) 
 
In this segregated society, black children are forced to sacrifice their personal lives, but 
only to live their political lives for a struggle against the apartheid regime. Mrs. Curren 
conceptualizes this brutal plight as “a thanatophany: showing us our deaths. Viva la muerte! 
Their cry, their threat. Death to the young. Death to life. Boars that devour their offspring. 
The Boar War” (30-1). In this death-driven and merciless society, black people are 
compelled to abandon their lives. Whilst Mrs. Curren suffers from anguish and shame, 
Florence has to deny her motherhood for black liberation. This denied motherhood affects 
both sides: Mrs. Curren’s daughter left the dying country as war broke out, whilst 
Florence’s son Bheki protests against the State and then sacrifices his life. Seeking a radical 
shift in relation to racial discrimination, black youths proclaim “freedom or death!” (163). 
Their deaths depicted in the novel ultimately play a crucial role in radically changing Mrs. 
Curren’s perception of the black revolutionaries. In this section, I will argue that their death 
functions as an event, drawing on the difference between a sacrificial and an impersonal 
death, which connects apartheid South Africa to the community to come.  
Taking the position of a white liberal, Mrs. Curren strongly criticizes both the 
oppressive apartheid regime and the black revolutionaries on the grounds that both rely on 
the politics of death. On the one hand, her aversion to apartheid is often revealed through 
the symptoms of her sickness and its relation to the regime: an ailing old woman and a 
dying country. In the years of war, policemen massacre black insurrectionists. Land is taken 
by force and is “despoiled, spoiled, abandoned in its barren late years” (26). Also, the 
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message of the politicians never changes and “turns people to stone” (29). The message, 
from Mrs. Curren’s point of view, deprives people of their thought and emotion by raising 
stupidity to a virtue: “To stupefy; to deprive of feeling; to benumb, deaden; to stun with 
amazement. Stupor; insensibility, apathy, torpor of mind. Stupid: dulled in the faculties, 
indifferent, destitute of thought or feeling” (29). On the other hand, Mrs. Curren also keeps 
a distance from the black militants gathering in the black townships. The black children are 
educated as warriors: “being careless of their own lives and everything else” (48). Their 
parents, like Florence, send their children to death. Thus, Mrs. Curren thinks of Florence 
as a Spartan mother in the age of iron: “A Spartan matron, iron-hearted, bearing warrior 
sons of the nation. ‘We are proud of them’. We. Come home either with your shield or on 
your shield” (50). From Mrs. Curren’s perspective, both the politics of the regime and the 
black revolutionaries cause people to resemble iron, thus calling for the deaths of the 
younger generations.   
However, with her experience of the deaths of black people, Mrs. Curren radically 
changes her perspective on the black revolutionaries. This change in perspective is brought 
about by the death of two black youths: Florence’s son Bheki and his friend John, whose 
deaths Mrs. Curren witnesses. It is helpful to look at Mrs. Curren’s perspective on the black 
youths, before examining the two deaths as an event. Bheki and John are militant 
revolutionaries who partake in a school boycott, and who are temporarily staying in Mrs. 
Curren’s house. Yet, they, as the new Puritans, push their creed to be afraid of nothing and 
to act violently towards anyone, which is the opposite of their central conviction. For 
instance, Bheki finds Vercueil drunk in Mrs. Curren’s house, as he tugs at a bottle of brandy 
in his pocket. Shattering Vercueil’s bottle of brandy, Bheki says, “they [the white people] 
are making you into a dog!” (45), and then takes out a belt from his trousers and begins to 
lash him. Alongside his calling Vercueil a dog, Bheki’s attack on him resembles white 
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people’s colonial discourse and violence, as represented by the colonizer’s categorization 
of black people as inhuman beings and their lashing of black slaves in the past. Yet, 
Florence is openly proud of Bheki’s violent action against Vercueil. Shocked by his 
violence and Florence’s response, Mrs. Curren claims that Florence’s acceptance of her 
son’s violence could push him to become callous, while retelling Florence a story she had 
once told. Florence had previously witnessed children in the townships who had laughed 
at a burning woman who was screaming for help. Furthermore, they threw more petrol on 
her (49). Nevertheless, Florence blames white people for making the children so cruel. In 
this context, whilst struggling against the oppressor, the black revolutionaries repeat the 
ideology and violence of the colonizers in history. Accordingly, Mrs. Curren observes that 
the revolutionaries, through their lack of mercy and emotion, have become monsters.   
Mrs. Curren criticizes the term “comradeship”, a central concept drawn on by the 
black revolutionaries in the novel, because of its resonance with fascist politics. Mrs. 
Curren, whilst debating with Florence’s relative, Mrs. Thabane, claims that:  
 
“Comradeship is nothing but a mystique of death, of killing and dying, 
masquerading as what you call a bond (a bond of what? Love? I doubt it). I 
have no sympathy with this comradeship. You are wrong, you and Florence 
and everyone else, to be taken in by it and, worse, to encourage it in children. 
It is just another of those icy, exclusive, death-driven male constructions”. 
(150)  
 
Despite Mrs. Curren’s criticism of the affinity between the revolutionaries and the Nazis in 
terms of this comradeship, it is also important to acknowledge the great difference between 
these groups on the grounds that the black people in apartheid South Africa are victims of 
an oppressive regime, which denies fundamental rights of equality, whilst the Nazis were 
the oppressors. Without a sort of comradeship that could work towards liberation, the status 
127 
 
of black people was confined to slavery. That is why the younger generation of black 
revolutionaries in the novel is required to be puritans and their parents oppress their 
emotions, even when they face their own children’s deaths. In a segregated society, black 
people are seen as non-human beings, and thus are forced to sacrifice their personal and 
emotional lives, which have already been denied by white people. Mrs. Curren initially 
does not understand that the black revolutionaries’ comradeship requires the politics of 
sacrifice. However, her position radically shifts to support for the black revolutionaries, 
after witnessing Bheki and John’s victimization by the police. In one incident, the police 
deliberately push the two boys, causing them to crash into a truck. After the crash, Bheki 
quickly recovers, but John lays sprawled on his back, bleeding over the pavement. Mrs. 
Curren then pinches John’s bleeding parts tightly to stop the blood, although she does not 
like him. At that moment, she feels herself tied up with him in terms of the flow of blood: 
“Because blood is one: a pool of life dispersed among us in separate existences, but 
belonging by nature together” (63). Mrs. Curren’s witnessing of their deaths immediately 
affects her transformation into inter-subjectivity and then impersonality.  
Amongst the two deaths, Mrs. Curren observes Bheki’s dead body shot in the 
township of Guguletu during black faction fighting: 
  
Against the far wall, shielded from the worst of the rain, were 
five bodies neatly laid out. The body in the middle was that of Florence’s 
Bheki. He still wore the gray flannel trousers, white shirts, and maroon 
pullover of his school, but his feet were bare. His eyes were open and 
staring, his mouth open too. The rain had been beating on him for hours, 
on him and his comrades, not only here but wherever they had been when 
they met their deaths; their clothes, their very hair, had a flattened, dead 
look. In the corners of his eyes there were grains of sand. There was sand 




The pictorial description of the dead body of Bheki represents an instance where Mrs. 
Curren faces death. Seeing Bheki’s body, Mrs. Curren says: “This is the worst thing I have 
witnessed in my life. And I thought Now my eyes are open and I can never close them 
again” (102-3). It is here that we need to rethink the nature of death in order to understand 
Bheki’s death and its effect on Mrs. Curren. The death of Bheki affects Mrs. Curren by 
forcing her to experience a conjunction between her terminal condition and Bheki’s death.  
However, a question arises from Mrs. Curren’s opening her eyes and its relation to 
her terminal condition. After her revelation, Mrs. Curren chooses to become a sufferer like 
black people. Rather than engaging with the black revolution or addressing a public 
criticism of the regime, she passively witnesses and bears their suffering. Witnessing John 
being killed by the police in her house, Mrs. Curren goes out to the street, saying that “It’s 
not my home anymore” (157). As a result, sleeping on the street, she becomes a wanderer 
like Vercueil and has to endure pain and humiliation. She has to urinate where she lies. The 
black boys creep over her body and press a stick between her lips and gums to find the 
golden teeth: “With the tip of the stick he lifted my upper lip. I pulled back and tried to spit. 
Impassively he stood up. With a bare foot he kicked, and a little rain of dust and pebbles 
struck my face” (159). Yet, she cannot prevent the black boys from attacking her. Rather, 
she passively undertakes her suffering. After her eyes open, the wandering and the 
humiliation she experiences have an affinity with those of the Magistrate in Waiting for the 
barbarians. The processes that both Mrs. Curren and the Magistrate suffer on a personal 
level, are thus connected with ethical and political implications. Their processes foreground 
the colonizer’s transformations through their corporeal frailty. Nevertheless, compared to 
the Magistrate, Mrs. Curren’s ailing and dying create an impersonal death in its ontological 
dimensions.        
Specifically, we can rethink Mrs. Curren’s experience by drawing on Deleuze’s 
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account of impersonal death. For Deleuze, death always has a dual nature, comprising an 
actual and a virtual death. As I mentioned in the Introduction, Deleuze explains two aspects 
of death, which resonate with Maurice Blanchot’s notions of personal and impersonal death. 
One is “personal” concerning “the I or the ego”, and the other is “impersonal”, “with no 
relation to ‘me’, neither present nor past but always coming”.38 Blanchot, in The Instance 
of My Death, describes impersonal death as a living in death: “I am alive. No, you are 
dead”.39 According to Deleuze, a personal death “occurs and is actualized in the most harsh 
present”, but an impersonal death, as an event, is “inseparable from the past to the future 
into which it is divided, never present, ‘ungraspable, that which I cannot grasp, for it is not 
bound to me by any sort of relation, which never comes and toward which I do not go’”.40 
To put it another way, split from a personal death in the present, an impersonal death is a 
dying, but it is also, as James William explains, “a living on through participation in a cycle 
                                           
38 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 112. Drawing on Blanchot’s conceptualization of two 
deaths in The Space of Literature, Deleuze quotes the following words from Blanchot: “It is the fact 
of dying that includes a radical reversal, through which the death that was the extreme form of my 
power not only becomes what loosens my hold upon myself by casting me out of my power to begin 
and even to finish, but also becomes that which is without any relation to me, without power over 
me—that which is stripped of all possibility—the unreality of the indefinite. I cannot represent this 
reversal to my self, I cannot conceive of it as definitive. It is not the irreversible step beyond which 
there would be no return, for it is that which is not accomplished, the interminable and the incessant. 
… It is inevitable but inaccessible death; it is the abyss of the present, time without a present, with 
which I have no relationships; it is that toward which I cannot go from, for in it I do not die, I have 
fallen from the power to die. In it they die; they do not cease, and they do not finish dying … not 
the term, but the interminable, not proper but featureless death, and not true death but, as Kafka says, 
‘the sneer of its capital error’.” Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock 
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 154-5. Despite the fact that Deleuze 
describes an affinity with Blanchot’s conception of impersonal death in Difference and Repetition 
and The Logic of Sense, Eleanor Kaufman claims that there is a difference between Blanchot’s and 
Deleuze’s theories. According to Kaufman: “Maurice Blanchot embraces more fully than Deleuze, 
at least in the twentieth-century French tradition, a being of pure inertia and immobility, so that, for 
Blanchot, movement or action ultimately leads to a more radical form of inertia, an inertia of being 
(as opposed to a seemingly more Deleuzian notion of becoming)”, since Deleuze’s discussion of 
“Aion”’ (impersonal time) as the “event” displays “an implicit premium placed on the movement of 
becoming”. Eleanor Kaufman, Deleuze, The Dark Precursor: Dialectic, Structure, Being (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 111. However, despite Kaufman’s claim, I connect 
Blanchot’s conception of impersonal death to that of Deleuze through Deleuze’s analysis of death 
in his works.    
39 Maurice Blanchot, The Instant of my Death, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 9.  
40 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 156.  
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of dying”, because although “everything dies we live on in the dying and living of others”.41 
In the case of Bheki, his heartbeat ceases, which identifies his actual and personal death. 
Yet, Mrs. Curren experiences Bheki’s death as an impersonal one through her connection 
of his death with the cycle of death and others’ lives from the past to the future.  
Specifically, as she confesses to Vercueil, Mrs. Curren identifies a major difference 
between the deaths of black and white people: “I have not seen black people in their death 
before, Mr. Vercueil. They are dying all the time, I know, but always somewhere else. The 
people I have seen die have been white and have died in bed” (124). Compared to white 
people’s natural dying, the black revolutionaries cannot die gradually, but they are rather 
massacred and sacrificed. Nevertheless, Mrs. Curren eventually links Bheki’s death to an 
impersonal death:  
 
It has something to do with his deadness, his dead weight. It is as though in 
death he became very heavy, like lead or like that thick, airless mud you get 
at the bottoms of dams. As though in the act of dying he gave a last sight and 
all the lightness went out of him. Now he is lying on top of me with all that 
weight. Not pressing, just lying. (124)  
 
Bheki’s death repeatedly returns at every moment of Mrs. Curren’s life, accumulating 
through the weight of time. As well as affecting Mrs. Curren, this also offers potential for 
a changing sociopolitical landscape in South Africa.  
In this context, Mrs. Curren’s own death in the last part of the novel can be rethought 
through Deleuze’s conceptualization of an impersonal death.  
 
                                           
41 James Williams, “Never Too Late? On the implications of Deleuze’s Work on Death for a 
Deleuzian Moral Philosophy”, Deleuze and Ethics, eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 173.  
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“Is it time?” I said. I got back into bed, into the tunnel between 
cold sheets. The curtains parted; he came in beside me. For the first time 
I smelled nothing. He took me in his arms and held me with mighty force, 
so that the breath went out of me in a rush. From that embrace there was 
no warmth to be had. (198) 
 
Because this part occurs at the point where Mrs. Curren writes of her own death in a letter, 
Jane Poyner claims that “the letter apparently breaks off as Vercueil squeezes out her last 
breath”.42 Poyner goes on to suggest that “the narrator is brought to a close” by an unnamed 
narrator, or presumably Coetzee.43 However, given Blanchot’s and Deleuze’s conception 
of an impersonal death, Mrs. Curren’s death can be understood as an impersonal death: “I 
am dying” rather than her actual and personal death. In other words, as in Deleuze’s account, 
she wishes to bring about the “coincidence of the two faces of death—of prolonging 
impersonal death by means of the most personal act”.44 As a result, Mrs. Curren does not 
die as an individual, or as a white liberal, but rather she lives in death in an impersonal 
dimension. She can participate in the deaths and lives of both black people and white people 
by drawing a conjunction between the past and the future. In Deleuze’s account, Ms. 
Curren’s dying can also be seen as an event, which continue to multiply the movements 
from the past to the future in the virtual dimension.   
 
The event in turn, in its impassibility and impenetrability, has no 
present. It rather retreats and advances in two directions at once, being 
the perpetual object of a double question: What is going to happen? What 
has just happened? The agonizing aspect of the pure event is that it is 
always and at the same time something which has just happened and 
                                           
42 Poyner, “Writing in the Face of Death”, 117.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 156.  
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something about to happen; never something which is happening.45       
 
In the event, Mrs. Curren’s actual death never happens and has yet happened. 46 This 
paradoxical time resonates with what Deleuze calls Hamlet’s great formula: “Time is out 
of joint, time is unhinged. The hinges are the axis around which the door turns”.47 Deleuze 
goes on to assert: “But time out of joint signifies the reversal of the movement—time 
relationship. … Time is no longer related to the movement which is measure, but movement 
is related to the time which conditions it”.48 In paradoxical time, Mrs. Curren becomes 
another, thus embodying Rimbaud’s formula that “I is another”.49 It is here that we can 
consider an ethical aspect of Mrs. Curren’s impersonal death in the South African context. 
Mrs. Curren’s dying in the time of paradox is linked to the time to come for the community, 
which is irreducible to the present in South Africa.     
 
 
IV. A posthumous letter as an impersonal message 
 
After having been diagnosed with terminal cancer, Mrs. Curren starts to write a 
letter to her absent daughter. She also requests the homeless man Vercueil, as a messenger, 
                                           
45 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 63. 
46 Jack Reynolds explains that Deleuze’s account of “the event” has an affinity with Derrida’s 
conception of “the messianic”: “Indeed, according to Deleuze, the genuine Stoic sage must 
simultaneously wait for the event as something eternally yet to come and always already passed 
(Aion) (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 166). The truth of the pure event is its paradoxical temporal 
dimension: the waiting expectation of an arrival that is quite closely related to what Derrida calls 
the messianic, along with the recognition that the event has also already passed”. Jack Reynolds, 
Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Analytic Philosophy, and 
Phenomenology (New York: Lexington Books, 2012), 118. This affinity between Deleuze and 
Derrida in terms of temporality can be considered as a possibility of opening to the time to come in 
South Africa. This will be reconsidered in the next chapter on The Master of Petersburg.  
47  Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Continuum, 2008) vii.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid., viii. 
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to post the letter to her daughter, after her death. This posthumous letter can be understood 
as a sort of document of Mrs. Curren’s personal sickness and of her experience of the 
turbulence within South African society. Yet, rather than acting as a record of a personal 
story, Jane Poyner characterizes the letter as a confession of the truth through which she 
“bares her soul”: “hers is the confessant’s struggle for endings”.50 However, Mrs. Curren 
denies that the letter is a confession of her personal conviction: “This letter is not a baring 
of my heart. It is a baring of something, but not of my heart” (15). Nevertheless, given the 
fact that Mrs. Curren confesses her shame and torment with regards to living in the regime, 
the letter might be read as a confession containing self-doubt. As Neil asserts, a confessant 
“endlessly interrogates not only his own truthfulness, but even the sincerity of that 
interrogation itself”.51 However, if Mrs. Curren aims to send her addressee a message that 
relays the truth, Mrs. Curren chooses a strange way of sending it. She requests the vagrant 
Vercueil to post it to the receiver after her death. We could question why Mrs. Curren 
chooses Vercueil as a messenger instead of other people such as Florence. Vercueil is 
basically a ragged stranger: “a derelict, an alcoholic, a lost soul” (14). As Graham Huggan 
explains, he is the “most treacherous of allies” etymologically: “In French, his name 
suggests a combination of ‘ver’ (worm) and ‘cercueil’ (coffin); in Afrikaans a conflation of 
‘verkul’ (to cheat) and ‘cercueil’ (to hide)”.52 In this context, Derek Attridge claims that 
there is “something absolute about the trust that is called for,” because the letter is 
“posthumous, without thought of return”.53 Thus, according to Attridge, Mrs. Curren must 
trust him as the Other on the grounds that “the recipient of her trust will never be called to 
account; the daughter will never know of the letter’s existence if it does not arrive”.54 
                                           
50 Poyner, “Writing in the Face of Death”, 111.  
51 Neil, “The Language of Heart”, 86.  
52 Huggan, “Evolution and Entropy in J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron”, 202.  
53 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), 93-4.  
54 Ibid., 94.  
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However, my contention here is that Mrs. Curren’s letter represents an inorganic and 
impersonal form of language, strikingly differentiated from Poyner’s notion of a confession 
or of baring a soul, and Attridge’s assertion of the letter as an implication of trust for the 
Other.  
It is necessary to raise a question concerning why Mrs. Curren writes a letter to her 
absent daughter. In spite of her position as an intellectual, Mrs. Curren recognizes that there 
are limitations to her knowledge, by virtue of her position as a white liberal within a racially 
segregated South African society. As I have mentioned earlier, by means of the media, such 
as TV, the message of the State is unchanging and discourages people from critically 
engaging with what they see. It thus causes them to lack empathy and petrifies them. In this 
way, no possibility exists for changing the segregated society, since the message of the 
State is fixed and is unilaterally sent to the people. Mrs. Curren’s theories of classics and 
morality are also distant from reality, as she cannot properly communicate with Florence 
and Bheki who often ignore her words. She hears about the situation of the schools and the 
black rebellion in Guguletu only from Florence. Her insufficient knowledge thus represents 
a lack of experience concerning the reality. For this reason, on receiving the news of her 
terminal cancer, Mrs. Curren writes a message concerning her dying to her daughter, 
because she believes death is not merely a thought but the truth: “Death is the only truth 
left. At every moment when I am thinking of something else, I am not thinking death, I am 
not thinking the truth” (26). Accordingly, Mrs. Curren writes a letter and tries to reach out 
to her daughter: “So day by day I render myself into words and pack the words into the 
page like sweets: like sweets for my daughter, for her birthday, for the day of her birth. 
Words of my body, drops of myself, for her to unpack in her own time, to take in, to such, 
to absorb” (9). In this sense, her letter is filled with the words of her body, drops of herself 
for her daughter in the future.  
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However, we can ask to whom Mrs. Curren writes the letter. Poyner insists that the 
letter “is addressed to both her daughter and to the unresponsive and aloof vagrant 
Vercueil”. 55  However, Mrs. Curren interrogates herself and then clearly answers this 
question: “To whom this writing then? The answer: to you but not to you; to me; to you in 
me” (6). From this, the addressee is not only Mrs. Curren’s daughter, but also the 
intersubjective exchange between herself and her daughter across time. The multiple 
addressees are immediately expanded to encompass Vercueil, his dog and the house, in a 
form of embrace:  
 
Six pages already, and all about a man you have never met and 
never will. Why do I write about him? Because he is and is not I. Because 
in the look he gives me I see myself in a way that can be written. 
Otherwise what would this writing be but a kind of moaning, now high, 
now low? When I write about him I write about myself. When I write 
about his dog I write about myself; when I write about the house I write 
about myself. Man, house, dog: no matter what the word, through it I 
stretch out a hand to you. In another world I would not need words. I 
would appear on your doorstep. “I have come for a visit,” I would say, 
and that would be the end of words: I would embrace you and be 
embraced. (9) 
 
Because Mrs. Curren writes about herself, Vercueil, his dog and the house, the addresser 
rejoins the addressee, becoming an interactive subjectivity, including herself, her daughter, 
Vercueil and black children.  
A final question about the style of the letter can also be raised: why does Mrs. 
Curren use an epistolary form of writing, delivered through the messenger Vercueil instead 
of a telephone call or a visit? An epistolary form, what Deleuze and Guattari describe as “a 
                                           
55 Poyner, “Writing in the Face of Death”, 111.  
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rhizome, a network, a spider’s web,” is available for a “pack” or a “flux of letters”.56 How 
then do these letters function? Taking Kafka’s letters as an example, Deleuze and Guattari 
narrate the duality of the two subjects in Kafka’s letters: “a subject of enunciation as the 
form of expression that writes the letter, and a subject of the statement that is the form of 
content that the letter is speaking about (even if I speak about me)”.57 In Deleuze and 
Guattari’s account, it is the subject of the statement that proliferates a movement, alongside 
a postman or a messenger that doubles the trajectory of the letter. The number of letters is 
thus multiplied. In Deleuze and Guattari’s account of Kafka’s letters, the addressee is not 
particularly important to the addresser. Individual letters thus increasingly become “social 
and political contents which force the form to expand into the domains of the stories and 
the novels”.58 From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective of Kafka, we can rethink Mrs. 
Curren’s style of letter. Her letter is different from the traditional genre of epistolary writing, 
for example, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, because Mrs. Curren’s letter is intended for her 
daughter, whose response will not be possible. Moreover, the choice of Vercueil, as a 
messenger makes uncertain her letter’s arrival at the intended destination. Mrs. Curren 
thinks of him as an “insect”: “Not an angel, certainly. An insect, rather, emerging from 
behind the baseboards when the house is in darkness to forage for crumbs” (14). 
Nevertheless, as I asserted earlier, Mrs. Curren asks him to send her letter to her daughter: 
“There is something I would like you to do for me if I die. There are some papers I want to 
send to my daughter. But after the event. That is the important part. That is why I cannot 
send them myself” (31). By the nature of this request, the letter “will forever be words 
committed to the waves” (32). Thus, by means of assigning a particular messenger, her 
                                           
56  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 29-30.  
57 Ibid., 30.  
58 Tynan, Deleuze’s Literary Clinic, 34.  
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personal letter proliferates collective and impersonal contents, by avoiding the letter’s 
arrival at its destination. As a result, the letter as a message, does not end with its arrival at 
the moment of death, but it increases the potential movements between an addresser, a 
messenger and an addressee.    
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
Personal illness and death are, in Age of Iron, immanently connected to the public 
and collective sickness of South Africa during the apartheid regime. The physical pain that 
Mrs. Curren suffers is echoed in the sickness of racial segregation prevalent within the State 
of Emergency in apartheid South Africa. At that time, the black revolutionaries sacrificed 
their youth to struggle for their freedom, and frequently died at the hands of the police. In 
these turbulent years, receiving the news of her terminal cancer, Mrs. Curren, as a white 
liberal English-speaking woman, starts writing a letter and requests the homeless Vercueil 
to post her letter to her absent daughter, after her own death. Because of her accumulated 
shame related to living in South Africa, Mrs. Curren gets cancer of the heart, which 
illustrates a connection between her personal illness and the political malaise. However, 
Mrs. Curren also initially criticizes the black revolutionaries who pushed the younger 
generation to death. While at first she could not understand the viewpoint of the black 
revolutionaries, during her illness Mrs. Curren witnesses the deaths of two black youths, 
which provokes a shift in her understanding and empathy towards the black cause. In this 
way, Mrs. Curren’s disease can be diagnosed as a symptom of the dying country, alluding 
to a turbulent vision of the future.  
As I have argued in this chapter, drawing on Deleuze’s perspective of illness and 
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death, Mrs. Curren’s illness can be seen to designate the inorganic and creative power of 
the body, which pushes her to witness something collective and impersonal. As I have 
shown, Mrs. Curren’s illness is thereby transformed into a collective and impersonal power, 
bringing about a new mode of subjectivity through three modes: the crack, the dual nature 
of death and the letter. Firstly, Mrs. Curren’s recognition of herself as an old and ailing 
woman brings her to experience two sorts of cracks: a corporeal and personal crack and an 
incorporeal and impersonal crack. Through her personal pain, she becomes a personal crack, 
or an inorganic and fragmented body. Her experience of dying from cancer also enables her 
to perceive a new mode of inter-subjectivity, which acts as a form of embrace and being 
embraced by her children from the past to the future. This is linked to an incorporeal crack, 
one that allows her to recognize herself not solely as an individual body. Secondly, as a 
white liberal humanist, Mrs. Curren initially takes the position of criticizing both the regime 
and the black militants because of the politics of death these draw on. However, facing the 
deaths of the black children, Mrs. Curren connects their actual and personal deaths to what 
Deleuze calls an impersonal death. An impersonal death, like an event, relates to a living 
in dying. As a result of her experience of the deaths of black people, she enables her own 
personal death to be transformed into an impersonal death as an event: “I am dying”. This 
impersonal death gives her dying body over to an incorporeal event-effect, one that never 
actualizes her corporeal death but rather opens to the immemorial past and to the future to 
come.  
Finally, contrary to the message of the State, which does not encourage the people 
to critically interrogate its values and leads people to apathy, Mrs. Curren writes a message 
for her daughter, relating to her body and death. However, differentiated from the 
traditional form of epistolary writing, Mrs. Curren’s letter does not aim to arrive at its 
destination, as the addressees are multiplied into herself, her daughter, Vercueil and his dog. 
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Additionally, the chosen messenger makes more uncertain her letter’s arrival at its 
destination. Yet, through these blockages, her personal letter becomes a form of collective 
and impersonal writing. Thus, through her sickness, Mrs. Curren is able to transform herself, 
forming an inter-subjective relationship with both black and white people through a 
conjunction between the past and the future. This generates an impersonal event-effect of 
opening the past and the future. Her letter is not only destined for her daughter, but also for 
people from the past to the future. Consequently, Mrs. Curren’s illness, as an inorganic 









Mourning and Memory in The Master of Petersburg 
 
 
I. Introduction  
J.M. Coetzee’s novel, The Master of Petersburg (1994) is a fictional work about 
Fyodor Dostoevsky’s mourning for his deceased stepson, Pavel Isaev. At the start, Pavel is 
already dead and absent, and Dostoevsky travels to St. Petersburg in order to collect Pavel’s 
documents and belongings. Accordingly, whilst coming to terms with his grief as a result 
of the loss, Dostoevsky desires to recollect and resuscitate the dead Pavel. Dostoevsky’s 
mourning is thus related to the survivor’s desire to keep the dead alive within memory. 
According to Sigmund Freud, in “Mourning and Melancholia”, “mourning is regularly the 
reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the 
place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on”.1 In Freud’s account, the 
mourner’s attachment to the loss of the beloved must be relieved and relinquished in order 
to reconnect to the world of the living. When “the work of mourning is completed”, he 
claims, the mourner becomes “free and uninhibited again”.2 This process of mourning 
involves the interiorization of the dead in the survivor’s memory. However, Dostoevsky is 
not able to complete his mourning for Pavel, but rather suspends it in a way that denies the 
                                           
1  Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth 
Press), 243.  
2 Ibid., 245.  
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death of Pavel. In this context, my question focuses on the impossibility of Dostoevsky’s 
mourning because of the intersection between the survivor’s and the dead’s memory. 
Subsequently, drawing on Jacques Derrida’s theory of “(im)possible mourning”, I will 
examine how Dostoevsky’s suspension of mourning breaks a living being’s narcissistic 
memory of the dead in its personal, political and aesthetic dimensions.  
The Master of Petersburg explores the work of mourning by foregrounding the 
mysterious death of Dostoevsky’s stepson Pavel. Set in October 1869 in St. Petersburg, the 
novel draws on Dostoevsky’s novel Demons (also known as The Devils or The Possessed), 
his biography, and the historical events surrounding the young Russian revolutionary Sergei 
Nechaev.3 The novel narrates the story of Dostoevsky, who has been living in exile with 
his wife and child in Dresden, and who secretly returns to St. Petersburg, because of the 
sudden death of Pavel, his first wife’s son. Pavel has fallen from a shot tower in St. 
Petersburg in somewhat suspicious circumstances. Dostoevsky’s sorrow in relation to his 
stepson’s death is shown to be extreme, creating an ambivalent state of mourning that 
wavers between his affirmation of and disavowal of Pavel’s death. For example, at the 
cemetery, when he visits his stepson’s grave, Dostoevsky’s grief is deeply performed: “He 
is crying freely, his nose is streaming. He rubs his face in the wet earth, burrows his face 
into it”.4 After that, however, he immediately denies Pavel’s death: “He is not here, he is 
not dead” (10). Overwhelmed by his sadness at the loss, Dostoevsky suspends his return to 
                                           
3 Sew Kossew describes many intersections between Dostoevsky’s life and Coetzee’s text and also 
explains Coetzee’s fictionalization of Dostoevsky’s life. According to Kossew, “The name Coetzee 
uses for Dostoevsky’s stepson matches that of his real-life stepson, Pavel (known affectionately as 
Pasha) Isaev, the son of Maria Isaev, Dostoevsky’s first wife, a stepson who led a somewhat 
dissipated life and seemed to have caused his stepfather a great deal of anxiety. By the time of 
Coetzee’s text’s chronology, Maria has died and Dostoevsky has married again, this time a much 
younger woman, Anna Snitkina, whom Pavel, in Coetzee’s novel, refers to as ‘the Snitkina.’ This 
biographical detail is faithful to Dostoevsky’s life, as are the details of his exile from Petersburg 
because of creditors, his gambling in Europe, and his and Anna’s residing in Dresden”. See Sue 
Kossew, “Text/Intertext,” Pen and Power: A Post-Colonial Reading of J.M. Coetzee and André 
Brink (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 216-7.  
4 J.M. Coetzee, The Master of Petersburg (London: Vintage Books, 2004), 9. 
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Dresden, although there is a risk of creditors finding him in St. Petersburg. As part of the 
process of coming to terms with the painful loss of Pavel, Dostoevsky takes up his stepson’s 
residence, searching for the traces that Pavel has left. As a result of his refusing the work 
of mourning to be completed, his grief at the loss transforms into a pathological state of 
melancholy.  
Dostoevsky’s ambivalent attitudes towards the dead Pavel can be rethought in terms 
of Freud’s theory of mourning and melancholy. Similar to mourning, melancholy is, as 
Freud explains, the reaction to the loss of a loved object. However, the mental features of 
melancholia are characterized by a more profoundly painful sorrow at the loss. The 
melancholic does not give up the lost object, while the mourner declares the object dead, 
letting it go. Specifically, melancholy is firstly related to the loss of the unconscious object: 
“melancholy is in some way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from 
consciousness, in contradiction to mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that 
is unconsciousness”.5 Thus, the melancholia does not know “what he has lost in him”, but 
he knows “whom he has lost”.6 Secondly, the melancholic displays “an extraordinary 
diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning 
it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself”.7 The 
loss of the ego comes about when the lost object is incorporated into the ego, following the 
schizophrenic divide within the ego. Thirdly, in contrast to the work of mourning, the 
melancholic’s relation to the object is ambivalent, because of his desire to both keep the 
lost object and to free its libido. In the novel, Dostoevsky incorporates his son inside 
himself: “His son is inside him, a dead baby in an iron body in the frozen earth” (52). 
Additionally, Dostoevsky does not only deny the death of his stepson Pavel, but also thinks 
                                           
5 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, 245. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid., 246.  
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of himself as a being dead: “I am the one who is dead” (19). Thus, Dostoevsky’s 
incorporation of Pavel’s death within himself demonstrates a Freudian melancholy rather 
than a normal process of mourning.   
However, in contrast to a Freudian distinction between mourning and melancholy, 
Derrida depathologizes the work of mourning, providing an integration of possible and 
impossible mourning in our lives. From Derrida’s perspective of the possible mourning, we 
are fated to mourn the other, because of the constant threat of death in our life. In addition, 
Derrida addresses the possibility of mourning in terms of “friendship”:  
 
To have a friend, to look at him, to follow him with your eyes, to admire him 
in friendship, is to know in a more intense way, already injured, always 
insistent, and more and more unforgettable, that one of the two of you will 
inevitably see the other die.8  
 
One of the two friends must die before the other. Friendship is thus haunted by the presence 
of possible mourning. Without this possibility, there is no friendship. This possible 
mourning of the other is also related to the possibility of my own death. In other words, we 
are always, already in mourning for the other, which also implies the mourning for my own 
death on the grounds that the other as the dead is incorporated in myself. As J. Hillis Miller 
notes, this implies “the permanent incorporation of the other as a phantom, a dead-alive 
other within myself”.9 In this sense, Miller explains that Derrida’s assertion of the possible 
mourning is a condition of being human: “We are always in mourning for the absent or 
dead. It is the human condition. To be human is to be in mourning, or, rather, mourning is 
                                           
8 Jacques Derrida, The Works of Mourning, eds. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago, 2001), 107.  
9  J. Hillis Miller, “Absolute Mourning: It Is Jacques You Mourn For”, Re-reading Derrida: 
Perspectives on Mourning and Its Hospitalities, eds. Tony Thwaites and Judith Seaboyer (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2013), 16.  
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melancholic, since you can never get over it, put aside your black crape. To be human is to 
be perpetually in mourning for one’s own death: ‘I think about it all the time’”.10  
Derrida also affirms impossible mourning by foregrounding the survivor’s ethical 
relation to the other. From Derrida’s perspective, a work of mourning can neither be 
completed nor made possible, as mourning is the memory of the other: “the impossible here 
is the other”.11 Specifically, in a work of mourning, the beloved as the other is preserved 
and incorporated in me or in us through memory, but Derrida questions what is meant by 
“in me” or “in us”: 
 
Everything is entrusted to me; everything is bequeathed or given 
to us, and first of all to what I call memory—to the memory, the place of 
this strange dative. All we seem to have left is memory, since nothing 
appears able to come to us any longer, nothing is coming or to come, 
from the other to the present.12  
 
As Derrida notes, “we weep precisely over what happens to us when everything is entrusted 
to the sole memory that is “in me” or “in us”.13 According to Derrida, it is through the 
mourner’s memory that mourning is made “possible,” by virtue of the interiorization of the 
other: “we know, we knew, we remember—before the death of the beloved one—that 
being-in-me or being-in-us is constituted out of the possibility of mourning”.14 However, 
Derrida argues that the other “in me” or “in us” resists the closure of our interiorizing 
memory. According to Derrida,  
 
                                           
10 Ibid., 10.  
11 Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 32.  
12 Ibid., 32-3.  
13 Ibid., 33.  
14 Ibid., 34.  
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With the nothing of this irrevocable absence, the other appears as 
other, and as other for us, upon his death or at least in the anticipated 
possibility of a death, since death constitutes and makes manifest the 
limits of a me or an us who are obliged to harbor something that is greater 
and other than them; something outside of them within them.15  
 
In this sense, Derrida affirms impossible mourning as an ethical way of memorizing the 
other outside of us within us. Yet, Derrida’s ethics of impossible mourning confronts us 
with an aporia of memorization: “The impossible mourning imposes on memory a 
contradictory injunction: it has to fail in order to succeed because it succeeds only ‘when it 
fails’”. 16  Derrida’s contradictory injunction of mourning can be thus understood as 
(im)possible mourning. 
Drawing on Derrida’s theory of (im)possible mourning, there are a few issues that 
can be discussed concerning Dostoevsky’s mourning of the dead Pavel in its personal, 
political and aesthetic dimensions. Firstly, Dostoevsky’s mourning is intertwined with his 
erotic impulses for the landlady Anna and her daughter Matryona. This casts doubts on the 
authenticity of his mourning, even though his irrepressible sorrow continues to be 
expressed. In relation to this issue, Patrick Hayes argues that “Dostoevsky is ostensibly 
grieving for Pavel”, but “from the outset his thoughts and actions are troubled by some 
awkward suspicions”, or rather by his suspicious erotic desires for Matryona and Anna.17 
When he sees Matryona for the first time, according to Hayes, Dostoevsky is immediately 
attracted to her: he “singles out from a group of children a particularly ‘striking’ girl”.18 
Dostoevsky’s persistent “male gaze” confuses her19: “The girl raises her eyes for an instant, 
                                           
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., 35.  
17 Patrick Hayes, J.M. Coetzee and the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 173. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 177.  
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encounters his gaze exploring her, and turns away in confusion. An angry impulse rises in 
him. He wants to grip her arm and to shake her. Look at me, child! He wants to say: Look 
at me and learn!” (13). In contrast to this indirect seduction of Matryona, Dostoevsky is 
driven to an “acute, fiery” desire to be sexually intimate with Anna (11). Dostoevsky has 
sexual intercourse with her in the dead Pavel’s bed whilst grieving the loss of his stepson. 
In effect, Dostoevsky’s mourning for his stepson is contaminated and distorted by his erotic 
desires for Anna and Matryona.  
The second issue concerning Dostoevsky’s mourning relates to the politics of death. 
A further risk of infidelity to Pavel in Dostoevsky’s work of mourning is highlighted by the 
revolutionary Nechaev’s attitude towards the dead. In Nechaev’s conception, the dead are 
to be exploited to advance the mourner’s public and political views, since the dead can no 
longer respond to the survivor. Thus, to accelerate his revolution, Nechaev seeks to exploit 
Dostoevsky’s grief by persuading him to write a statement saying that Pavel has been killed 
by the police. Nechaev says, “We must use his death to light a flame. He would agree with 
me. He would urge you to put your anger to good use” (179). In a similar way, Dostoevsky’s 
mourning for the death of Pavel, may be seen as a way of pitying himself. In both cases, 
the death becomes instrumental, subordinated to another agenda. The work of mourning 
can thus be exploited for public purposes or for the mourner’s personal needs.  
The third issue concerning Dostoevsky’s mourning relates to his writing in the 
blank pages of Pavel’s diary. Dostoevsky’s writing in Pavel’s diary can be seen as a form 
of posthumous writing, since Dostoevsky’s writing is incorporated into the dead’s 
uncompleted fiction. However, Dostoevsky’s mourning is contaminated by his writing of a 
vile and pornographic story in his stepson’s diary. Moreover, Dostoevsky writes the story 
in order to seduce and corrupt Matryosha, since he knows she will read it. Dostoevsky’s 
writing in Pavel’s diary thus betrays the dead Pavel and at the same time violates a child 
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Matryosha. However, Dostoevsky’s writing in Pavel’s diary can be associated in a 
paradoxical way with the work of mourning, through resurrection and betrayal of the dead.     
In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine Coetzee’s representation of 
Dostoevsky’s mourning and its relation to memory in its personal, political and aesthetic 
domains. Firstly, Dostoevsky’s (im)possible mourning will be explored by focusing on the 
relationship between the mourner and the dead. Secondly, in comparison with Dostoevsky’s 
excessive mourning, the public or political mourning represented in the form of the 
policeman, Maximov and the revolutionary, Nechaev will be examined. It will be argued 
that such forms of mourning are not sufficient to mourn the dead ethically. This insufficient 
mourning and its political implication will be discussed as a disavowal of mourning in the 
name of sacrifice. Finally, I will examine how Dostoevsky’s writing of the dead can be 
understood as a work of mourning, depending on the betrayal of the mourner. Thus, by 
exploring the work of mourning in its three dimensions, I will ultimately examine how the 
living Dostoevsky thinks of himself in terms of his relationship with the dead Pavel and 
how he can have an ethical relationship with the dead through memory. These explorations 
concerning mourning are inextricably related to Mrs. Curren’s experiences of corporeal and 
incorporeal deaths that I have examined in Age of Iron, since Dostoevsky and Mrs. Curren 
are transformed into the living dead in order to keep the deaths within their memories. In 
this chapter, drawing on Derrida’s theory of mourning, my analysis focuses on a new 
figuration of subjectivity as a mourner in diverse dimensions, which can illuminate 








Dostoevsky’s mourning of Pavel is suspended by his desire to remember and 
resurrect his stepson. As I have discussed earlier, Derrida’s impossible mourning confronts 
us with an aporia of memorization: “it has to fail in order to succeed because it succeeds 
only ‘when it fails’”. Drawing on Derrida’s contradictory injunction of mourning, we can 
question whether Dostoevsky’s mourning of his stepson can be seen as an ethical 
memorization. Yet, this ethical issue needs to be reflected upon alongside Dostoevsky’s 
erotic impulses for Anna and Matryona which contaminate the authority of his mourning. 
In relation to this issue, Derek Attridge points out that Dostoevsky’s mourning depends on 
his indirect memory of Pavel: “the absence of a blood relation between them in some ways 
makes the loss all the more difficult to cope with, reminded as he constantly is that his 
claim on Pavel’s memory is an indirect one”.20 Attridge goes on to note that Dostoevsky 
“allows his actions to be determined by impulses, attractions, obscure desires, though 
without fully trusting in any of them”.21 However, I will argue that Dostoevsky’s mourning 
of his stepson is rather involved with the conditions of being human. His memory is 
contaminated by his desire, which concerns itself with the complicated relationship 
between the survivor and the dead. Thus, in this part, through the work of mourning and 
memory, I will explore a mode of subjectivity as a living dead.  
It is necessary to examine the excessive or pathological aspects of Dostoevsky’s 
mourning of Pavel’s death. Dostoevsky’s mourning seems to be pathological, since he can 
hardly affirm what Freud calls mourning and he is rather attached to his son’s death. His 
pathological symptoms are shown in his diverse responses to the death of his stepson: 
lamentation, denial of the death, desire for Pavel’s resuscitation, and a melancholic 
                                           
20 Derek Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading: Literature and Event (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 124-5.  
21 Ibid., 125.  
149 
 
identification with the dead. Initially, in the cemetery, Dostoevsky is not capable of finding 
any remedy for mourning his stepson: “From the boy who still lives in his memory to the 
name on the death certificate to the number on the stake he is not yet prepared to accept the 
train of fatality” (8). Thinking of his stepson’s death as “Provisional (8)”, Dostoevsky feels 
driven to exceed the limitation of death, as if he is Orpheus descending towards Eurydice. 
Dostoevsky feels the urgent need to resurrect him:  
 
He is trying to cast a spell. But over whom: over ghost or over 
himself? He thinks of Orpheus walking backwards step by step, 
whispering the dead woman’s name, coaxing her out of the entrails of 
hell; of the wife in graveclothes with the blind, dead eyes following him, 
holding out limp hands before her like a sleepwalker. (5)  
 
In his mourning of Pavel, Dostoevsky’s identification with Orpheus descending to the dead 
Eurydice pushes him to reject his own status as a living being. As Maurice Blanchot asserts, 
only in his song to face Eurydice “does Orpheus have power over Eurydice, but in the song 
Eurydice is also already lost and Orpheus himself is the scattered Orpheus, the ‘infinitely 
dead’ Orpheus into which the power of the song transforms him from then on”.22 During 
his attempt to resurrect his dead son, Dostoevsky is stuck in an infinitive death, namely, in 
a suspension that he is neither living nor dying. This is demonstrated when he says: “I am 
the one who is dead, he thinks; or rather, I died but my death failed to arrive” (19). 
Compared to Blanchot’s ontology of infinitive death, Freud’s pathology of melancholy 
implies a mourner’s identification with death. In other words, Dostoevsky’s extreme form 
of mourning appears to be a pathological symptom of withdrawing his libido, followed by 
a melancholic identification with the dead. This is evidenced when Dostoevsky says, 
                                           
22 Maurice Blanchot, The Gaze of Orpheus and other literary essays, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: 
Station Hill, 1981), 101.  
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“Because I am he. Because he is I” (53). However, as I have asserted earlier, instead of the 
pathological point of view, Dostoevsky’s mourning displays its impossibility through an 
interaction between the memory of the dead and the survivor.   
In this light, Dostoevsky’s mourning is blocked, in such a way that the survivor 
incorporates the dead within himself in his memorization of the dead. Dostoevsky’s 
mourning is a sort of posthumous fidelity towards Pavel, which acts as a means of keeping 
him alive in his memory. Thus, Dostoevsky denies his mourning of Pavel: “He is not in 
mourning. He has not said farewell to his son, he has not given his son up. On the contrary, 
he wants his son returned to life” (52). Absorbed in his desire to resuscitate his dead stepson, 
Dostoevsky tries to incorporate the dead Pavel into himself in terms of sensation and 
memory. Concerned with sensation, Dostoevsky depends on corporality or materiality as a 
means of directly reaching the dead Pavel, believing that the corporeal traces of the dead 
are preserved in the things his stepson used. In this regard, Dostoevsky thinks that his 
stepson’s documents and other items enable him to merge with the dead Pavel. Dostoevsky 
thus occupies Pavel’s room, awaiting the return of Pavel’s documents taken by the 
policeman, Maximov. Whilst he is in Pavel’s room, Dostoevsky also smells the traces his 
stepson has left:  
 
He lifts the suitcase on to the bed. Neatly folded on top is a white 
cotton suit. He presses his forehead to it. Faintly the smell of his son 
comes to him. He breathes in deeply, again and again, thinking: his ghost, 
entering me. (4)  
 
For Dostoevsky, his sensation of Pavel’s white cotton suit is thereby available for him to 
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incorporate the dead son to himself and to keep him alive.23 This incorporation generates 
a unity of the living and the ghost, since Dostoevsky’s sensation of Pavel’s suit signifies 
his stepson’s absence. Similarly, he inhales the dead Pavel’s smell and then wears the white 
suit. In the process, Dostoevsky thinks that Pavel is incorporated into himself:  
 
At moments like this he cannot distinguish Pavel from himself. 
They are the same person; and that person is no more or less than a 
thought, Pavel thinking it in him, he thinking it in Pavel. The thought 
keeps Pavel alive, suspended in his fall. (21)  
 
These corporeal traces of the dead Pavel are incorporated into the survivor Dostoevsky. In 
this regard, through sensing the material traces left by his dead son, Dostoevsky enters into 
a mode of the living dead, entailed in the suspension of Pavel’s death.  
However, as I have suggested earlier, Dostoevsky’s desire to breathe life into Pavel 
seems incompatible with his erotic impulses for Anna and Matryona. Concerning this issue, 
I want to argue how Dostoevsky’s work of mourning as a way of connecting with his 
memory of Pavel is inevitably intertwined with his experience of desire. In spite of his 
endless mourning, Dostoevsky’s erotic desire can be seen as a form of infidelity, since he 
has a death drive generated by his strong wish to incorporate the dead to himself. In order 
to explore this contradiction between erotic and death desires, we need to begin with 
Dostoevsky’s ideas about Anna and Matryona’s memory of Pavel. It is noteworthy that, 
like Dostoevsky, they are the mourners who keep Pavel’s memory alive. At the cemetery, 
Anna consoles Dostoevsky by saying: “No, of course he is not dead” (10). At that moment, 
                                           
23 In a similar way, Anna’s hands convey a memory to Dostoevsky. When he sees her hands, he 
thinks: “The innocence of hands, ever-renewed. A memory comes back to him: the touch of a hand, 
intimate in the dark. But whose hand? Hands emerge like animals, without shame, without memory, 
into the light of day” (10). 
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he finds Anna “motherly, not only toward her daughter but toward Pavel too” (10). 
Suddenly, Dostoevsky feels a drive to touch her: “Absurdly, he would like to lay his head 
on her breast and feel those fingers stroke his hair” (10). After that, he feels a strong sexual 
impulse for Anna: “Where does his desire come from? It is acute, fiery: he wants to take 
this woman by the arm, drag her behind the gatekeeper’s hut, lift her dress, couple with her” 
(10-1). Dostoevsky’s desire for Anna develops into a sexual relationship. By having sex 
with Anna, Dostoevsky thinks that he can reach the dead Pavel: “Again, through her, he 
passes into darkness and into the waters where his son floats among the other drowned. 
‘Do not be afraid,’ he wants to whisper, ‘I will be with you, I will divide the bitterness with 
you’,” (58). In order to make the dead alive, Dostoevsky, as a living dead or a being with a 
ghost, has an erotic experience with Anna, one that keeps his stepson’s memory alive. 
Nevertheless, Dostoevsky’s sexual desire, although it is a means of reaching the dead, 
definitely exists in tension with his excessive grief for the dead. Regarding this issue, 
Attridge asserts that Dostoevsky’s mourning is influenced and determined by his impulses 
and attractions because of his indirect memory of Pavel. Similarly, Attridge claims that 
Dostoevsky yields to a “force from outside”, which is related to his “epilepsy” that 
“manifests in stark terms his subjection to forces over which he has no control”.24 However, 
Dostoevsky’s sexual desire for Anna is involved with his desire for recollecting and 
preserving the memory of Pavel. As for this issue, through Derrida’s insight into 
“friendship” and its relation to mourning, I further argue that Dostoevsky’s mourning of 
the dead Pavel is always preserved and betrayed by his memory. Thus, in a different vein 
to Attridge’s assertion of a “force from outside”, I will argue that Dostoevsky’s erotic desire 
for Anna is impelled by the impossibility of his mourning.  
Similarly, perceiving a close relationship between Pavel and Matryona, Dostoevsky 
                                           
24 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading, 125. 
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thinks: “To her Pavel is not yet dead. Somewhere in her he still lives, breathing the warm, 
sweet breath of youth” (14). In contrast with his strong sexual desire for Anna, 
Dostoevsky’s feelings for Matryona are ambivalent, comprising both desire and hatred, 
because she is alive while his child, Pavel is dead: “he is in a rage against everyone who is 
alive when his child is dead. In a rage most of all against this girl, whom for her very 
meekness he would like to tear limb from limb” (16). Yet, Dostoevsky’s rage against 
Matryona goes together with his desire to protect her: “There is a rush of feeling in him, 
contradictory, like two waves slapping against each other: an urge to protect her, an urge to 
lash out at her because she is alive” (23). On the one hand, as I have discussed, 
Dostoevsky’s desire for Matryona can be seen as dependent upon a corporeal memory that 
seeks to maintain the dead by virtue of sensation, since he thinks that Matryona like Anna 
maintains her memory of his stepson. On the other hand, Dostoevsky’s contradictory 
feeling for Matryona can be rethought as the work of mourning, or as an act of both 
preserving and betraying the dead Pavel. Whatever his desire for Matryoana, Dostoevsky 
wishes to reach the dead Pavel through Anna’s and Matryona’s memories of Pavel. 
Dostoevsky says to Anna: “‘I have a hunger to talk about my son’, he says, ‘but even more 
of a hunger to hear others talk about him’” (25). In this context, the work of mourning the 
dead ironically proliferates connections and erotic desires amongst living beings. 
It is here necessary to question what the living beings commemorate when they 
think of the dead Pavel. To engage with this, we need to consider an ethical memory 
between the survivor and the dead in terms of Derrida’s aporia of mourning. Since Master 
of Petersburg begins with Dostoevsky’s mourning of Pavel, the dead Pavel can no longer 
respond to or speak to Dostoevsky, although he is remembered by the survivors. The dead 
Pavel cannot exist without the memory of the mourner. As a consequence, Pavel is thereby 
preserved “in” Dostoevsky’s memory, but the dead Pavel in Dostoevsky can resist his 
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memory. In relation to this issue, Derrida explains mourning with reference to an “aporia”:  
 
The aporia of mourning and of prosopopeia, where the possible 
remains impossible. Where success fails. And where faithful 
interiorization bears the other and constitutes him in me (in us), at once 
living and dead. It makes the other a part of us, between us—and then 
the other no longer quite seems to be the other, because we grieve for 
him and bear him in us, like an unborn child, like a future. And inversely, 
the failure succeeds: an aborted interiorization is at the same time a 
respect for the other as other, a sort of tender rejection, a movement of 
renunciation which leaves the other alone, outside, over there, in his 
death, outside of us.25  
 
Derrida’s aporia of mourning navigates the paradoxical structure of memory. On the one 
hand, if the dead Pavel is successfully incorporated into the mourner Dostoevsky’s memory, 
the Otherness of Pavel is repressed within Dostoevsky. In this way, Pavel can no longer be 
the other to Dostoevsky. Thus, Dostoevsky’s mourning succeeds only when it fails. If 
Dostoevsky’s mourning fails, he bears the dead Pavel in himself like “an unborn child, like 
a future”, which is “a respect for the other as other”.26 Thus, as Ziarek suggests, Derrida 
provides an ethical injunction in relation to mourning as “the aporia to preserve both the 
memory and the alterity of the other”. 27  This marks the mourner, Dostoevsky, as an 
example of the living dead, where the memory of the dead unfolds the future.  
Within the framework of Derrida’s theory, it could be argued that Dostoevsky 
experiences an impossible mourning for his own death as well as the dead Pavel, because 
his body always lives with a dead-alive other as a ghost. As Miller argues, Dostoevsky, in 
                                           
25 Derrida, Memories, 35.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, “Encounters possible and impossible: Derrida and Butler on Mourning,” 
Philosophy Today (2006), 144.  
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mourning, is not a “self-enclosed unity”, but he is “always inhabited by death”.28 In this 
way, Dostoevsky feels himself dead and also feels Pavel alive within himself: “I am the 
one who died and was buried, he thinks Pavel the one who lives and will always live” (124). 
Thus, in his recurring dreams of Pavel, Dostoevsky hears his stepson’s voice: “Father, why 
have you left me in the dark forest? Father, when will you come to save me?” (126). 
Moreover, as a dead-alive other, Pavel often transforms his images in Dostoevsky’s 
memory. The images of Pavel that Dostoevsky recalls always change. For example, when 
he tries to summon up Pavel’s face, the face overlaps with that of the other young man who 
“sat behind Bakunin on the stage at the Peace Congress two years ago. His skin is cratered 
with scars that stand out lived in the cold” (49). The dead Pavel in Dostoevsky’s memory 
is also reconstructed through an interaction with other people’s remembrance of him. 
Matryona, who had a close relationship with Pavel, is also in mourning. Dostoevsky is 
aware that she wants to find the traces of Pavel in his face, although he does not look like 
Pavel: “She is trying to see Pavel in me and she cannot” (14). At the same time, Dostoevsky 
thinks that “To her Pavel is not yet dead” (14). Thus, through the dead Pavel, Dostoevsky 
is able to open himself to an unfamiliar and unexpected relationship to others. As a result, 
the dead Pavel is constantly changing, as he interacts with the survivors’ memories.  
The loss of the dead cannot be wholly regained in the survivors’ memories, because 
time is divided into the past and the future. In other words, the memory of the other in the 
past cannot be totally controlled and determined by the mourner in the present, which opens 
the future in the form of a promise. The temporal dimension of this mourning, as Jack 
Reynolds explains, displays Derrida’s theory of “contretemps that is associated with both 
the past and the future (PF 16)”.29 Reynolds thus claims that this shows “Derrida’s ethics 
                                           
28 Miller, “Absolute Mourning”, 11.  
29 Jack Reynolds, Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Analytic Philosophy 
and Phenomenology (New York: Lexington Books, 2012), 156.  
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of nonpresentist time”.30 It is noteworthy that there is an affinity between Derrida’s and 
Deleuze’s theory of time, via the concept of “nonpresentist time”. Deleuze in his work, The 
Logic of Sense, articulates “Aion” as the time of the wound that is constantly split into pasts 
and futures: “Always already passed and eternally yet to come”.31 In this way, both Derrida 
and Deleuze assert that within the time of mourning, the present is broken and decomposed 
by the past and the future. In this context, it seems that Dostoevsky’s painful grief is always 
already betrayed and his memory of the dead is also contaminated and distorted over time. 
At the grave of Pavel, Dostoevsky promises to come back, but he also knows he never 
keeps his promises: “I will come back: the same promise he made when he took the boy to 
school for his first term. You will not be abandoned. And abandoned him” (5). Dostoevsky’s 
broken promise reflects how the promise of the perpetual memory of the dead is always 
breakable. In mourning Paul de Man, Derrida articulates the problem of the promise:  
 
“… yesterday, you may remember, we made each other a promise. 
I now recall it, but you already sense all the trouble we will have in 
ordering all these presents: these past presents which consist of the 
present of a promise, whose opening toward the present to come is not 
that of an expectation or an anticipation but that of commitment”.32  
 
As Martin Hägglund argues, Derrida’s definition of the promise highlights “the division 
between past and future that is the condition of temporal survival”.33 Hägglund goes on to 
say:  
 
                                           
30 Ibid., 154.  
31 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 165.  
32 Derrida, Memories, 47.  
33 Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 137.  
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On the one hand, to promise is to commit oneself to the future, since one can 
only promise something that is to come. On the other hand, to promise is to 
commit oneself to the past, since it entails a promise to remember the promise. 
Whatever I promise, I necessarily promise to keep the memory of the 
promise.34  
 
Thus, Dostoevsky’s promise in mourning is always haunted by the possibility of his 
memory and betrayal over time. Subsequently, Dostoevsky’s work of mourning displays 
an ethical way of commemorating and betraying the dead Pavel, opening a connection 
between the past and the future for the dead. In this context, there is an affinity between 
Derrida’s and Deleuze’s theories of death and its relation to subjectivity. Specifically, in 
facing the deaths of the Other, both Mrs. Curren and Dostoevsky experience the dissolution 
of their subjectivity, which cause them to transform their subjectivity into an inter-being 
between the living and the dead. Additionally, because of their memories of the dead, both 
Mrs. Curren and Dostoevsky do not live in the present, but in the time of the wound that is 
split between the past and the future.      
 
 
III. Insufficient mourning 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, in spite of his absence, Pavel always haunts the people 
he has left behind, which produces his absent presence as ghost-like. Similarly, Dostoevsky 
becomes, as it were, one of the living-dead and then his act of mourning cannot be 
completed. Yet, intervening in the matters of Pavel’s mysterious death, Dostoevsky’s 
impossible mourning is changed into a political event. The truth of Pavel’s death, whether 
                                           
34 Hägglund, Radical Atheism, 137.  
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he kills himself or is killed, is not revealed. Indeed, it is the mystery of Pavel’s death that 
urges Dostoevsky to probe the circumstances of his death and to contact Maximov and 
Nechaev. Through his meeting with Maximov and Nechaev, Dostoevsky comes to feel that 
Pavel’s death cannot be properly mourned and it is thus forced to be interpreted in terms of 
its different political directions: rebellion and revolution. On the one hand, from Maximov’s 
position in the police, there are suspicions surrounding Pavel’s involvement with Nechaev’s 
rebellion against Tsarism. Pavel’s documents, which are a mixture of private and political 
contents, contain a list of people who are to be assassinated, in the name of “the People’s 
Vengeance” (36). Accordingly, Pavel’s private letters and papers are classified as political 
documents and his death is unavoidably bound up with the rebellion against Tsarism. On 
the other hand, in order to politicize Pavel’s death for the sake of the revolution, Nechaev 
urges Dostoevsky to write a political pamphlet saying that Pavel was killed by the police. 
In this way, Dostoevsky’s (im)possible mourning of his stepson shifts to the politics of 
death signified and represses the ghost of Pavel as a dead-alive. In this context, I will 
examine how the politics of death in Coetzee’s novel needs to be examined in terms of the 
ethical work involved in mourning the dead by considering an affinity between the 
oppressive circumstances of Russian Tsarism in the novel and apartheid South Africa in 
Age of Iron. This can also be related to an exploration of the political deaths of black people, 
approached through the prism of both the apartheid regime and the revolutionaries in Age 
of Iron.  
Let us begin with the division between personal and political deaths in the novel. 
Different approaches towards Pavel’s death are evidenced, which leads Dostoevsky to 
classify Pavel’s documents as personal and Maximov to classify them as political. Among 
Pavel’s documents, there are Pavel’s private documents, including Dostoevsky’s letter, 
which chides his stepson for spending too much money. Yet, Pavel’s fiction of revenge is 
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interpreted differently by Maximov and Dostoevsky. Maximov insists that the story of 
revenge is concerned with a rebellion against Tsarism. Specifically, Sergei as the hero in 
Pavel’s fiction is described as “a young man convicted of treasonous conspiracy and sent 
to Siberia” (40). In the story, Sergei escapes from prison and hides with the help of a kitchen 
maid, Marfa, at the home of the landowner Karamzin. One evening Karamzin, as an old 
sensualist, tries to caress the girl, and Sergei then kills Karamzin with a hatchet. 35 
Maximov goes on to assert that Sergei does not leave the murder weapon behind because 
“it is the weapon of the Russian people, our means of defence and our means of revenge” 
(41) against Tsarism. From this fiction, Maximov insists that the dead Pavel was associated 
with the Nechaevites by emphasizing words and their connection to acts. However, 
Dostoevsky rebuts Maximov’s interpretation of Pavel’s fiction as evidence of political 
rebellion against Tsarism. According to Dostoevsky, Pavel’s fiction has to be understood 
as a private fantasy, written in his private space. In addition to this, Dostoevsky views 
Nechaevism as a universal “spirit” rather than as a particular act of the rebellion: 
“Nechaevism is not an idea. It despises ideas, it is outside ideas. It is a spirit, and Nechaev 
himself is not its embodiment but its host; or rather, he is under possession by it” (44). In 
short, rather than being seen as a particular ideology and its embodiment, Dostoevsky sees 
Nechaevism as a radical evil force of rebellion or betrayal within history, which anyone 
can be possessed and affected by. In this fashion, there are contrary positons for interpreting 
Nechaevism and the relation between Pavel’s fiction and rebellion. Accordingly, 
Dostoevsky’s suspension of mourning of his stepson shifts into a political debate 
surrounding his death.    
However, it is necessary to further consider Nechaevism as a radical force that 
                                           
35  This is an intertextual reference to Dostoevsky’s novel Crime and Punishment, in which 
Raskolnikov kills the money-lender with a hatchet.  
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Dostoevsky asserts. In the debate on Pavel’s death and Nechaevism, Dostoevsky considers 
the dead Pavel’s betrayal. Dostoevsky’s assertion of Nechaevism also has implications for 
his relationship to his stepson Pavel, for Nechaevism as a radical force can be expanded 
into the relationship between fathers and sons. Through probing the mystery of his 
stepson’s death, Dostoevsky recognizes the dead Pavel’s infidelity. Dostoevsky encounters 
the unexpected fact that Pavel’s rebellion is also motivated by his hatred of fathers: “Not 
the People’s Vengeance but the Vengeance of the Sons: is that what underlies revolution—
fathers envying their sons their women, sons scheming to rob their father’s cashboxes?” 
(108). Sue Kossew points out that “the political revolution is envisaged in terms of a 
generation clash, with Nechaev, the young revolutionary leader, seen as giving ‘a voice to 
something dumb and brutal that is sweeping through young Russia’ (112)”.36  Pavel’s 
participation in Nechaev’s rebellion does seem to imply a resistance against or a betrayal 
of his stepfather Dostoevsky and the old Russia. In this fashion, it is significant that Sergei, 
the hero of Pavel’s story, thinks of himself as an orphan. Specifically, through Sergei’s 
mouth, Pavel denies the stepfather Dostoevsky, while calling his biological father Isaev his 
true one.  
 
“I have no parents,” says, Sergei to Marfa. “My father, my real 
father, was a nobleman exiled to Siberia for his revolutionary sympathies. 
He died when I was seven. My mother married a second time. Her new 
husband did not like me. As soon as I was old enough, he packed me off 
to cadet school. I was the smallest body in my class; that was where I 
learned to fight for my rights. Later they moved back to Petersburg, set 
up house, and sent for me. Then my mother died, and I was left alone 
with my stepfather, a gloomy man who addressed barely a word to me 
from one day to the next. I was lonely; my only friends were among the 
                                           
36 Kossew, Pen and Power, 215.  
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servants; it was from them that I got to know the sufferings of the people”. 
(151) 
 
After reading this part of the fiction, Dostoevsky thinks that the content is distorted: “Not 
untrue, not wholly untrue, yet how subtly twisted, all of it!” (151). Thinking of Pavel’s 
story as “the full truth dullest of all” (152), Dostoevsky remembers that Pavel’s real father 
was “a clerk, a pen-pusher” (152) rather than a “nobleman” with “revolutionary sympathies” 
(152). In Dostoevsky’s reading of and response to Pavel’s fiction, it is ironically shown that 
he also reads Pavel’s fictive story as a reality, like Maximov’s reading of the text and its 
relation to the political act. Thus, in contrast to his excessive grief surrounding the loss, 
Dostoevsky remembers an episode in Pavel’s lonely childhood, when his stepson was so 
“suspicious and unsmiling” and tried to “cling to his mother like a leech and grudged every 
minute she spent away from him” (151). Maximov, who has read all of Pavel’s documents, 
expresses a severe reservation about handing them over to Dostoevsky. Because “painful 
discoveries lie in store” for Dostoevsky—“painful and unnecessary discoveries” (147), 
Maximov warns against his reading of the papers. Clearly Maximov anticipates that Pavel’s 
writing of the story about Sergei could be read as expressing his wish to deny his stepfather, 
Dostoevsky. Thus, reminding himself of Maximov’s advice, Dostoevsky “would like to 
burn the letter, to erase it from history” (150). In this fashion, the survivor’s memory of the 
past cannot be determined, since it contains the betrayal of the dead in the form of 
Nechaevism. In this context, we can recall Derrida’s idea that the survivor’s mourning 
constitutes a betrayal of the dead. Dostoevsky’s mourning contains a betrayal of the dead 
Pavel, which is relative to Dostoevsky’s incomplete and impossible mourning.  
Although Dostoevsky recognizes Pavel’s infidelity, he considers himself as Pavel’s 
real father. Dostoevsky thinks that Pavel’s story about Sergei was made available to him 
because writers “write out of anguish and, out of lack” (152). Dostoevsky goes on to think: 
162 
 
If Isaev had lived and Pavel had followed him, Pavel “too would have become nothing but 
a clerk”, and he “would not have left this story behind” (152). Moreover, for Dostoevsky, 
through his work of remembering, the dead constructs a real relationship between father 
and son. Thus, despite Pavel’s infidelity to him, Dostoevsky laments the dead Pavel:  
 
Poor boy! On the streets of Petersburg, in the turn of a head here, 
the gesture of a hand there, I see you, and each time my heart lifts as a 
wave does. Nowhere and everywhere, torn and scattered like Orpheus. 
Young in days, chryseos, golden, blessed. (152)  
 
Pavel is thereby nowhere and everywhere, producing a space of the living-dead. 
Dostoevsky also thinks that only his remembering keeps Pavel alive:  
 
I am here and father Isaev is not. If, drowning, you reach for Isaev, 
you will grasp only a phantom hand. In the town hall of Semipalatinsk, 
in dusty files in a box on the back stairs, his signature is still perhaps to 
be read; otherwise no trace of him save in this remembering, in the 
remembering of the man who embraced his widow and his child. (153)  
 
In this space of mourning, as I have asserted earlier, Pavel also becomes an “unborn child”, 
through which the survivor Dostoevsky’s memory is broken open for the future.  
However, Dostoevsky’s mourning is denied by Nechaev’s idea of the revolution. In 
order to persuade Dostoevsky to write a pamphlet for his revolution, Nechaev takes him to 
the cellar in which the cold and famished children and women are dying. Dostoevsky is 
sympathetic towards the miserable circumstances of the starving people. This scene 
overlaps with Mrs. Curren’s witnessing of the deaths of young black revolutionaries in the 
township of Guguletu in Age of Iron. Rather than Mrs. Curren’s change of her attitude 
towards the black revolutionaries, Dostoevsky finds more crucial flaws in Nechaev’s idea 
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of justice and revolution. Specifically, Dostoevsky recognizes that Nechaev uses the 
pathetic circumstances of the oppressed and even their death as a medium for the realization 
of his ideal society. As Nechaev asserts, “But hunger and sickness and poverty are not the 
enemy. They are only ways in which real forces manifest themselves in the world. Hunger 
is a medium, as water is a medium” (181). What Nechaev calls the “real forces” can be 
understood as anger, or the negative passion that activates or forces the oppressed to resist 
the oppressor. In this context, Nechaev accuses Dostoevsky of representing the suffering 
of people but of ignoring its causes: “You see children starving in a cellar; you refuse to 
see what determines the conditions of those children’s lives” (186). Thus, Nechaev claims: 
it is time that Dostoevsky tries “to share the existence of the oppressed” (186). By accusing 
the police of Pavel’s death, Nechaev also attempts to persuade Dostoevsky to use his anger 
about Pavel’s death: “We must use his death to light a flame. He would agree with me. He 
would urge you to put your anger to good use” (179). In his debate about revolution with 
Nechaev, Dostoevsky realizes that Pavel is sacrificed as a message to the students who 
“will be bound to come out in the streets in just outrage” (179). Moreover, Dostoevsky 
finds that the death of Pavel is Nechaev’s trap to lure Dostoevsky: “A trap, a devilish trap. 
… Pavel’s death was merely the bait to lure him from Dresden to Petersburg (203).  
Nechaev’s revolution seeks to exploit the deaths of the young generation. Thus, 
Nechaev’s view does not offer a possibility for the work of mourning, but rather promotes 
the sacrifice of young people. Nechaev’s thought of sacrifice is more shockingly manifested 
by Matryona, when she gives a poison to a Finnish girl, a comrade of Nechaev. Matryona 
gives her the purse of poison that Nechaev left, when the Finnish girl and the police come 
to Dostoevsky’s home. Matryona follows Nechaev’s orders and provides the Finnish girl 
with the means to commit suicide. Yet, Matryona does not show any guilt. Instead she is 
smiling slightly, in contrast with her mourning of Pavel’s death. From this, Nechaev’s 
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concept of revolution is problematic, when the deaths of the young generation are exploited 
to instigate people’s anger. This negative passion of anger implies resentment in the 
Nietzschean and Deleuzian senses. In his reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze describes 
resentment as “spirit of revenge”: “the man of resentment experiences every being and 
objects as an offence in exact proportion to its effect on him”.37 The spirit of revenge risks 
using revenge as a means for revolution, which can in turn bring about the sacrifice or death 
of young generations.   
In order to examine a new vision for the future in oppressive regimes, we need to 
further examine the difference between revolution and resentment. For Dostoevsky, 
Nechaev’s spirit of revenge is explicitly problematic, because Nechaev’s revolution was 
motivated by his personal revenge. Nechaev wanted to become a schoolmaster, but he 
failed the qualifying examinations, and then turned to revolution in revenge against his 
examiners (182). Moreover, his revolution is also a reaction against his father’s violence. 
Nechaev believes that the history of the world is constructed by “fathers and sons at war 
with each other” and the meaning of revolution implies “the end of everything old, 
including fathers and sons” (189). Accordingly, Nechaev’s revolution denies the lineage of 
fathers in order to generate a new future. However, there are further questions that can be 
asked about Nechaev’s principles of revolution. Firstly, Nehcaev demands the sacrifice of 
the young generation (including Pavel and the Finnish girl) in the name of martyrdom. This 
politics of sacrifice relates strongly to the politics of Tsarism that sacrifices people’s power 
for the tsar. In relation to the death of Pavel, Matryona poses a question to Dostoevsky: 
“Gave himself up for what?” (247). Dostoevsky answers: “For the future. So that he could 
be one of the martyrs” (247). Yet, a war, whether it is “the old against the young”, or “the 
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young against the old” (247), is effectively a method of exploiting death. Secondly, 
Nechaev’s spirit of revenge constructs an enemy which people project their resentment into. 
The principle of resentment thus says: “You are evil, therefore I am good”.38 Although a 
real enemy exists, since tsarism oppresses people, Nechaev’s resentment is reactive towards 
the oppressor through his memory of his hatred of objects in the past. In his reading of 
Nietzsche, Deleuze describes the principle of resentment as the slave’s morality: 
“resentment is the triumph of the weak as weak, the revolt of the slaves and their victory 
as slaves. It is in their victory that the slaves form a type. The type of the master (the active 
type) is defined in terms of the faculty of forgetting and the power of acting reactions”.39 
In this sense, Nechaev’s revolution, as Dostoevsky reasons, relies on the father as an object 
of hatred: “Desperate. Desperate to be betrayed, desperate to find a father to betray him” 
(194). As a result, Nechaev’s thought of revolution is a reaction against his memory of the 
past, rather than an action for opening the future. In this context, it could be said that the 
work of mourning has to include both remembering and forgetting for the future. This is a 
Deleuzian concept of memory, which can provide more political approaches towards the 
revolution than a Derridean conception of mourning. Concerned with the revolution, we 
can consider what Dostoevsky calls “forgiveness” as a new vision for society. Dostoevsky 
tells Nechaeve: “Forgiveness of all. He has only to think of it and his head spins. And they 
shall be united, father and son. Because it comes from the foul mouth of a blasphemer, shall 
it therefore not to be the truth?” (201). Yet, an ethics of forgiveness has to be haunted by 
its betrayal. I will now discuss this in relation to writing as a form of betrayal.  
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IV. Writing as a Posthumous infidelity 
 
Dostoevsky’s writing in the blank pages of Pavel’s diary, after his death, is 
associated with the work of mourning. As I have asserted earlier, Dostoevsky’s desire to 
resurrect Pavel is initially connected to Orpheus, who is “walking backwards step by step, 
whispering the dead woman’s name, coaxing her out of the entrails of hell” (5). Because of 
the power of art, Orpheus is able to descend to death, or Eurydice. However, Dostoevsky 
does not see himself as a poet Orpheus, but rather as a dog: “Poetry might bring back his 
son. He has a sense of a poem that would be required, a sense of its music. But he is not a 
poet: more like a dog that has lost a bone, scratching here, scratching there” (17). The dog 
signifies Dostoevsky as a writer engaged with loss rather than Orpheus’s attempted 
recovery of the dead. Because of his loss, Dostoevsky’s attempt at writing after Pavel’s 
death is concerned with a perversion. In the final chapter “Stavrogin”, instead of writing 
his work, Dostoevsky begins to write Pavel’s uncompleted fiction in the blank pages of the 
diary in order to resurrect him, but his writing is vile and pornographic. In this writing, the 
hero Stavrogin seduces and contaminates the innocent Matryona. His writing of Pavel’s 
incomplete fiction is engaged in a means of betrayal: “Not a matter of fidelity at all. On the 
contrary, a matter of betrayal—betrayal of love first of all, and then of Pavel and the mother 
and child and everyone else. Perversion: everything and everyone to be turned to another 
use, to be gripped to him and fall with him” (235). Thus, a question may be asked in relation 
to the work of mourning in order to explore why Dostoevsky distorts Pavel’s fiction in this 
way.  
Dostoevsky’s writing in Pavel’s diary in Coetzee’s The Master of Petersburg 
parallels an act of mourning in the real Dostoevsky’s work. In essence, Coetzee’s novel can 
be seen as a posthumous writing of the real Dostoevsky’s works. “At Tihkon’s” written by 
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the real Dostoevsky is the original version of the chapter called “Stavrogin”. “At Tihkon’s” 
was omitted from the original version of Demons, but it is added as an appendix in the 
modern version.40 As Uhlmann recounts, the real Dostoevsky “caused offense, both in his 
life, and through his works, and unlike Nabokov, in his portrayal of pedophilia—‘At 
Tikhon’s’ or Starvrogin’s confession’ was censored or self-censored”.41 Coetzee redeems 
the suppressed “At Tikhon’s” in the last chapter of The Master of Petersburg. The fictional 
Dostoevsky writes an offensive posthumous fiction through the character of Pavel. 
Coetzee’s and the fictional Dostoevsky’s writings demonstrate a work of mourning to 
incorporate the works of the dead into their writings. In effect, in this posthumous writing, 
Coetzee and the fictional Dostoevsky resuscitate the dead Dostoevsky and Pavel, but in a 
manner in which it betrays them.  
It is questionable, however, why the fictional Dostoevsky chooses a form of 
perverse posthumous writing as a way of keeping Pavel alive. In his mourning of Pavel, 
Dostoevsky has sex with Anna in Pavel’s room in order to seduce and corrupt Matryona. 
Perceiving this perversion, Anna says, “you use me as a route to my child” (231). As Anna 
points out, Dostoevsky’s writing in Pavel’s diary is also a perverse form of writing to seduce 
Matryona to read it. It is thus the reader who Dostoevsky tries to seduce and contaminate 
through a form of perversion. This precisely relies on his thought of his writing as a 
perversion of the truth: “I write perversions of the truth. I choose the crooked road and take 
children into dark places. I follow the dance of the pen” (236). This perversion of the truth 
is relative to a paradox exposed in Dostoevsky’s writing of Pavel’s diary, which embodies 
an encounter between the living and the dead. “Ultimately it will not be given him to bring 
                                           
40 See Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Yolokhonsky (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), 681-714.  
41  Anthony Uhlmann, “Excess as Ek-Stasis: Coetzee’s The Master of Petersburg and Giving 
Offense”, The Comparatist, 38 (October 2014), 64.  
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the dead boy back to life. Ultimately, if he wants to meet him, he will have to meet him in 
death” (237-8). This paradox demonstrates a dilemma in Dostoevsky’s posthumous writing, 
since his writing always represents the absence of the beloved after his death. Concerning 
this paradoxical situation, Dostoevsky draws on the Biblical parable of the thief in the night 
and the householder.  
 
If he is to be saved, it will be by the thief in the night, for whom 
he must unwaveringly be on watch. Yet the thief will not come till the 
householder has forgotten him and fallen asleep. The householder may 
not watch and wake without cease, otherwise the parable will not be 
fulfilled. The householder must sleep; and if he must sleep, how can God 
condemn his sleeping? God must save him, God has no other way. Yet 
to trap God thus in a net of reason is a provocation and a blasphemy.  
He is in the old labyrinth. It is the story of his gambling in another 
guise. He gambles because God does not speak. He gambles to make 
God speak. But to make God speak in the turn of a card is blasphemy. 
Only when God is silent does God speak. When God seems to speak God 
does not speak. (236-7)  
 
In this vision, the householder must watch on in order to be saved by the thief. Yet, if the 
householder watches on, the thief will not come. This dilemma is then reworked, perhaps 
through a wager, as a parable of gambling: he claims he gambles in order to make God 
speak, but to attempt to make God speak through gambling is “blasphemy”. This leads to 
the paradox that God speaks only when he is silent.   
The paradoxes of the householder and gambling designate Dostoevsky’s “choice 
that is no choice” (239), when he tries to write about Pavel in the work of mourning. 
Paralyzed, Dostoevsky has to bear Pavel within himself or to let him loose: “Either Pavel 
remains within him, a child walled up in the crypt of his grief, weeping without cease, or 
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he lets Pavel loose in all his rage against the rule of the fathers. Lets his own rage loose too, 
like a genie from a bottle, against the impiety and thanklessness of the sons” (239). This 
dilemma can also be understood as his choice between whether he writes (or mourns) Pavel 
for himself or for his stepson. Dostoevsky lets Pavel loose within his memory and lets Pavel 
grow and change beyond his memory: “from this vision of Pavel grown beyond childhood 
and beyond love—grown not in a human manner but in the manner of an insect that changes 
shape entirely at each stage of its evolution” (240). In this circumstance, Dostoevsky waits 
for Pavel’s voice beyond his memory, after his stepson has already died.  
However, Dostoevsky still hesitates to write, as “he cannot mourn except to and for 
himself” (239). Thus, Dostoevsky incorporates himself into the dead Pavel like “the 
goddess-fiend drawing out the seed from the corpse, saving it” (241). Gazing upon “the 
body-parts without which there can be no fatherhood” (241), Dostoevsky begins to write 
at the moment when “Nothing is private any more” (241) between Dostoevsky and Pavel. 
Dostoevsky “takes Pavel’s diary and turns to the first empty page, the page that the child 
did not write on because by then he was dead. On this page he begins, a second time, to 
write” (242). In this way, when Dostoevsky starts his writing, his identity dissolves and 
disappears in the process of incorporating himself into a “version of Pavel” (242).  
   
In his writing he is in the same room, sitting at the table much as 
he is sitting now. But the room is Pavel’s and Pavel’s alone. And he is 
not himself any longer, not a man in the forty-ninth year of his life. 
Instead he is young again, with all the arrogant strength of youth. He is 
wearing a white suit, perfectly tailored. He is, to a degree, Pavel Isaev, 
though Pavel Isaev is not the name his is going to give himself. (242)  
 
By writing in Pavel’s diary, Dostoevsky becomes Pavel as a living-dead, producing the 
undetermined space between self and the other, the living and the dead. As a result, he 
170 
 
encounters a paradox of writing: “He is writing for himself. He is writing for eternity. He 
is writing for the dead” (245). The writer Dostoevsky thereby creates a paradoxical space 
where the self and the other can coexist, incorporating the dead into the living.  
Nevertheless, what Dostoevsky writes in his stepson’s diary is not simply 
pornography, but also the corruption of innocent Matryona. Dostoevsky describes his 
writing as a trap to catch God:  
 
It is an assault upon the innocence of a child. It is an act for which he can 
expect no forgiveness. With it he has crossed the threshold. Now God must 
speak, now God dare no longer remain silent. To corrupt a child is to force 
God. The device he has made arches and springs shut like a trap, a trap to 
catch God. (249) 
 
However, it is noteworthy that Dostoevsky’s trap to catch God needs to be distinguished 
from Nechaev’s trap for Dostoevsky. As I have argued, Nechaev traps Dostoevsky to write 
a pamphlet for a revolution by sacrificing the death of Pavel. However, Dostoevsky 
becomes a betrayer of the dead Pavel, the innocent Matryona and God, which results in the 
production of a paradoxical space. In this context, it is important to rethink what Uhlmann 
describes in relation to the writer’s betrayal. Uhlmann says:  
 
…a particular kind of sacrifice is required in order to be a writer: 
the sacrifice not of Christ, but of Judas, who betrays so that Christ (or 
the idea of the truth) might be revealed. The betrayal destroys the idea of 
the one who betrays because it gives offense and draws condemnation. 
Yet, paradoxically, in drawing offense down on his head the writer is able 
to bring ideas into focus that might lead us to truths.42  
 
                                           
42 Uhlmann, “Excess as Ek-Stasis”, 64.  
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However, although Uhlmann describes the writer as an embodiment of Judas by betraying 
Christ, there is a risk that a writer inevitably condemns the position of sacrificing himself 
in order to access what is called the truth. This could also result in elevating the writer to 
the sacred one who sacrificies himself for the truth. Given Dostoevsky’s desire to become 
a dog rather than a poet, it is necessary to consider the relationship between a writer and 
the truth through Deleuze’s conception of betrayal. From Deleuze’s perspective, rather than 
sacrificing himself, a writer traces a line of flight, which is always related to betrayal. 
According to Deleuze, firstly, betrayal has to be a “double turning away”: “The movement 
of betrayal has been defined as a double turning-away: man turns his face from God, who 
also turns his face away from man”.43 For example, “It is a story of Jonah: the prophet is 
recognizable by the fact that he takes the opposite path to that which is ordered by God and 
thereby realizes God’s commandment better than if he had obeyed”. Thus, in his writing in 
Pavel’s diary, Dostoevsky turns away from Pavel, who also betrays him. Secondly, betrayal 
is related to a traitor, who betrays “the world of dominant significations”, and “the 
established order”.44 For example, Captain Ahab, in Herman Melville’s novel, Moby Dick, 
chooses “Moby Dick, the white whale, instead of obeying the law of a group of fishermen, 
according to which all whales are fit to hunt”. 45  This engages Ahab with a “whale-
becoming-himself”. 46  In this context, Dostoevsky’s posthumous writing is a double 
turning away that he betrays Pavel who turns away from him. This is an act of betrayal of 
                                           
43 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 40.  
44  Ibid., 41. Deleuze distinguishes a traitor from a trickster: “for the trickster claims to take 
possession of fixed properties, or to conquer a territory, or even to introduce a new order. The 
trickster has plenty of future, but no becoming whatsoever” (41). Unlike that of a trickster, Deleuze 
and Guattari, in A Thousand of Plateaus, describe a traitor’s betrayal as a “universal deception”, 
which can invent a new relation between signs and signs, or an individual and a community. Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand of Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 118. 




a writer who resurrects the dead or the past. To put it another way, betraying the dead Pavel 
and the living Matryona in his posthumous writing, the writer Dostoevsky is forced to 
become a ghost, or one of the living-dead, through the paradox of incorporating death into 
his life.  
Subsequently, a posthumous writing entails an infidelity to the dead in order to be 
faithful to him. This is associated with what Kossew describes in relation to Dostoevsky’s 
betrayal: “Life becomes story, death becomes life. The writer himself takes on Pavel’s 
youth, becoming a ‘version of Pavel’, who has ‘passed through the gates of death and 
returned’ (242)”. Kossew goes on to assert that “Writing on a blank page in Pavel’s diary 
(an act which represents the time he had ceased to write in it because he was dead), the 
writer takes on an ambiguous identity (‘he is not a god but he is no longer human either’) 
and, in some way, the writing process begins” (221). As a result, in writing the dead, 
Dostoevsky experiences himself as existing in a space of paradox: “time stands still and 
watches too. Time is suspended, everything is suspended before the fall” (249). In the 
suspension of time, Dostoevsky feels his own living dissolved: “I have lost my place in my 
soul, he thinks” (250). Dostoevsky eventually reaches the thought of his own death by 
betraying his own life: “He has betrayed everyone; nor does he see that his betrayal could 
go deeper.” “Am I dead already?” (250). In this context, Dostoevsky’s consciousness of 
himself as a ghost has an affinity with Mrs. Curren’s recognition of herself as an ailing and 
dying woman, when they write the deaths of the young generation. Dostoevsky’s 
posthumous writing therefore displays a fidelity to the dead and the living through an 
infidelity to both of them.  
 
 




As I have argued, J.M. Coetzee’s novel The Master of Petersburg is a work that 
concerns itself with the mourning of the dead. In the novel, the protagonist Dostoevsky 
returns to Petersburg to mourn his stepson Pavel’s mysterious death. Yet, Dostoevsky’s 
mourning is suspended, because he is attached to the dead Pavel, by virtue of keeping his 
stepson alive in memory. From this, I have discussed Dostoevsky’s mourning in its three 
dimensions: the impossibility of mourning, the political denial of mourning and the 
mourning as posthumous writing. As I have noted, Derrida argues that an act of mourning 
is impossible, since the survivor’s mourning implies the perpetual memory of the dead. 
Specifically, in mourning, the survivor incorporates the dead within his memory, but the 
alterity of the dead can be determined by the survivor’s memory. Thus, Derrida offers an 
ethical aporia of mourning to preserve both the memory and the alterity of the other. Within 
the framework of Derrida’s ethics of mourning, rather than engaging with the incorporation 
of the dead, the mourner is forced to recognize the dead as a dead-alive other, whilst 
thinking of himself as a living-dead. In other words, the mourner and the dead, in the work 
of mourning, both become living-ghosts, following the death of the other.  
In relation to Derrida’s writing on mourning, firstly, I have argued that Dostoevsky’s 
mourning is impossible. Overwhelmed by his sorrow at the loss of Pavel, Dostoevsky 
becomes melancholic, forcing him to recall and resuscitate his stepson in his memory. In 
the process of the mourning, Dostoevsky, however, comes to recognize a paradox of 
mourning the dead from Derrida’s perspective: Dostoevsky succeeds in mourning his 
stepson, only when he fails. The dead Pavel is not able to resist Dostoevsky’s incorporation 
and memory. However, in mourning, Dostoevsky experiences himself as the dead, a 
position that dissolves his self. Instead of being a “self-enclosed unity,” Dostoevsky 
becomes a living-dead, haunted and inhabited by the dead. As a result, Dostoevsky’s 
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mourning is not completed, but is always suspended.  
Secondly, although the dead Pavel cannot resist Dostoevsky’s memory or 
incorporation of him, he, as a dead-alive other, is able to betray the survivor in the act of 
mourning. The betrayal of the dead can be juxtaposed with the risk that the mourning of 
the dead is used politically. Specifically, Dostoevsky’s grief for the dead Pavel has to be 
suppressed because of the political implication that his stepson was involved with Sergei 
Nechaev’s rebellion against the Tsarist regime. Firstly, the policeman Maximov interprets 
Pavel’s fiction as evidence of his rebellious activities, whilst Dostoevsky thinks of the 
fiction as a form of private writing. Secondly, trapped by Nechaev, Dostoevsky is forced to 
write a pamphlet saying that Pavel was killed by the police. Nechaev wishes to use the 
death of Pavel for the purposes of political agitation. As I have argued, Nechaev’s 
revolution relies on the politics of sacrifice, which prohibits Dostoevsky from experiencing 
an impossible mourning. In an interview with the policeman Maximov, Dostoevsky 
interprets Nevchaevism as a radical and evil force of rebellion, a betrayal of history rather 
than as a specific commitment to rebellion. This radical force can also be understood as an 
act of betrayal with reference to the relationships between sons and fathers. Thus, 
Dostoevsky recognizes that Pavel betrays his stepfather through his fiction in which his 
stepson denies him as a father. However, Dostoevsky comes to comprehend a work of 
mourning as “the inside-outside relation”, one that bears a betrayal within any relations.  
Finally, Dostoevsky’s writing in Pavel’s diary, is clearly associated with an act of 
mourning. However, this writing offers a paradox, since he presents the absence of the 
beloved by resuscitating the dead. This paradox is described as Dostoevsky’s assertion of 
a “choice that is no choice”. In addition, in order to mourn Pavel, Dostoevsky writes his 
stepson’s uncompleted fiction in the empty pages of his diary, but his writing is a 
pornography that seeks to seduce and contaminate the innocent Matryona. As a result, his 
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perversion of writing enacts an infidelity towards his stepson. However, Dostoevsky’s 
mourning is suspended rather than completed, through the paradox of incorporating the 
dead into the living. In this way, Dostoevsky offers fidelity towards the dead through 
infidelity. Accordingly, Dostoevsky’s posthumous writing triggers his mourning for both 
the other and himself. The Master of Petersburg can be seen as a work of posthumous 
writing, which commemorates the dead, and constructs a betrayal within the relations 
between the survivor and the dead, between fathers and sons, and between the texts of the 






The discordant accord and the ridiculous effect of the sublime  
in Disgrace 
 
I. Introduction  
 
During the post-apartheid period in South Africa, the sovereign power of the former 
regime was dismantled and the hierarchical relationship between the colonizer and the 
colonized was challenged. As Paul Patton observes, “this painful transition to a new South 
Africa is directly implicated in many of the events that befall” the characters in J.M. 
Coetzee’s novel, Disgrace (1999).1  The protagonist David Lurie, once a professor of 
Romantic literature, teaches communication skills at the Cape Technical University, as part 
of what he calls the “great rationalization”.2 From Lurie’s perspective, the authority of 
traditional values and emotions in the university needs to be discarded, in order to develop 
practical and communicative skills.3 However, in contrast to this stream of “rationalization” 
                                           
1  Paul Patton, Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), 119.  
2 J.M. Coetzee, Disgrace (London: Vintage Books, 2000), 3.  
3 Coetzee, in “Critic and Citizen” comments on the changing model of the university: the “old model 
of the university finds itself under attack as an increasingly economistic interrogation of social 
institutions is carried out”. J.M. Coetzee, “Critic and Citizen: A Response”, Pretexts: Literary and 
Cultural Studies, 9:1 (2000), 110. Quoting this part, Derek Attridge suggests a possible connection 
between the changes in Lurie’s and Coetzee’s own universities: “Coetzee’s resignation from the 
University of Cape Town in 2001 and his move to Australia may not be unconnected with the views 
implicit here”. Dereck Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 169. 
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in the altered world, Lurie thinks that “his temperament is not going to change, he is too 
old for that. His temperament is fixed, set” (2). This discord between his fixed personality 
and the spirit of rationalization within the university marks him as an anachronistic 
individual, and this anticipates his friction with the spirit of the new South Africa. In this 
chapter, however, I will consider how Lurie’s decline triggers an encounter with the sublime, 
which can be described as a sentiment that opens up a chasm in his imagination and reason. 
This chapter will investigate the effects of the sublime in relation to the subject’s decline 
in Coetzee’s novel, drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s and Slavoj Žižek’s theories of the sublime. 
I will examine how Lurie’s experience of the sublime is transformed into the two effects of 
the ridiculous as articulated in Žižek’s theory and of inhuman becoming, as outlined in 
Deleuze’s theory. Subsequently, through this focus on the two effects of the sublime, I will 
explore how Lurie’s disgrace can be seen to designate an ethical and political potentiality 
for a new South Africa rather than a repetition of the violent structure of its history.       
Set in turbulent times following the end of apartheid, the novel depicts a bleak South 
Africa fraught with violence, rape and revenge, which predicts a pessimistic future. From 
the perspective of white people, the colonizer’s racial privilege over the colonized has been 
lost. Lurie, as a white intellectual, is not able to maintain his former privileged position, 
but rather he has to negotiate with black Africans on different terms in the altered political 
circumstances of the new South Africa. Dawn, a young white woman, who Lurie takes out 
for lunch, regards the political shift as “anarchy”, by complaining that “Now people just 
pick and choose which laws they want to obey” (9). This circumstance, according to Tom 
Herron, entails the “white dilemma” in “dark times” (216): “the breakdown of law and 
order there; the ethics of silence as response to black-on-white, male-on female rape; the 
notion of historical retribution; the mechanics of land redistribution; the impact of 
178 
 
economic rationalization; the status of truth and the possibilities for reconciliation”.4 The 
focus of the early part of the narrative is Lurie’s sexual relationship with his student 
Melanie Isaacs, and her charge that he has raped her. This affair and its aftermath force 
Lurie to take a track of chaotic descent. After his retirement from the university, Lurie 
moves to his daughter Lucy’s smallholding in the Eastern Cape Town of Salem. Here, Lurie 
is beaten by three black Africans while Lucy is raped by them. There is an obvious linkage 
between these two acts of sexual violations, and in both cases their actions relate to the 
reversal of the relationship between the oppressor and the victim in the past. In this respect, 
the political change in South Africa involves the failure of reconciliation between the 
oppressor and the victim. Given the oppressive history of the apartheid regime, it becomes 
necessary that white people understand the pain of the black victims. In this context, as 
Dereck Attridge notes, the novel contains not even a “tinge of celebration and optimism”.5   
Lurie’s traumatic experience at the hands of his attackers compels him to experience 
a fundamental sense of frailty and formless horror. It is this sense of formless fear that I 
want to approach through the conception of the sublime. From this perspective, I want to 
examine how this experience of the sublime pushes him to the limit of his imagination and 
reason. My first consideration is how Lurie’s imagination plays a role in understanding a 
transformative reality that the white people have lost their former privilege over the black 
people and have to negotiate with them. As an expert in Romantic poetry, Lurie identifies 
himself with Lord Byron and his circle. His literary imagination appears in contrast with a 
rationalization of South Africa. There is a disparity between the political demand of 
“rationalization” and his literary imagination. The second consideration is for whom the 
sentiment of the sublime provides a potentiality, since it enables an experience of the 
                                           
4 Tom Herron, “The Dog Man: Becoming Animal in Coetzee’s Disgrace”, Twentieth-Century 
Literature (51:4, Winter 2005), 473.  
5 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 150.  
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formless that he cannot perceive or imagine in the oppressive society of South Africa. I will 
explore Lurie’s decline and his experience of the sublime in terms of Deleuze’s notion of 
the double movements of discord and accord, and Žižek’s assertion of the effect of ridicule.  
In order to explore the effects of the sublime in terms of the subject’s decline, it is 
necessary to begin with Deleuze’s conception of the sublime. In his reading of Immanuel 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Deleuze defines the sublime as a sensation or feeling of 
experiencing the limit of our imagination and reason, when we face “the formless or the 
deformed (immensity or power)”.6 Specifically, in Deleuze’s conception, there are two 
forms of the sublime, the “mathematical” and the “dynamical”, which both lead us to 
experience feelings of pain.7 As Deleuze points out, we experience the sublime in the form 
of a dissension or a “contradiction experienced between the demands of reason and the 
power of the imagination”. 8  This contradiction or disparity, as Deleuze stresses, is 
available for the subject to reach the limit of the imagination. This makes possible “a 
tempest in the depths of a chasm opened up in the subject”.9 Deleuze goes on to assert that 
“This is why the imagination appears to lose its freedom and the feeling of the sublime 
seems to be pain rather than pleasure. But at the bottom of the dissension the accord 
emerges; the pain makes a pleasure possible”.10 In other words, the discord between reason 
and the imagination can be resolved in an accord, since reason and imagination have a 
“suprasensible” destination which also makes us feel “the indeterminate suprasensible 
                                           
6 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Barbara Habberjam (London: Continuum, 2008), 42.  
7 In Kant’s account, the mathematical sublime involves the relationship between the imagination 
and theoretical reason, while the dynamic sublime is associated with a relationship between the 
imagination and practical reason. In this chapter, I will focus on the dynamic sublime in order to 
discuss the process of the discordant accord between reason and the imagination, alongside the 
change from pain to pleasure.  
8 Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 43.  
9 Ibid., xi.  
10 Ibid., 43. 
180 
 
unity of all the faculties”.11 In this way, Deleuze describes Kant’s notion of the sublime as 
a sensation of experiencing the discord between reason and the imagination, followed by 
the sensation of an accord in the form of sensation. Thus, Deleuze focuses on the 
potentiality of an accord between each faculty through an experience of the discordant in 
Kant’s work, saying that “a discordant accord is the great discovery of the Critique of 
Judgement, the final Kantian reversal”.12 
In Žižek’s theory of the sublime, however, emphasis falls on the relationship 
between the sublime and the ridiculous. At first, it is useful to consider Žižek’s discussion 
of the sublime, drawing on the tragic figure of the ‘Elephant Man’ in the late Victorian age. 
As its subtitle, “A Study in Human Dignity” suggests, “it was the very monstrous and 
nauseating distortion of his body which revealed the simple dignity of his inner life”.13 
Žižek explains that the sublime arises from the great gap between the nullity of man as 
natural being and the infinite power of his spiritual dimension” 14  It is here that the 
ridiculous effect of the sublime reveals a Victorian morality. Žižek’s discussion of the 
ridiculous sublime is applied to humour, drawing on the Freudian conception. Žižek argues 
that humour is “the contribution made to the comic through the agency of the superego”, 
or “severe master of the ego”.15 According to Žižek, “‘The malevolent neutrality’ of the 
superego consists in the impossible position of pure metalanguage, as if the subject can 
extract himself from his situation and observe himself from the outside”.16 For Žižek, this 
split happens between the superego and ego: “when the subject adopts this neutral position 
to his ego, with all its problems and emotions, it is suddenly perceived as something petty 
                                           
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., xi.  
13 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997), 219. 
14 Ibid. 




and insignificant”.17 Drawing on the example of Hitchcock’s The Trouble with Harry, 
Žižek draws attention to the moment when “the old gentleman drags Harry’s corpse along 
a forest path and encounters an elderly woman who kindly asks him ‘What seems to be the 
trouble?’ Over the corpse, they fix their first date”.18 In this way, the subject’s indifferent 
attitude towards his own predicament brings on the effect of humour. The point of humour 
is, according to Žižek, its distinction from jokes or what is simply funny. In humour, “a 
person maintains the distance where one would not expect it—he acts as if something which 
we know very well exists, does not exist”.19 In this vision, humour thus reveals how the 
subject both sustains and suspends the ruling ideology. In this way, humour can be applied 
to the ridiculous effect, when the sublime falls. I will argue, drawing on Žižek’s theory of 
the ridiculous sublime, that we can rethink Lurie’s fall and its relation to the ideology of 
South Africa in this way.  
One of the questions the novel raises is whether Lurie’s humiliation can be 
compared to the suffering of the Other, which, in the novel, includes black Africans, women 
and animals. In particular, most of the animals in the novel are abandoned, slaughtered or 
incinerated by humans, but they are not able to escape from their suffering. In other words, 
compared to the human victims, the animals, in this novel, are incapable of avoiding their 
death, because “they exist to be used” (123) and to be sacrificed by and for humans. In fact, 
animals are presented as the wholly Other and incapable of resisting their suffering. Given, 
as Derek Attridge remarks, that “the most powerful writing in the novel involves the 
relation not to animal life but to animal death”,20 animal suffering becomes strikingly 
suffused with their ruthless slaughter. As a result, we are invited to consider how Lurie’s 
                                           
17 Ibid., 218. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 185.  
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disgraceful decline is connected to the suffering of animals. Based on Deleuze’s theory of 
becoming-animal, Paul Patton describes Lurie’s becoming-animal in terms of the proximity 
between humans and animals. However, my contention here is that Lurie transforms 
himself into a becoming-animal (or becoming inhuman) through an experience of the 
sublime, or, more specifically, through Deleuze’s sublime with its double movements of 
discord and accord between the imagination and reason.   
In this chapter, I will firstly examine how Lurie’s literary imagination functions as 
a vehicle of self-deception that enables him to avoid a transformative reality, which I will 
explore by comparing the concepts of the literary imagination and the sympathetic 
imagination. Secondly, drawing on Deleuze’s and Žižek’s theoretical perspectives, I will 
examine how the assault he undergoes forces him to encounter the sentiment of the sublime, 
via the disparity between his imagination and reason, and how the ridiculous effects of the 
sublime produced by Lurie’s decline ironically bring him to face his own crime against the 
black people in its ideological aspects. Finally, drawing on Deleuze’s theory of a discordant 
accord, I will examine how Lurie’s becoming-inhuman is processed by sacrificing the 
structure of revenge and sacrifice for the sake of a community to come.  
 
 
II. The limit of the imagination   
 
What role does the faculty of the imagination play in enabling Lurie to understand 
and recognize the Other in a new South Africa? This question will be central to the 
following section. In his reading of Kant, Deleuze explains that “the synthesis, as both 
apprehension and reproduction, is always defined by Kant as an act of the imagination”, 
but the synthesis is insufficient to constitute understanding, or knowledge: “That which 
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constitutes knowledge is not simply the act by which the manifold is synthesized, but the 
act by which the represented manifold is related to an object” 21 . This is called the 
“recognition” of the object, or cognition and understanding of the Other. Yet, imagination 
and understanding become free and unregulated, when we face the immensity or power of 
the sensible object or world. Reason pushes the imagination to “unite the immensity of the 
sensible world as a whole”.22 Because the imagination grasps the object as its parts, there 
is a “dissection” or a “contradictory experience” between the imagination and reason.23 At 
this moment, the imagination goes to its limit. As Deleuze observes, it is, yet, through its 
limit that imagination-reason accord is “engendered”, as a discord-accord, or a 
“suprasensible destination”.24 In this context, I will consider here how Lurie as an expert 
on Romantic poetry is capable of recognizing the Other and the changed world through his 
imagination in the new South Africa.   
Having already published three books on Romanticism, Lurie now has the idea of 
composing Byron in Italy, a reflection on the love between Byron and his lover Teresa 
Cuiccioli in the form of a chamber opera. Although the communications of “thought, 
feelings and intentions (4)” is required in the setting of a rationalized university, Lurie 
offers a course on Romantic poets such as Wordsworth and Byron this year. In contrast with 
his aesthetic comprehension of the Romantic spirit of revolution, Lurie’s personality is 
determined and fixed by his old habits and attitudes. Lurie attests that “I am not prepared 
to be reformed. I want to go on being myself” (77). For this reason, Paul Patton describes 
Lurie as an “allegorical figure” who restates “if not the habits and attitudes of the ruling 
class of the old colonial regime, then at least a certain kind of Eurocentric and cultured cast 
                                           
21 Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 13.  





of mind that sustained the possibility of colonial relations”.25 Nevertheless, his privileged 
habits and attitudes can be viewed as problematic and unconventional in post-apartheid 
South Africa.  
Lurie’s refusal to change his old habits and attitudes appears to be particularly risky 
in his private and intimate life. The novel starts by describing Lurie’s old habits relating to 
his sexual life through his regular meetings with a prostitute: “For a man of his age, fifty-
two, divorced, he has, to his mind, solved the problem of sex rather well” (1). Yet, his 
thoughts concerning his sexual life are soon shown to be delusionary, and entail his 
misunderstanding of the Other. Specifically, in order to solve “the problem of sex”, he 
makes a weekly arrangement with Soraya, a Muslim woman. From the start, it is clear that 
Soraya herself embodies contradictions. Thus, although she works as a part-time prostitute, 
she is, he thinks, “surprisingly moralistic”, as suggested in her opinion of tourists: “She is 
offended by tourists who bare their breasts on public beaches” (1). More importantly, 
because of his “unfailing” pleasure with her, Lurie thinks they have a “reciprocated 
affection” (2), whereas Soraya actually does this simply for a job. After he accidently meets 
Soraya with her two sons in an open space, his opinion that a mutual affection exists is 
revealed as illusionary. After this encounter, Soraya cuts off their arrangement. Although 
he senses Soraya’s shame with regards to her “precarious double life” (6), Lurie pursues 
his own desire by hiring a detective to track down her real name and address. Shocked by 
his unexpected phone call, Soraya adamantly says: “You are harassing me in my own house. 
I demand you will never phone me here again, never” (9-10). Thus, Lurie’s desire is 
exposed as “the predator’s intrusion” “into the vixen’s nest, into the home of her cubs” (10). 
Clearly, a gap exists between Lurie’s comprehension of and the reality of his relationships 
with the Other. This gap is exposed, in his relationship with Soraya, when his delusion is 
                                           
25 Patton, Deleuzian Concepts, 121.  
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blocked.   
Lurie’s delusion surrounding the relationship between himself and the Other is 
instigated by his literary imagination. Specifically, what is noticeable in Lurie’s use of the 
literary imagination is his twisting of Kant’s concept of beauty. From a Kantian perspective, 
judgement of beauty is entirely “subjective” and is thus located in the dimension of the 
personal. As Steven Shaviro articulates, a Kantian notion of beauty is neither cognitive, nor 
reasonable: “A judgement of taste is not based on determinate concepts”: that is to say, the 
concept behind such a judgement “does not allow us to cognize and prove anything 
concerning the object because it is intrinsically indeterminable and inadequate for 
cognition”.26 In this respect, Shaviro describes a Kantian conception of beauty as “an event, 
rather than a condition or a state”.27 For example, “The flower is not beautiful in itself; 
rather, beauty happens when I encounter the flower”.28  
Just as in Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgement, Lurie regards Melanie as the 
beautiful object that lures and affects him. Shaviro, in his reading of Kant, expounds a 
similar perspective: “the object lures the subject while remaining indifferent to it; and the 
subject feels the object, without knowing it or possessing it or even caring about it”.29 In 
this way, when Lurie encounters Melanie on campus, he subjectively interprets her 
indifference to him as a luring gesture. Thus, he thinks of her smile as “sly rather than shy” 
(11). Through his judgement of her smile, Lurie calls her a “beauty” (16) and he goes on to 
treat her as an object: “She does not own herself. Beauty does not own itself” (16). On the 
basis of this aesthetic claim, Lurie treats Melanie like a beautiful object to be desired, since 
he thinks that Melanie’s beauty itself draws him regardless of her response and interest. 
                                           
26 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (Massachusetts: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009), 1.  
27 Ibid., 4.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid., 5. 
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Accordingly, Lurie comes to imagine his relationship with Melanie as an irresistible “love”, 
justifying it by saying that “Eros entered” (52). In short, Lurie imagines that Melanie 
arouses his sense of beauty without engaging understanding.  
However, as I have suggested, Lurie’s conceptualization of Melanie as the beautiful 
object only arises through his twisting of the Kantian concept. From a Kantian perspective, 
his experience of the beautiful is not an actualization of his feeling and desire for the object, 
but rather it is an aesthetic judgement that involves recognizing the object through the 
faculty of the imagination. Shaviro asserts that “Aesthetic judgement is a kind of 
recognition: its’s an appreciation of how the object ‘adapts itself to the way we apprehend 
it’, even though, at the same time, it remains indifferent to us”.30 Thus, the subject’s 
aesthetic experience is also his engagement with the object’s indifference towards him. 
However, Lurie is not interested in recognizing Melanie’s existence, but he rather 
determines and fetishizes her within his imagination for his own pleasure.  
The novel emphasizes Melanie’s passive attitude, but we can question why she does 
not resist his sexual advances. In fact, there is no direct reference to Melanie’s thoughts and 
feelings towards Lurie’s pursuit and abuse of her. Attending his lecture on Wordsworth’s 
poem, Melanie is seemingly confused about the sexual violation she experienced at the 
hands of Lurie: “For the first time she looks up; her eyes meet his and in a flash see all. 
Confused, she drops her glance” (23). However, Melanie is not always passive. Later, when 
she comes to stay over at his house and excuses her absences from his classes, he reflects: 
“she is learning to exploit him and will probably exploit him further. But if she has got 
away with much, he has got away with more. … he is the one who leads, she the one who 
follows” (28). Nevertheless, Lurie elevates his affair as a flash of love inspired by Eros.  
However, despite Lurie’s exaltation of his affair, its exposure results in the ridicule 
                                           
30 Ibid., 2.  
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he already half anticipates. This half-anticipation itself reflects the disjunction between his 
imagination and his understanding. Thus, there is a distinctive discord between his and 
other people’s perception of his affair. His ex-wife Rosaline says that his affair is regarded 
as “stupid, and ugly too” (44). She goes on to say: “Don’t’ expect sympathy from anyone 
else either. No sympathy, no mercy, not in this day and age. Everyone’s hand will be against 
you, and why not? Really, how could you?” (44). In this account, Rosaline observes that 
Lurie’s affair can be understood as anachronistic. However, by ignoring the transformative 
reality that his former privilege can no longer be accepted, Lurie still elevates his affair 
with Melanie, since he is absorbed in his illusive imagination. Accordingly, Rosaline calls 
him “a great self-deceiver” (188).  
Lurie’s literary imagination is problematic in his recognition of the Other, as he 
deliberately refuses a reality. In order to engage with this, it is necessary to examine the 
aesthetic experience of the subject’s perception of the object through the imagination. In 
his lecture on Wordsworth’s Book 6 of The Prelude, Lurie quotes part of the poet’s 
description of the summit of Mon Blanc unveiled.  
 
“From a bare ridge”, he reads aloud,  
           we also first beheld 
   Unveiled the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved  
   To have a soulless image on the eye 
   That had usurped upon a living thought  
   That never more could be. (21) 
 
As “the clouds cleared”, “the peak was unveiled (21)”. At that moment, Wordsworth 
perceives the image of the summit and experiences a feeling of disappointment. This 
disappointment arises, as Lurie explains to the students, because the soulless image of the 
summit usurps the poet’s living thought. Yet, Lurie suggests: “The question is not, How 
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can we keep the imagination pure, protected from the onslaughts of reality? The question 
has to be, Can we find a way for the two to coexist? (22)”. Specifically, this coexistence 
presents what Žižek describes as “a harmony in the conflict itself” instead of “the harmony 
of an imposed uniform order”.31 In Lurie’s words,  
 
“Wordsworth seems to be feeling his way toward a balance: not 
the pure idea, wreathed in clouds, nor the visual image burned on the 
retina, overwhelming and disappointing us with its matter-of-fact clarity, 
but the sense image, kept as fleeting as possible, as a means toward 
stirring or activating the idea that lies buried more deeply in the soil of 
memory”. (22)  
 
Thus, what Lurie tries to assert in his lecture on Wordsworth’s poem is the aesthetic 
experience of a spontaneous harmony between the imagination and reality, the image and 
the pure idea through the unregulated imagination.    
However, a discord exists between the imagination and reality in Lurie’s experience, 
since Lurie connects a sense of the poetic moment to his sexual relationship with Melanie: 
“What did he say to Melanie that first evening? That without a flash of revelation there is 
nothing” (21). However, far from being a mutual encounter, Lurie’s sexual encounter with 
Melanie presents a mixture of his illusion and perverse pleasure, which involves his 
domination and exploitation of Melanie’s body. While he fulfills his desire during sex, 
Melanie is like a corpse: “her limbs crumple like a marionette’s” (24). Their intercourse is 
thus more like a predator preying on a victim: “As though she had decided to go slack, die 
within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck. So 
that everything done to her might be done, as it were far away” (25). Lurie’s desire is only 
                                           
31 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 245.   
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achieved by failing to comprehend and recognize her subjectivity. In this way, there is a 
great gap between Lurie’s imagination and a Kantian concept of “recognition”. Accordingly, 
through his illusive imagination, Lurie avoids and denies his responsibility for Melanie. In 
the hearing, Farodia Rassool, as one of the committee members, criticizes Lurie’s 
avoidance of confession and of apology:  
 
“Yes, he says, he is guilty; but when we try to get specifically, all 
of a sudden it is not abuse of a young woman he is confessing to just an 
impulse he could not resist, with no mention of the pain he has caused, 
no mention of the long history of exploitation of which this is part” (53).  
 
Thus, the gap between the imagination and reality turns Lurie into a self-deceptive and self-
enclosed figure, pursuing his desire in a conflict with the faculty of understanding.      
Nevertheless, there is a further question that needs to be asked in relation to Lurie’s 
imagination, arising from the great gap between the power of the imagination and the 
demand of reason. Choosing to identify himself with Byron and his literary figures, Lurie 
refuses to renounce his lifestyle and pursues his perverse desire. In this context, through 
Lurie’s analysis of Byron’s poem “Cain”, we are prompted to think of a demonic figure and 
its relation to Lurie. As Lurie says, Lucifer, “the angel hurled out of heaven” (32), acts by 
impulse. Let us look at the part of “Cain” that Lurie discusses in his class:  
 
He could 
At times resign his own for others’ good, 
But not in pity, not because he ought,  
But in some strange perversity of thought, 
That swayed him onward with a secret pride 
To do what few or none would do besides; 
And this same impulse would in tempting time 
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Mislead his spirit equally to crime. (33) 
 
Before explaining this poem, Lurie asks who Lucifer is. In answer to his question, 
Melanie’s boyfriend says that Lucifer “does what he feels like. He does not care if it’s good 
or bad. He just does it” (33). In this deliberately provocative answer, an implicit connection 
is made between Lucifer’s conduct and Lurie’s sexual conduct. Specifically, as Lurie 
asserts, Lucifer is a figure who “does not act on principle but on impulse, and the source of 
his impulses is dark to him” (33). The darkness, as Lurie restates, implies madness: “‘His 
madness was not of the head, but heart’. A mad heart” (33). In this formulation, Lurie 
claims that desire is not in accord with reason and understanding. As a result of taking his 
impulse to its limit, Lurie asserts that Lucifer is reduced to an inhuman monster. “For 
though he lives among us, he is not one of us. He is exactly what he calls himself: a thing, 
that is a monster. Finally, Byron will suggest, it will not be possible to love him, not in the 
deeper, more human sense of the world. He will be condemned to solitude” (33-4). 
Lucifer’s becoming a monster predicts Lurie’s own fate. Lurie’s Romantic imagination is 
not able to function as a vehicle of understanding and reconciliation with the Other in a 
new South Africa, but it rather determines and fetishizes the Other, and, as a result, will 
condemn him to solitude.    
  
  
III. The Sublime and the Ridiculous  
 
As I have demonstrated so far, the accord between the imagination and reason that 
Lurie advocates through his reading of Wordsworth’s poem breaks down, when, as in 
“Cain”, the imagination is allowed to be free. The unlimited imagination then pushes a 
Byronic figure such as Lucifer to act by impulse, becoming a “thing”, a “monster”, in the 
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process. However, a further question can be asked: What is the relation between the discord 
of the imagination and reason in Romantic poetry and Lurie’s disgrace in the dimensions 
of the individual and the political? In this section, drawing on Žižek’s theory of the sublime 
and the ridiculous, I will here examine how Lurie’s decline is processed beyond his 
imagination and reason and how Lurie’s experience of the sublime through his decline 
ridiculously reveals the deadlock in which he maintains his political ideology. 
In order to engage with this, it is firstly necessary to examine how the sublime is 
enacted through Lurie’s decline. From Žižek’s perspective, the sentiment of the sublime 
relates to Lurie’s experience of the attack he undergoes on Lucy’s farm. According to Žižek, 
the Kantian concept of the sublime can be found in a great gap, for example, between the 
diminished ego and the infinite power of the object. This is evoked in an example that Žižek 
draws upon from an episode of the Marx Brothers’ film, Meaning of Life, which 
demonstrates the sentiment of the sublime in the form of humour. Two men from the ‘live 
organ transplants’ business visit a couple’s apartment and demand the husband’s liver. 
Although the poor husband resists, the two men drag his liver out of his viscera with cold 
indifference and then demand the wife’s liver too. With her refusal, one of them brings her 
on a journey across the universe, “singing about the billions of stars and planes, and their 
intelligent dispositions with the universe”.32  Žižek goes on to explain that “after she 
realizes how small and insignificant her problem is compared to the universe, she gladly 
agrees to donate her liver”.33 In this example, drawing on the Kantian concept of the 
sublime, Žižek focuses on the subject’s sensation of the diminished self through the 
ridiculous effect of the sublime, as manifested in humour.   
Drawing on Žižek’s theory, we can reflect on ways that the sentiment of the sublime 
                                           
32 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 219.  
33 Ibid.  
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constitutes the dissolution of the self in Lurie’s experience. Before the attack, Lurie still 
elevates his sexual desire for Melanie, justifying his impulsive sex as an irresistible love: 
“It was a god who acted through me” (89). However, he is rendered powerless with the 
arrival of the black African assailants.34 Reality all of a sudden dawns on him:  
 
So it comes, the day of testing. Without warning, without fanfare, 
it is here, and he is in the middle of it. In his chest his heart hammers so 
hard that it too, in its dumb way, must know. How will they stand up to 
the testing, he and his heart? (94).  
 
In this account, Lurie’s reason and imagination do not have any part to play. Only his body 
responds to the attack, and that response occurs in a “dumb way”. Thus, for Lurie, the act 
of the rape is neither apprehensible nor capable of representation. It is only catastrophic.   
Lurie’s experience of the attack arises as a feeling of formless horror. When the 
gang set Lurie’s body on fire in the bathroom, he feels “only fear”, whilst his words and 
voices are shattered. “He strikes at his face like a madman; his hair crackles as it catches 
alight; he throws himself about, hurling out shapeless bellows that have no words behind 
them, only fear” (96). The “shapeless bellow” marks the formless sensation that Lurie is 
incapable of articulating. This event thus forces him to experience something that he 
previously failed to understand. The sublime arises from the gap between the powerlessness 
                                           
34  Andrew Van Der Vlies articulates that the assailants can be marked as black Africans by 
examining the characters’ language in many ways, although there are not overtly expressions 
concerning their race. For example, Vlies asserts: “But the reader should notice that there are few 
overt indications of race in the narration of the attack. The attackers, ‘two men and a boy’, walk (in 
David’s opinion) ‘with countrymen’s long strides’ (91); the majority of rural South Africans are 
black” (46). Also, he provides another example: “When Lucy shouts at the men taunting the dogs, 
she does so in Xhosa (‘Hamba!’), the first language of the majority black population of the Eastern 
Cape (about which more later), and the syntax of the assailant who explains why they want to use 
the telephone—‘His sister . . . is having an accident’—also suggests a second-language English (and 
specifically a first-language black Xhosa-language) speaker (92)”. Andrew Van Der Vlies, J.M. 
Coetzee’s Disgrace: A Reader’s Guide (New York: Continuum, 2010), 46. 
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of man and the tremendous power of violence. After the attack, Lurie feels shocked and 
weakened: 
 
The events of yesterday have shocked him to the depths. The 
trembling, the weakness are only the first and most superficial signs of 
that shock. He has a sense that, inside him, a vital organ has been bruised, 
abused—perhaps even his heart. For the first time he has a taste of what 
it will be like to be an old man, tired to the bone, without hopes, without 
desires, indifferent to the future. Slumped on a plastic chair amid the 
stench of chicken feathers and rotting apples, he feels his interest in the 
world draining from him drop by drop. It may take weeks, it may take 
months before he is bled dry, but he is bleeding. When that is finished, 
he will be like a fly-casing in a spiderweb, brittle to the touch, lighter 
than rice-chaff, ready to fly away”. (107)  
    
In contrast to his sublimation of self in his poetic imagination before the traumatic attack, 
the passage offers a vivid description of Lurie’s inertia. Lurie’s body and spirit have been 
wounded, which results in his diminished self, evoked through a shapeless horror. This 
demonstrates how an experience of the sublime breaks and overturns the imagination and 
knowledge that Lurie depends upon.  
 However, from the vantage point of Žižek, it is important to reflect on the 
ridiculous effects of the sublime rather than Lurie’s sensation of the sublime itself. 
Concerning the ridiculous effects of the sublime, we must re-evaluate Lurie’s overly 
privileged position, and its relationship with his subsequent humiliation. At first, the issue 
of Lucy’s rape and sexual violation at the hands of the assailants raises questions in relation 
to Lurie’s sexual harassment of Soraya and Melanie. For example, the telephone call, the 
uninvited intrusion, the unwanted sexual encounter, and the refusal to apologize. Yet, it is 
important to look at the processes behind these actions, when Lurie calls Soraya and 
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Melanie. With his telephone call to Soraya, Lurie “intrudes into the vixen’s nest, into the 
home of her cubs” (10). Similarly, giving no warning, Lurie calls Melanie and invades her 
flat. This incident most clearly anticipates the rape of Lucy; “she is too surprised to resist 
the intruder who thrusts himself upon her” (24). These telephone calls, the invasion and the 
rape are brought together in the scene where the gang unexpectedly intrudes on Lucy’s 
smallholding on the pretext of using a telephone. However, Lurie distinguishes between his 
affairs and his daughter’s rape at the hands of these men. This raises the question of how 
he is not able to notice an affinity between the sexual violations, since the two violations 
are clearly related. As we have seen, Lurie fundamentally lends his sexual violation a 
romantic pathos through associations with poetry and music, but he recognizes a realistic 
and political matter in the attackers’ rape. In this way, he maintains a distance from the 
crimes of the assailants as a way of de-realizing his own crime. Yet, there is also humour 
evident in this formulation, in the way that Lurie rages against the attackers and their 
attitude towards the violation, whilst remaining oblivious to his own acts.  
In this context, it is worth examining Lurie’s rage against Petrus’s silence. During 
the black men’s attack, Petrus was absent, but Lurie suspects his involvement with the 
gang’s rape. However, Petrus maintains silence surrounding the attack. This parallels 
Lurie’s refusal to confess his sexual violation of Melanie. Frustrated by Petrus’s silence 
related to the assailants, Lurie recalls the past: “In the old days one could have had it out 
with Petrus. In the old days one could have had it out to the extent of losing one’s temper 
and sending him packing and hiring someone is his place” (117). However, Petrus is now 
a “neighbour” (117) rather than “the black man for hire”35 as in the past. In this new context, 
                                           
35 Vlies examines how Petrus’s race can be considered as black based on Lurie’s words. For 
example, Lurie thinks that “Petrus is an old-style kaffir”. Vlies points out that Lurie’s use of the 
word “kaffir” is “inflammatory and highly offensive” because it is “a racist epithet for a black South 
African”. Moreover, as I have quoted, Lurie thinks that “In the old days one could have had it out 
with Petrus”. From this, Vlies describes Petrus’s race as black by stating “Petrus is no longer the 
black man for hire”. Ibid., 47.  
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Lurie thinks that Petrus is now “entitled to his silence” (116). “It is a new world they live 
in, he and Lucy and Petrus, Petrus knows it, and he knows it, and Petrus knows that he 
knows it” (117). Because of Petrus’s changed position, Lurie is not able to express his 
outrage against Petrus’s silence, as he might have done in the past, but he rather blames 
Petrus mutely:  
 
Yet at this moment he would like to take Petrus by the throat. If 
it had been your wife instead of my daughter, he would like to say to 
Petrus, you would not be tapping your pipe and weighing your words so 
judiciously. Violation: that is the world he would like to force out of 
Petrus. Yes, it was a violation, he would like to hear Petrus say; yes, it 
was an outrage (119).  
 
White people’s silence and indifference towards black victims in the past now echo in an 
uncanny way. Nevertheless, ridiculously, Lurie blames Petrus and the black men, as if no 
link exists between his and their crimes. This is one of the comical effects of Lurie’s decline.   
However, in reality, Lurie’s decline is made more obvious through an examination 
of his relationship with his daughter. The relationship between Lurie and Lucy reveals a 
discord, through its contrast with that of Mr. Isaacs and Melanie. Lurie fails to protect Lucy 
from the attack of the invaders and fails to sympathize with Lucy’s wound. In contrast with 
Lurie, Mr. Isaacs, after hearing that his daughter has been victimized, denounces Lurie and 
reports his crime to the university. As a result of Mr. Isaacs’s actions, Melanie is protected 
from further harassment at the hands of Lurie. Moreover, in contrast to Lurie’s 
powerlessness, Petrus gets to exert his domination over Lucy and also to occupy her land. 
After the rape, Lucy is forced to be more dependent on Petrus. In fact, after the rape, Lurie 
has little to do with Lucy, but Petrus efficiently trades her flowers in the market, laying out 
the wares and selling them. As a peasant, Petrus is able to technically help Lucy who wants 
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to become a farmer. It is a significant marker of the changed political context when Petrus 
tells Lurie that “I will protect her” (139). In a further indication of the shift in power 
between whites and blacks, after the attack, Lucy, a lesbian, feels obliged to become 
Petrus’s third wife and a tenant of his land. Petrus allows her “to creep under his wing” 
(203). Both Lurie and Petrus are part of the old generation of apartheid, but a clear contrast 
exists between Petrus’s and Lurie’s recognition of reality in post-apartheid South Africa. In 
this respect, Lurie’s failure to understand this reality is relevant to his tragic decline.  
Further questions can be asked concerning why Lurie fails to recognize the affinity 
between his and the black men’s crimes, and why it is important for Lurie to recognize this 
affinity. It is necessary to examine the parts of the novel where Lurie has sex with Melanie, 
as the sex is not overtly described as a rape, but it is at least considered as an act of 
exploitation. Let us look at the scene where Lurie first has sex with Melanie in her flat:  
 
“But nothing will stop him. He carries her to the bedroom, 
brushes off the absurd slippers, kisses her feet, astonished by the feeling 
she evokes. Something to do with the apparition on the stage: the wig, 
the wiggling bottom, the crude talk. Strange love! Yet from the quiver of 
Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming waves, no doubt about that.  
She does not resist. All she does is avert herself: avert her lips, 
avert her eyes. She lets him lay her out on the bed and undress her: she 
even helps him, raising her arms and then her hips. Little shivers of cold 
run through her; as soon as she is bare, she slips under the quilted 
counterpane like a mole burrowing, and turns her back on him” (25).  
 
Although it is written very concisely, this sexual scene is depicted in some detail. The scene 
is initially described from Lurie’s perspective, invoking the idea of ‘love’ and decorated 
with the classical allusion to Aphrodite. This perspective ignores what the second 
paragraph reveals: the fact that Melanie averts her lips and eyes—and turns her back on 
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him when he is finished. As Lurie thinks, the sex is at least exploitative: “Not rape, not 
quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core” (25). Lurie goes on to reflect 
that the sex is an act of exploitation and it may also be considered as rape: “As though she 
had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of 
the fox close on its neck” (25). In contrast to the details of Lurie’s sexual violence against 
Melanie, the black men’s rape of Lucy is a central absence in the novel. This absence marks 
the limitations of Lurie’s understanding. In relation to Lucy’s subsequent response to the 
incident, Lurie says, “I failed to understand why you did not lay real charges against them, 
and now I fail to understand why you are protecting Petrus?” (133). Lucy points out Lurie’s 
inability to comprehend the event, saying, “You weren’t there. You don’t know what 
happened” (140). Lurie’s incomprehensibility is not just caused by his absence in temporal 
and spatial dimensions, but also by his ideological perspective. Lurie’s incomprehensibility 
of the event in relation to Lucy is inextricably linked to his ignorance of Melanie’s pain. In 
the hearing, Lurie refuses to read Melanie’s statement: “I do not wish to read Ms Isaacs’s 
statement. I accept it. I know of no reason why Ms Isaacs should lie” (49). In this respect, 
despite the details of Lurie’s sexual harassment provided to the reader, the impossibility of 
his comprehension of Melanie’s situation lies at the heart of his decline. In the same way, 
a gap exists between Lurie’s and Lucy’s understanding of the event. Nevertheless, 
responding to Lucy’s remark about his lack of comprehension, Lurie insists that “On the 
contrary, I understand all too well” (157). He goes on to assert that “I will pronounce the 
word we have avoided hitherto. You were raped. Multiply. By three men” (157). The reader 
is not provided with a representation of this event, but Lurie understands the basic facts. In 
contrast, where the reader is provided with details of his exploitation of Melanie, Lurie 
seems oblivious to that basic fact. The ridiculous point of Lurie’s response lies in the fact 
that he pronounces the word “rape” and insists on using “the words we have avoided”. It is 
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ironic that he thus insists on appropriate, legal, realistic language in trying to understand 
Lucy’s traumatic experience, whereas his own exploitation of Melanie was filtered through 
his literary imagination. This is the ridiculous effect arising from the discord between 
Lurie’s understanding and his imagination of reality.    
Lurie’s ridiculous disclosure also has a relation to the political circumstances of 
South Africa. Instead of charging the black men, Lucy insists that the rape is a personal 
matter. However, a vital question remains as to whether the event could be seen as a private 
matter in South Africa. In her reference to her traumatic experience, Lucy remarks on the 
element of hatred on the part of her attackers: “It was done with such personal hatred. That 
was what stunned me more than anything. The rest was . . . expected. But why did they 
hate me so? I had never set eyes on them” (156). Lurie responds that “It was history 
speaking through them”. He restates: “A history of wrong. Think of it that way, if it helps. 
It may have seemed personal, but it wasn’t. It came down from the ancestor” (156). 
Responding to Lurie, Lucy observes: “That doesn’t make it easier. The shock simply 
doesn’t go away. The shock of being hated, I mean. In the act” (156). In this dialogue, both 
of them unexpectedly expose the fact that they cannot live a personal life in South Africa. 
Regardless of Lucy’s and Lurie’s different positions on the issue, they reveal that their 
personal lives are inextricably tied up with political life. Even the black men’s and Lurie’s 
perverse impulses have political overtones. In this context, it is ironic that both Lucy and 
Lurie treat their rapes discursively as personal matters separated from political ones. As I 
have discussed earlier, Lurie elevates his exploitation of Melanie, seeing it as an act of 
personal love, but he ridiculously exposes his lack of awareness that this was an act of 
violation when he attempts to empathize with Lucy’s pain.  
Lucy’s disavowal of the public and political implications of her rape, however, 
poses a political and ethical question. Lucy says, “What happened to me is a purely private 
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matter. But in another time, in another place, it might be held to be a public matter. But in 
this place, it is not. It is my business, mine alone” (112). This is clearly Lucy’s chosen 
survival strategy, but it is clear from the previous discussion that this ‘private matter’ is 
permeated by the public and the political. Furthermore, concerning Lurie’s connection 
between her rape and the idea of black African “vengeance”, Lucy goes on to challenge 
him: “Is it some form of private salvation you are trying to work out? Do you hope you can 
expiate the crimes of the past by suffering in the present? No. You keep misreading me. 
Guilt and salvation are abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions” (112). From this, 
it can be seen that Lucy’s remarks on her private matters deny the crucial link with white 
people’s crimes in the past. In relation to this issue, I will now examine why Lucy’s refusal 
to treat her rape as a political issue is relevant to an escape from the structure of revenge 
and sacrifice in South Africa.   
 
 
IV. Becoming-Inhuman  
 
As I have discussed, drawing on Žižek’s theory, the ridiculous effects of the sublime 
are evidenced, when Lurie’s and Lucy’s catastrophic circumstances push them to 
experience something incomprehensible and unimaginable, which they would not have 
expected in their previous lives. As I have suggested, Deleuze’s notion of the sublime 
provides Lurie and Lucy with an experience of unformed or deformed power, via the 
discord between the imagination and reason. Deleuze asserts that the discord also produces 
an accord between the imagination and reason, which resonates with Kant’s concept of the 
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sublime. Deleuze’s vantage point concerning the sublime offers the “suprasensible”36 of a 
discordant accord between the imagination and reason, which “reveals the forces or 
intensities that lie behind sensations, and which draw us into nonhuman or inhuman 
becomings”.37 Thus, from Deleuze’s perspective, the forces or intensities emerging from 
this chaotic sensation push humans into a becoming-something else beyond the human. 
According to Daniel W. Smith, “this is where Deleuze breaks with Kant and inverts the 
critical philosophy”.38 In this final section, drawing on Deleuze’s theory of becoming-
inhuman, I will explore how Lurie and Lucy become inhuman beings, entering into the 
zone of proximity between human and animal. Moreover, I will explore how their 
transformations provide a potentiality, which is capable of generating a radical change in a 
new South Africa by escaping from the structure of revenge and sacrifice.   
As noted earlier, humans subject animals to violence in the novel. The animals die 
disgracefully in ways that involve abandonment, slaughter and incineration. Animals are 
much more vulnerable than women and black people. Animals are not regarded as members 
of the human community, but rather as objects to be used and sacrificed by humans. 
Alongside his decline, Lurie is compelled to observe animals’ suffering in the country. In 
Lucy’s smallholding, Lurie sees the watchdogs, and an abandoned dog, Katy. The dogs, 
which Lucy calls “working dogs” (61), are used to deter thieves in the case of a break-in. 
Thus, the watchdogs threaten and growl at the black strangers in Lucy’s smallholding, but 
they are shot by one of the invaders. The brutal scene of the slaughter is meticulously 
described:  
                                           
36 Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 49.  
37 Daniel W. Smith, “Translator’s Introduction”, Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), xxii.  
38 Smith, “Translator’s Introduction”, xxii. Smith explains: “For Deleuze, the faculty of Idea is no 
longer identified with Reason; rather, Deleuze posits Ideas within sensibility itself and defines them 
not by their transcendence to Nature but rather in terms of their immanence to experience itself (the 




With practiced ease he brings a cartridge up into the breech, 
thrusts the muzzle into the dogs’ cage. The biggest of the German 
Shepherds, slavering with rage, snaps at it. There is a heavy report: blood 
and the brains splatter the cage. For a moment the barking ceases. The 
man fires twice more. One dog, shot through the chest, dies at once; 
another, with a gaping throat-wound, sits down heavily, flattens its ears, 
following with its gaze the movements of this being who does not even 
bother to administer a coup de grâce. (95) 
 
The striking scene of the slaughter of the watch-dogs provides us with the sensation of 
violence generating intensities. Nevertheless, Lurie does not express any compassion for 
the slaughtered animals. When he buries the corpses in the grave, Lurie rather remains 
indifferent to them, thinking of the death of the dogs as the revenge of the black people, 
and seeing their deaths from that perspective: “Contemptible, yet exhilarating, probably, in 
a country where dogs are bred to snarl at the mere smell of a black man. A satisfying 
afternoon’s work, heady, like all revenge” (110). In this context, the death of the watch dogs 
represents a sacrifice on the part of white people, which is related to the revenge of the 
black people.     
Nevertheless, Lurie’s apathetic gaze also enables him to deal with dying animals 
and their corpses in Bev’s clinic. Lurie seems to operate here on the grounds that he 
considers animals as a different species destined to die for humans. Observing Bev 
euthanizing a goat, Lurie says, “They know how death comes to a goat. They are born 
prepared” (84). Bev, on the other hand, does not think that there should be any difference 
between the deaths of humans and animals. She responds to his observation: “I am not sure. 
I don’t’ think we are ready to die, any of us, not without being escorted” (84). Lurie’s 
thoughts concerning animals are also different from Lucy’s attitudes towards them. Lucy 
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believes in an equality of lives among humans and animals, saying that “there is no higher 
life”, but “only the life”, one that “we share with animals” (74). By contrast, Lurie stresses 
the difference between humans and animals: “We are of a different order of creation from 
the animals. Not higher, necessarily, just different” (74). In this context, Lurie cannot 
imagine and comprehend Bev’s evocation of the interactions between humans and animals 
through sensation. When in the animal clinic, Lurie assists Bev to operate on the dog, which 
is full of pain and fear. Bev tells him: “Think comforting thoughts, think strong thoughts. 
They can smell what you are thinking” (81). She goes on to say, “I sense that you like 
animals” (81). However, Lurie denies her suggestion: “Do I like animals? I eat them, so I 
suppose I must like them, some parts of them” (81). Despite Bev’s insistence on shared 
intensities of feelings between humans and other animals, Lurie maintains his indifferent 
attitude towards animals’ suffering.  
However, Lurie’s experience of the death of animals dismantles his abstractive 
distinction between human and animal. Instead of using his imagination and understanding, 
Lurie now starts to sense animals’ suffering. Thus, annoyed by the bleating of the two 
young sheep to be killed for Petrus’s party, Lurie thinks about their sacrificial destination 
for humans: “Sheep do not own themselves, do not own their lives. They exist to be used” 
(123). This reflects his earlier thoughts on Melanie, when he lures her by insisting that her 
beauty should be shared: “She does not own herself. Beauty does not own itself” (16). Yet, 
unexpectedly, Lurie feels compassion for the lot of the two sheep: “A bond seems to have 
come into existence between himself and the two Persians, he does not know how. The 
bond is not one of affection. It is not even a bond with these two in particular, whom he 
could not pick out from a mob in a field. Nevertheless, suddenly and without reason, their 
lot has become important to him” (126). Lurie’s sensitivity to the sheep may have arisen 
from the feeling of his own frailty in his circumstances of disgrace. On a deeper level, 
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Lurie’s compassion may be accompanied by his identification with the sheep’s vulnerability. 
We certainly see radical change in Lurie’s dealing with dying animals in Bev’s clinic.   
 
He had thought he would get used to it. But that is not what 
happens. The more killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets. One 
Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop 
at the roadside to recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he 
cannot stop; his hands shake. (142-3).  
 
Although “he does not understand what is happening to him” (143), Lurie is clearly affected 
by the death of animals, which dismantles his indifference to the suffering of animals 
beyond his imagination and reason.  
Deleuze, in his analysis of Francis Bacon’s paintings shows how a possibility exists 
in a “zone of indiscernibility or undecidability between man and animal” through the 
deformation of their bodies or the disorganization of their faces. As a result, the great gap 
between human and animal is dissolved. For example, in Bacon’s painting, Three Figures 
and a Portrait (1975[78]), there is, according to Deleuze, the pictorial tension that achieves 
“meat” “through the splendor of its colors”.39 Deleuze restates: “Meat is the state of the 
body in which flesh and bone confront each other locally rather than being composed 
structurally”.40 This “meat” is a common connection between the flesh of the human and 
the animal. Bacon establishes it by merging the faces or frames that represent their identity. 
As a result of this deformation and merging, Deleuze finds a sharability between humans 
and animals in the “meat” of Bacon’s paintings through their suffering. The sensation of 
meat arises in its manifestation of violence rather than its representation, which brings 
                                           
39  Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. and intro. Danial W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 20.  
40 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 20-1.  
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about a “violence of reaction and expression”.41 This violence of sensation triggers us to 
embody within ourselves invisible forces, which push us to interact with the object in a 
material way. In this way, according to Deleuze, Bacon paints “the scream rather than the 
horror”.42 Drawing on Kant’s conception of the sublime, we can further consider how the 
violence of sensation can bring about transformative forces. Danial W. Smith describes the 
experience of the sublime: “Kant presents a disconcerting scenario: I look at something, 
but my imagination wavers, I become dizzy, vertiginous”.43 Smith goes on to explain that 
the experience of catastrophe, or the sublime takes place when the edifice of synthesis 
collapses: I no longer apprehend parts, I no longer reproduce parts, I no longer recognize 
anything. Instead of rhythm, I find myself drowned in a chaos”.44 Yet, in the moment the 
imagination is unregulated and free, chaos becomes a rhythm or a wave between bodies.  
Drawing on Deleuze’s assertions related to Bacon’s paintings, we can further 
examine Lurie’s transformation through the assistance he gives to Bev, as he incinerates 
the corpses of animals. For Lurie, it is beyond his imagination and comprehension that Bev 
euthanizes abandoned animals. In response to Bev’s statement of “Someone has to do it”, 
Lurie even thinks that Bev “may be not a liberating angel but a devil, that beneath her show 
of compassion may hide a heart as leathery as a butcher’s” (144). Nevertheless, similar to 
Bev’s euthanization of abandoned animals, Lurie takes the bags of corpses to the hospital 
grounds and also incinerates them in the furnace. By asserting that he is “offering himself 
to the service of dead dogs” (146), Lurie is transformed into an inhuman beyond the 
morality of humanism: “He saves the honour of corpses because there is no one else stupid 
enough to do it. That is what he is becoming: stupid, daft, wrongheaded” (146). 
                                           
41 Deleuze, “Author’s Introduction to the English Edition”, Francis Bacon, xxix.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Smith, “Introduction”, xix. 
44 Ibid.  
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Accordingly, rather than offering pity to the dead dogs, Lurie “becomes a dog-man: a dog 
undertaker; a dog psychopomp; a harijan” (146). In this context, an affinity exists between 
Lurie’s becoming-inhuman and Bacon’s becoming-meat on the grounds that they are both 
affected by the corporeality of animals’ suffering rather than by the abstractive idea of them. 
It is in this way that we should understand what Lurie means, when he says that he becomes 
stupid by incinerating the corpses of animals     
In this context, it also becomes possible to understand how Lucy’s becoming-
inhuman is different from the politics of revenge and sacrifice. This distinction is 
inextricably connected to Lurie’s giving up of a mode of human life. In order to continue 
living on the farm, Lucy decides to become Petrus’s third wife. Additionally, Lucy gives 
up her land and becomes a tenant of Petrus. In her dialogue with Lurie, Lucy says:  
 
‘Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to 
start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at 
ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No 
cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity’.  
‘Like a dog’. 
‘Yes, like a dog’. (205) 
 
In this passage, Lucy decides to live like a dog in the country. As I have mentioned earlier, 
Lucy’s refusal to treat her rape as a public matter is deeply related to her becoming-dog. 
The structure of revenge and sacrifice are merely repeated in the relationship between black 
Africans and white people, men and women, humans and animals in South Africa. In order 
to escape from this vicious cycle of revenge and sacrifice, an ethics of becoming-inhuman 
is required.  
In the context of Lucy’s becoming-dog, we can also further rethink Lurie’s 
becoming-inhuman in a situation in which animals and women are forced to be sacrificial 
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offerings for the reconciliation between the oppressor and the victim. The moment when 
Lurie is about to kill the dog is revealing in this regard:     
 
The dog wags its crippled rear, sniffs his face, licks his cheeks, 
his lips, his ears. He does nothing to stop it. ‘Come’.  
Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery. ‘I 
thought you would save him for another week’, says Bev Shaw.  
‘Are you giving him up?’ 
‘Yes, I am giving him up’. (220).  
 
Lurie’s giving up of the dog can be misread as a sacrifice of the dog, who is treated like a 
scapegoat for the crimes of human beings. Yet, it is important to note that Lurie’s giving up 
of the dog is neither an act of compassion towards the dying animal, nor a sacrifice of the 
dog for the purgation of South Africa. The sacrifice must be sacrificed in order not to repeat 
the history of revenge for a new community. Lurie’s giving up of the dog is thus closer to 
his becoming-meat rather than the sacrifice of the victim. In this context, Lurie eventually 
learns how to love the Other by assisting in Bev’s euthanization of animals: “He and Bev 
do not speak. He has learned by now, from her, to concentrate all his attention on the animal 
they are killing, giving it what he no longer has difficulty in calling by its proper name: 
love” (219). In this way, Lurie becomes a monster beyond the understanding and 
imagination of human beings. This is also the ethical aspect of Lurie’s becoming-inhuman, 





In this chapter, I have explored how the protagonist David Lurie’s decline 
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encounters the effect of the sublime in a new South Africa by drawing on Deleuze’s and 
Žižek’s theories of the sublime. During the transition of the post-apartheid period, 
bleakness fraught with violence such as rape and revenge, is rife in South Africa, and is 
also evident in the novel. The characters are required to change their previous modes of 
life, but Lurie as a white professor in Cape Town originally maintains his fixed personality. 
However, Lurie’s sexual violence against his student Melanie Isaacs brings him into a state 
of disgrace. By drawing on Deleuze’s and Žižek’s theories, I have investigated that Lurie’s 
decline takes him to the limit of his imagination and reason, generating his transformation 
in three dimensions: the limit of the imagination, the sublime and its ridiculous effect, and 
the becoming-inhuman.    
Firstly, I have examined how Lurie’s literary imagination hardens his narcissistic 
personality. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s conception of the imagination, Lurie’s 
imagination can be seen to function as a synthetic faculty that enables him to recognize and 
understand the Other. However, by identifying himself with Byron and his literary figures, 
Lurie twists the Kantian concept of the beautiful in order to achieve his sexual desire for 
Melanie. However, Lurie’s imagination is not in accord with his understanding of the Other 
and the altered world. Accordingly, by relying on his imagination, Lurie ignores the 
suffering of the Other in his sexual obsession with Melanie. Thus, by following his 
imagination to its limit, Lurie becomes a monster like a Byronic figure that nobody can 
comprehend. That is why Lurie’s imagination can be seen as dangerous in relation to the 
Other in a new South Africa.  
Secondly, I have discussed Lurie’s decline in relation to the ridiculous effect of the 
sublime. Lurie’s experience as the victim of violence brings him to a sensation of formless 
fear. From Žižek’s perspective, Lurie’s traumatic experience however produces its 
ridiculous effect. Specifically, Lurie does not recognize the affinities between his own 
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sexual exploitation of Melanie and the black men’s rape of Lucy. Rather, he regards his 
exploitation of Melanie as a private and irresistible love while thinking of the black men’s 
violence as the political revenge of the black people. However, through his experience of 
the ridiculous sublime, Lurie ironically is compelled to face and name his crimes. His 
encounter with his own crimes offers the potentiality of dismantling white people’s 
privileged attitudes and habits, as the ridiculous effect of the sublime. Nevertheless, Lurie’s 
recognition of his crimes is not sufficient to bring a radical change to the ethical and 
political implications of a new South Africa, since the ridiculous effect of the sublime does 
not offer an ethical and political solution to the question of how not to repeat the structure 
of sacrifice and revenge between the oppressor and the victim.  
In this chapter, I engaged with this issue by drawing on Deleuze’s sensation of the 
sublime. I further examined how to escape from the structure of revenge and sacrifice in a 
new community, drawing on Deleuze’s analysis of Francis Bacon’s works, which conveys 
the becoming-inhuman evident in Bacon’s paintings of the body as meat. Bacon paints a 
violence of sensation by embodying invisible forces in his painting of meat. This affords 
us with the possibility of entering a zone of indiscernibility between human and animal. 
Animals in the novel initially exist to be used and sacrificed by and for humans. At first, 
Lurie is indifferent towards the suffering of animals. Yet, after his decline, Lurie assists 
Bev’s euthanization of abandoned and dying animals, and the incineration of their corpses. 
The violence of the sensation in coming into contact with the suffering of animals forces 
him to become inhuman in an ethical sense, through interactions between himself and 
animals rather than through his compassion for the victimized animals. Lurie’s becoming-
inhuman therefore provides an ethics that enables us to escape the politics of revenge and 









I. Introduction  
 
This chapter will investigate the ethical ways that humans can think of and 
sympathize with animals, as presented in J.M. Coetzee’s novel, Elizabeth Costello (2003). 
Framed as eight lessons and a Postscript on diverse issues, the novel comprises fragmentary 
chapters, taken from the continuous point of view of the eponymous protagonist. Among 
the fragmentary lessons, the two on “The lives of Animals” are connected through different 
subtitles: “The Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets and Animals”. In these two 
lessons, Elizabeth Costello, an elderly, successful, vegetarian writer, gives lectures on 
animals and their vulnerability by drawing on striking analogies between humans and 
animals. Most strikingly and controversially, for instance, she makes a comparison between 
the extermination of the Jews of Europe and the treatment of animals. Less controversially, 
drawing on Thomas Nagel’s question, “what is it like to be a bat?”, Costello considers the 
limit of our sympathetic imagination to think the being of another.1 The limit of sympathy 
is, according to Costello, “tragically restrictive, restrictive and restricted” (76). However, 
                                           
1 J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello: Eight Lessons (London: Vintage Books, 2003), 75. 
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Costello claims that “There is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into 
the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination” (80). 
Nevertheless, Costello’s remarks do not convince her audience, and rather cause anger and 
indifference. In this context, it is questionable as to whether Costello’s use of analogy and 
the sympathetic imagination can function as potential ways to affect us to empathize with 
the other by dismantling the representation of difference between humans and animals. My 
contention will be here that Costello’s use of analogy and the sympathetic imagination has 
the potential to generate a new configuration of self-differentiating difference, which I will 
explore by drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s theory of sympathy, imagination and becoming. 
Moreover, I will show that Costello’s sympathy with the being of another makes possible 
her own becoming-animal in terms of Deleuze’s theory.  
First of all, however, the ethical rethinking of other lives in Elizabeth Costello needs 
to be explored in relation to the novel’s complex composition in various contents and forms. 
The novel is a generic hybrid of fiction and argument, an assemblage of diverse forms of 
lecture, discussion and letter. These multiple forms deal with multiple contents such as 
language, African literature, animals, the Humanities, Evil, Eros, and belief. In this context, 
it is useful to note the start of the first lesson on “Realism”: “There is first of all the opening, 
namely, how to get us from where we are, which is, as yet, nowhere, to the far bank. It is a 
simple bridging problem, a problem of knocking together a bridge” (1). The novel itself is 
an assemblage that bridges multiple connections, whilst looking to a realm that is yet to 
come. However, the bridge metaphor can also be misleading, since these diverse elements 
are arranged in a disjointed way. For example, the relation between language and the world 
in the first lesson on “Realism”, is presented as cracked. Costello says that a “word-mirror” 
of language in realism is broken (19), thereby making possible the ironical circumstance of 
Kafka’s ape, Red Peter, who makes a speech to scholars in a human language. In the second 
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lesson, “The Novel in Africa”, as Costello claims, language is again split from the body. 
Emmanuel Egudu, a writer from Nigeria, insists on “an [African] oral novel that has kept 
in touch with the human voice and hence with the human body, a novel that is not 
disembodied like the Western novel” (53). However, Costello contests this and challenges 
Egudu’s assertion of an essentialized African identity, saying that “A novel about people 
who live in an oral culture, she would like to say, is not an oral novel. Just as a novel about 
woman isn’t a women’s novel” (53). By contrast, in the sixth lesson, “The Problem of Evil”, 
Costello describes the danger of a writer representing an evil deed such as the execution 
scenes of the Holocaust, ironically emphasizing the power of the realistic novel. As this 
suggests, the fragmentary elements of the lessons and Postscript are interwoven, yet 
generate crevices between their connections. Thus, the complex composition of the novel 
implicitly poses the questions of how to connect its disjunctive elements.  
The novel’s assemblage poses three basic questions related to analogy, the 
sympathetic imagination and becoming. Firstly, there is the consideration of how to connect 
the philosophical arguments and the fictive aspects in the novel. Costello’s thinking about 
the being of another, as I have mentioned earlier, is suggested as a form of analogical 
thinking and the sympathetic imagination. However, the novel’s exploration of ethical ways 
of sympathizing with animals is presented alongside philosophical arguments in the forms 
of lectures and discussions. Not only Costello’s lectures, but also her audiences’ responses 
are argumentatively presented. In addition, the two lessons titled “The Philosophy and the 
Animals” and “The Poets and the Animals” were originally delivered by Coetzee himself 
as his Princeton Tanner lectures in 1997-8, and were later reprinted in The Lives of Animals 
(1999) with the addition of the “reflections” of four scholars: Marjorie Garber, Peter Singer, 
Wendy Doniger and Barbara Smuts. Following this, the two chapters of The Lives of 
Animals were included in Elizabeth Costello in 2003. Moreover, given their earlier 
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appearance as Coetzee’s own words, it is questionable how a reader may respond to them 
being presented as the words of a character Costello. In this context, they pose a question 
of how philosophical arguments relying on reason enable us to develop our extensive 
engagement with others and their lives.  
Secondly, the novel allows us to reflect on the difficulty of connecting distinct 
lessons. Because of an assemblage of dissimilar issues, there are inconsistencies or holes 
in the presentation of Costello’s and other characters’ thoughts. Dereck Attridge points out 
various “inconsistencies” in the characterization. For example, according to Attridge, 
Costello’s son, John lives in Australia in the part of “What is Realism” and “teaches in the 
department of astronomy at the Australian National University”. Yet, in the U.S. in Lives 
of Animals, he is “assistant professor of physics and astronomy” at Appleton College. 
Attridge goes on to assert that “When Coetzee brought the pieces together in Elizabeth 
Costello he had to make some slightly awkward adjustments to achieve consistency”: “John 
is said to be on leave in Australia for a year from his college in Massachusetts” in order to 
accompany his mother.2 More noticeable inconsistencies are shown in the arguments. For 
example, Costello, in the fifth lecture, “The Humanities in Africa”, writes a letter to her 
sister Blanche, who is called “Sister Bridget” in Africa. In the letter, Costello refers to 
human performances, of dressing and undressing, which distinguish us from animals. 
Costello says:  
 
“Acts like that are not available to animals, who cannot uncover themselves 
because they do not cover themselves. Nothing compels us to do it, Mary or 
me. But out of the overflow, the outflow of our human hearts we do it 
nevertheless: drop our robes, reveal ourselves, reveal the life and beauty we 
are blessed with”. (150)  
                                           
2 Dereck Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (Chicago: The University of Chicago 




However, Costello’s assertions surrounding clothing seems to repeat what scholars talk 
about in relation to “shame” (85), as a marker of differentiating humans from animals. 
Nevertheless, in her lectures on animals, Costello criticizes Western philosophers’ 
distinction between human and non-human by saying that they are “more alike than they 
are unlike” on the grounds that “a philosopher who says that the distinction between human 
and non-human depends on whether you have a white or a black skin” (111). In this context, 
the novel poses the question of how to synthesize the inconsistencies of Costello’s thoughts 
in relation to dissimilar elements, for example, species of human and animal, racial 
difference, religious and secular love, passion and belief.   
Thirdly, there is the final consideration of the writer’s voice and its relation to a 
fictive figure. Costello’s philosophical voice throughout the lectures triggers the question 
of whether it is merely a reflection of the author. Costello is described as a successful writer, 
the author of The House on Eccles Street (1969), which rewrites James Joyce’s Ulysses 
(1922). There is an obvious echo here of Coetzee’s Foe, as if Costello is an avatar of 
Coetzee. Like the character of Friday in Coetzee’s Foe, which rewrites Robinson Crusoe, 
Costello can be read as a fictive figure, delivering Coetzee’s own ideas. However, Sam 
Durrant raises an important question regarding the relationship between Coetzee and 
Costello by considering the inconsistency of their positions in relation to the sympathetic 
imagination. Specifically, by claiming that “Coetzee’s position is ultimately irreducible to 
Costello’s”, Durrant points out that “Costello’s assertion that ‘there are no bounds to the 
sympathetic imagination’ is turned upon itself in Coetzee’s fiction, which one might 
describe as acts of sympathetic imagination that continuously encounter their own 
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bounds”.3 Durrant goes on to say: “While Costello has apparently rewritten Ulysses from 
the perspective of Molly Bloom, Coetzee has written a book about the impossibility of 
recovering the point of view of Friday from Robinson Crusoe”.4 In this way, there is a lack 
of integration between Coetzee and Costello, between writer and character, and this is 
emphasized by their difference in gender. However, at the same time, comparisons can be 
made between Coetzee and Costello. This can be found in Costello’s comparison between 
herself and Franz Kafka’s educated ape, or Red Peter in her lecture, in which she also draws 
on Kafka’s comparison between Red Peter who “performs before human beings” and the 
Jew, Kafka who “performs for Gentiles” (62). Costello goes on to say that the comparison 
between Kafka and the ape is conceived of “ironically” in relation to a reader and an 
audience (62). In their speeches, Costello’s feelings towards the ape and Kafka’s creation 
of the ape allow for differentiations between Costello and audiences and between Kafka 
and readers. Thus, Coetzee’s creation of his character makes possible his own 
transformation, which can be seen as relative to Costello’s and Kafka’s becoming-animal.  
Through the consideration of these three questions, it becomes clearer in what ways 
the novel is an assemblage of heterogeneous elements: a mixture of argument and fiction, 
the coexistence of dissimilar issues, and an ironic integration between writer and character. 
This complex structure, I will argue, is closely related to the question of thinking and 
sympathizing with others. In this context, my argument focuses on how the use of analogy 
and sympathetic imagination in the disjunctive composition of the novel lead us to a way 
of thinking the being of another. Thus, this chapter will firstly examine the virtue and risk 
of analogy through Costello’s comparison between the extermination of the Jews and the 
                                           
3 Sam Durrant, “J.M. Coetzee: Elizabeth Costello, and the Limits of the Sympathetic Imagination”, 
J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual, ed. Jane Poyner (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2006), 119.  
4 Ibid.  
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slaughter of animals. Rather than being seen as a metaphor based on the similarities and 
differences between compared objects, I will show that Costello’s analogy generates 
interactions between them. Secondly, Costello’s sympathetic imagination will be examined 
as a method of corporeal association through Deleuze’s reading of David Hume. Thirdly, I 
will examine how Costello as a writer creates self-differentiating difference, by discussing 
her comparison with Kafka’s ape, or Red Peter in “Report to an Academy”. Subsequently, 
this chapter will show that Coetzee, through the figurative character Costello, minoritizes 
the major configurations of literature, transforming it into a minority literature like Kafka’s.   
 
 
II. Analogy  
 
Costello’s analogies between humans and animals indicate a metaphorical 
extension of humans and animals. However, Costello’s comparison between the human 
suffering of the European Holocaust and that of slaughtered animals brings about an angry 
reaction in her audience. In relation to this analogy, her son John Bernard, an assistant 
professor of physics and astronomy, thinks: “She should have thought twice before bringing 
up the Holocaust. I could feel hackles rising all around me in the audience” (93). The Jewish 
poet, Abraham Stern directly expresses his anger against her analogy through a letter, which 
states that Costello misunderstands “the nature of likeness” (94). By means of these 
fictional audience responses, a question is thus brought up about Costello’s analogy and its 
relation to metaphor. In this context, I will examine that Costello’s analogy is neither a 
metaphor that transforms one literal designation to another, nor a metaphor that asserts a 
resemblance between the two, but it rather attempts to trigger a new configuration of 
inhuman becoming.    
216 
 
Analogy can be defined as the core of cognition. It is created by drawing on 
similarities between designated objects, which otherwise may seem disconnected. The lives 
of animals have been unquestionably exploited for the benefits of humans, but this fact has 
rarely been explored by humans. To prompt this exploration, Costello attempts to evoke 
the Holocaust and its affinity with the food industry:  
 
“They went like sheep to the slaughter.” “They died like animals”. 
“The Nazi butchers killed them”. Denunciation of the camps 
reverberates so fully with the language of the stockyard and 
slaughterhouse that it is barely necessary for me to prepare the ground 
for the comparison I am about to make. The crime of the Third Reich, 
says the voice of accusation, was to treat people like animals”. (64-5) 
 
In this passage, Costello cites various similes used to describe the Holocaust. She implicitly 
notes the under-examined comparator in these similes: the slaughter of animals. Far from 
accepting this normalization, Costello presents the “meat industry” as worse than the Nazis: 
“once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the 
contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the 
comfort of our homes” (66). In this way, by creating the resemblance between the Nazis’ 
treatment of the dead bodies of people and the butcher’s treatment of the dead bodies of 
animals, Costello vividly presents the meat industry’s horrendous crime against animals.  .    
However, because of this comparison between the corpses of humans and animals, 
the audience resents Costello’s analogy. Attending Costello’s lecture, her son John thinks: 
“His mother does not have a good delivery. Even as a reader of her own stories she lacks 
animation” (63). In addition, John is concerned about Costello’s inappropriate comparison 
and the audience’s reaction. Stern directly reveals his resentment of Costello’s analogy by 
absenting himself from the dinner held in her honor. Stern notes the reason for his absence 
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in his letter:  
 
You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison 
between the murdered Jews of Europe and the slaughtered cattle. The 
Jews died like cattle, therefore cattle die like Jews, you say. That is a 
trick with words which I will not accept. You misunderstand the nature 
of likenesses; I would even say you misunderstand willfully, to the point 
of blasphemy. Man is made in the likeness of God but God does not have 
the likeness of man. If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow 
that cattle are treated like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the 
dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way. (94)  
 
In this passage, Stern senses in Costello’s analogy an insult against the dead Jews as well 
as a blasphemy against God. As this suggests, he refuses this analogy primarily due to the 
belief in the hierarchal relations between God, humans and animals in Western thought. 
Costello’s analogy is precisely designed to contest this.  
Stern’s criticism of Costello’s analogy can be viewed as reasonable and ethical, 
given Marjorie Garber’s remark concerning the risk of analogy in The Lives of Animals. In 
relation to Costello’s analogy, Garber asks: “Is the comparison of human beings to animals 
venal? Patronizing? A mode of false consciousness? A blasphemy? A necessary mediation? 
Viewed in literary terms, this is the challenge to humanism”.5 An analogy of human and 
animal could devalue humanism or human culture. Garber cites various examples of the 
abuse of analogy. Regarding an analogy against the Jews, for example, Garber mentions 
the children’s film Bebe, which draws on images of German expressionist film and the 
specter of the Nazi death camps. From this, Garber claims that “The Holocaust is one 
                                           
5 Marjorie Garber, “Reflections”, The Lives of Animals, ed. and intro. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 81.  
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profound challenge to the use of analogy”. 6  Garber’s remark is associated with the 
suffering of the victims, so that the analogy of the Holocaust can be morally understood 
and criticized. Analogy is more often used as a form of metaphor in literary and cultural 
texts. Yet, the metaphor can be problematic, when the difference between the compared 
objects is naturalized and forgotten. For instance, in quoting a remark from Richard 
Lewontin’s, Steven Rose’s, and Leon J. Kamin’s work, Not in Our Genes, Garber asserts 
that “one of the errors of sociobiology is to take metaphors for real identities, and to forget 
(we might say ‘naturalize’) the source of the metaphors”.7 Garber goes on to refer to the 
application of human culture to non-human animals as “false metaphor”.8  Given that 
human culture typically rests on the opposition between human and animal, the analogy 
between human and animal can be abused.  
However, Garber’s emphasis on the abuse of analogy is based on reinforcing the 
unequal relationship between human and animal. The same criticism applies to the Jewish 
poet, Stern’s criticism of Costello’s analogy. From Stern’s perspective, Costello’s analogy 
can be understood as an insult against the memory of the slaughtered Jews, since she 
reduces their plight to the death of animals. From Stern’s perspective, the suffering of the 
Jews cannot be compared to that of animals, as “man is made in the likeness of God but 
God does not have the likeness of man”. However, this hierarchical relationship between 
God, humans and animals is problematic, and it is precisely the effects of this hierarchy 
that Costello exposes. In fact, as Jacques Derrida remarks, the suffering of animals is 
perhaps even more serious than the suffering of humans, but it has been forgotten:  
 
No one can deny seriously any more, or for very long, that men 
                                           
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 83.  
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do all they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from 
themselves; in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or 
misunderstanding of this violence, which some would compare to the 
worst cases of genocide (there are also animal genocides; the number of 
species endangered because of man takes one’s breath away).9  
 
Because of this hierarchical divide, the fact that animals have been massively exploited and 
slaughtered in farming, industry and experiments for human’ benefit has been ignored. 
Stern’s attack on Costello’s analogy is thus based on the assumption that the suffering of 
animals is lesser than that of humans.  
In Western culture, various characteristics of humanity such as reason, language 
and consciousness have been putatively considered as markers that differentiate humans 
from animals. According to Costello, Western thought from St. Thomas to Immanuel Kant 
has regarded reason and language as distinctive traits in humans, and these are considered 
to be divergent from animals. Humans think of themselves as reflecting the likeness of God 
on the grounds that God is an embodiment of reason. However, from Costello’s perspective, 
the decisive elements involved in dividing humans and animals seem to be anthropocentric. 
Thus, when questioned about the “stupidity” of animals, Costello says that the thought that 
“animals are imbeciles is profoundly anthropocentric” (108). This can be rethought by 
reflecting on Deleuze’s discussion of “stupidity” and its relation to animals. By 
investigating the diverse concepts of “stupidity” in Western philosophy, Deleuze, in 
Difference and Repetition, asserts:  
 
Stupidity [bêstise] is not animality. The animal is protected by 
specific forms which prevent it from being ‘stupid’ [bête]. Formal 
                                           
9 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 26.  
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correspondences between the human face and the heads of animals have 
often been composed; in other words, correspondences between 
individual differences peculiar to humans and the specific differences of 
animals. Such correspondences, however, take no account of stupidity as 
a specifically human form of bestiality.10  
 
Deleuze problematizes the way that the concept of stupidity is reduced to “error”, thus 
engaging in a reversal of thinking or reason in Western philosophy. 11  Deleuze thus 
questions: “how is stupidity (not error) possible?”.12 Deleuze connects the concept of 
stupidity to the “indetermination” in relation to determination: “It is the indeterminate, but 
indeterminate in so far as it continues to embrace determination”.13 Similarly, Deleuze 
explains that “Stupidity is neither the ground nor the individual, but rather this relation in 
which individuation brings the ground to the surface without being able to give it form”.14 
In this context, Deleuze’s conception of stupidity can provide us with a question concerning 
the reason for dividing humans and animals.15 Along the same lines, Costello claims that 
                                           
10 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 150. Deleuze describes changing views of the concepts of “stupidity” in Western 
Philosophy. For example, “The stoic notion of stultitia involves at once both madness and stupidity. 
The Kantian idea of inner illusion, internal to reason, is radically different from the extrinsic 
mechanism of error. The Hegelian idea of alienation supposes a profound restructuring of the true-
false relation” (150).    
11 Ibid., 148.  
12 Ibid., 151.  
13 Ibid., 152.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Jacques Derrida, in his essay, “Man and the Becoming-Animal”, criticizes Deleuze’s discussion 
of stupidity on the basis that it still relies on humanism. Specifically, Derrida says that the two 
French words, “bête” and “bêtise”, are untranslatable and imply “not ‘stupid’ or ‘stupidity’ and not 
even ‘dumb’ or ‘dumbness’” (35). Using the French word “bêtise” rather than stupidity, Derrida 
insists that Deleuze “excludes the question of error from the question bêtise” in his question of “how 
is stupidity (not error) possible?” (45). The exclusion means that “la bêtise is not the relation of a 
judgement to what is” (45). From Derrida’s perspective, “‘bêtise’ implies not an error, nor a bad 
judgement, but rather an inability to judge, a flaw in judgement, a defect in judgement” (46). From 
this, drawing on Deleuze’s division between error and stupidity (bêtise), Derrida comes to assert 
that Deleuze’s discussion of “stupidity (bêtise) is not animality”, which implies that “only man is 
exposed to stupidity” (57). Jacques Derrida, “Man and The Becoming-Animal”, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Gabriele Schwab (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). However, 
despite the fact that Derrida describes Deleuze’s discussion of stupidity as evidence of the division 
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“For, seen from the outside, from a being who is alien to it, reason is simply a vast tautology” 
(69-70). This issue is seen as Costello’s criticism of language and reason grounded in 
humanism, as an exponent of the divide between humans and animals.  
In this context, Peter Singer in “Reflections” attests that “There’s a more radical 
egalitarianism about humans and animals running through her lecture than I would be 
prepared to defend”.16 Based on the utilitarianism of the equal consideration of creatures’ 
interests, Singer comes to distinguish humans and animals in terms of their interests. From 
Singer’s perspective, it could be concluded that all animals are available to be killed, 
depending on their capability to feel pain. Yet, in her dialogue with Singer, his daughter 
Naomi points out a potential induction of Singer’s logic: the painless killing of animals 
could be justified. This could be an abuse of rationalism exercised by applying the 
calculability of pain to humans and animals, despite the fact that Singer emphasizes animals’ 
capability of experiencing pain. Thus, from Naomi’s perspective, Singer’s approach 
towards animals is limited by its rationality as judged from the perspective of feeling: “Too 
much reasoning, not enough feeling. That’s a horrible thought”.17 Accordingly, Naomi’s 
argument designates the limit of thinking animals in terms of the anthropological grounds 
of reason. Thus, Costello says, “The question to ask should not be: Do we have something 
in common-reason, self-consciousness, a soul—with other animals?” (79). In this context, 
Costello’s comparison between the extermination of the European Jews and the slaughter 
of animals does not appeal to common reason, but rather to the indiscernibility between 
humans and animals through the effect of its analogy.  
However, if we consider the analogy of humans and animals presented in paintings, 
                                           
between humans and animals, Deleuze attempts to demonstrate the groundlessness of knowledge 
that links animals to stupidity.     
16 Peter Singer, “Reflections”, The Lives of Animals, 86.  
17 Ibid., 88.  
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we can begin to rethink a process of dismantling their representations through the 
conjunction of animal and human. Deleuze, in his work, Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation, finds a zone of indiscernibility or undecidability between human and animal in 
a composition of representative images of a face and an animal. According to Deleuze, 
Bacon “pursues a very peculiar project as a portrait painter: to dismantle the face, to 
rediscover the head or make it emerge from beneath the face” (the original emphasis).18 In 
other words, by deforming or dismantling the face, as a site of identity, Bacon paints an 
animal trait, such as meat, which is neither human nor animal, but rather represents a “zone 
of indiscernibility or undecidability”: 
 
Meat is not dead flesh; it retains all the suffering and assumes all 
the colors of living flesh. It manifests such convulsive pain and 
vulnerability, but also such delightful invention, color, and acrobatics. 
Bacon does not say, “Pity the beasts”, but rather that every man who 
suffers is a piece of meat. Meat is the common zone of man and the beast, 
their zone of indiscernibility; it is a “fact”, a state where the painter 
identifies with the objects of his horror and his compassion. The painter 
is certainly a butcher, but he goes to the butcher shop as if it were a 
church, with the meat as the crucified victim (the Painting of 1946 
[3])”.19  
 
In this passage, Bacon’s painting of meat does not merely imply the representation or the 
metaphor of the dead body, but rather it is associated with the sensation of containing all 
suffering and vulnerability. Accordingly, in Bacon’s paintings, meat looks “like” neither 
the dead flesh of humans nor of animals, but rather dissolves their representative images. 
                                           
18 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, translated and with an introduction by 
Danial W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 19.  
19 Ibid., 21-2.  
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It is also noteworthy that sensation arising from meat passes between the dead body and 
the painter Bacon, which generates the becoming-meat. In other words, sensation does not 
arise from the object and the subject but instead passes through them. Indeed, Bacon thinks 
of himself as meat in a butcher shop:  
 
I’ve always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat, 
and to me they belong very much to the whole thing of the Crucifixion…. Of 
course, we are meat, we are potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher shop I 
always think it’s surprising that I wasn’t there instead of the animal.20  
 
This is the becoming-meat of human that could be achieved by analogy.  
Deleuze’s and Bacon’s notions of meat are explicitly associated with Costello’s idea 
of the corpse. Similar to Bacon’s sensation of meat, Costello tells the audience how to 
recognize what a corpse is. For Costello, ageing enables us to embody the death that an 
abstractive knowledge cannot, since ageing signifies a sort of dying. As Costello observes:  
 
‘When I know, with this knowledge, that I am going to die, what 
is it, in Nagel’s terms, that I know? Do I know what it is like for me to 
be a corpse or do I know what it is like for a corpse to be a corpse? The 
distinction seems to me trivial. What I know is what a corpse cannot 
know: that it is extinct, that it knows nothing and will never know 
anything anymore. For an instant, before my whole structure of 
knowledge collapses in panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, dead 
and alive at the same time.’ (77) 
 
Costello says that she knows what it is like to be a corpse, since she lives dead and at the 
                                           
20 Ibid., 22. See David Sylvester, The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon, 1962-
1979, the third edition (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 23, 46.  
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same time dies alive. In this way, Costello’s rethinking of the corpse is produced through a 
compositional process of life and death. Consequently, Costello’s analogy between humans 
and animals is neither an identification nor a resemblance between humans and animals, 
but rather a compositional process of dismantling their representations as different species. 
From this, it can also be concluded that philosophical arguments concerning animals offer 
limited scope for thinking the being of another, since the arguments depend on reason and 
language. In order to draw on our sympathy with the being of another, philosophical 
arguments need to be processed in a way that dismantles the difference between humans 




III. The Sympathetic Imagination  
 
Alongside analogy as the dissolution of representative objects, Costello proposes 
the sympathetic imagination as an extensive capacity to feel and think the being of another. 
However, Costello does not further articulate how the sympathetic imagination can go 
beyond the limitations of anthropocentric ideas of thinking other lives. Nevertheless, she 
poses the question of how the sympathetic imagination can lead us to a cognitive 
engagement with—rather than an intellectual recognition of—the other. In this context, I 
will examine firstly the concept of the sympathetic imagination that Costello mentions in 
her lectures and secondly the problems of the sympathetic imagination, with specific 
regards to partiality, drawing on Deleuze’s reading of David Hume. Finally, I will explore 
how the sympathetic imagination entails a corporeal association and interaction in both 
Costello’s and Deleuze’s conceptions of sympathy and the imagination.   
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In order to engage with this, it is necessary to examine Costello’s concept of the 
sympathetic imagination in her lecture on the lives of animals. After ending her lecture, 
Costello is asked by a man on the floor about her theories. He asks whether Costello’s 
argument is concerned with practical issues related to “factory farms, eating meat, treating 
and killing animals more humanly, stopping experiments with animals” (81). However, 
Costello responds: “If principles are what you want to take away from this talk, I would 
have to respond, open your heart and listen to what your heart says” (82). In Costello’s 
account, the openness to other lives is emotional and affective, and thus explicitly divergent 
from reason and language. Costello’s conception of openness is associated with the 
sympathetic imagination as a way for empathizing with another, which is the opposite to 
people’s apathy towards the Nazis’ annihilation of the Jews and to the Nazis’ readiness to 
kill other humans. Specifically, Costello claims:  
 
“The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the 
place of their victims, as did everyone else. They said, ‘It is they in those 
cattle cars rattling past’. They did not say, ‘How would it be if it were I 
in that cattle car?’ … They didn’t say, ‘How would it be if I were 
burning?’ They did not say, ‘I am burning, I am falling in ash’” (70).  
 
In this way, Costello draws attention to the practical limits of thinking other lives and their 
suffering. She also draws attention to another limit while she explains the hearts as the seat 
of sympathy:  
 
“The hearts is the seat of a faculty, sympathy that allows us to 
share at times the being of another. Sympathy has everything to do with 
the subject and little to do with the object, the “another”, as we see at 
once when we think of the object not as a bat (“Can I share the being of 




Sympathy, she claims, is based on the subject rather than the object. In this context, it is 
worth remarking that Costello’s account of the sympathetic imagination is not limited to 
humans, but is extended to animals.   
The extensiveness of the sympathetic imagination can be further examined through 
Costello’s theorization surrounding the bat. As I discussed earlier, drawing on Thomas 
Nagel’s question of “what is it like to be a bat? (75)”, Costello addresses the limitation of 
our sympathy with the being of another. According to Costello, Nagel proposes the 
impossibility of humans’ becoming-bat on the grounds that the minds of humans and bats 
are different: “Whereas what we really aspire to know is what it is like to be a bat, as a bat 
is a bat; and that we can never accomplish because our minds are inadequate to the task—
our minds are not bats’ minds” (76). In Nagel’s remark, the mind is identified with the 
concept of subjectivity, which constitutes a profound divide between humans and animals. 
However, instead of the decisive difference between human and animal minds, Costello 
finds in both a commonality based around their status as living beings: “To be a living bat 
is to be full of being; being fully a bat is like being fully human, which is also to be full of 
being” (77). This fullness of being is, according to Costello, “a state hard to sustain in 
confinement” (77). Costello thereby asserts a necessary sharability between humans and 
animals, which leads us to the experience of “joy” in its fullness (77). From Costello’s 
perspective, the fullness of a life based on sharability works in opposition to the mind and 
subjectivity as markers of identity.    
However, in order to examine how Costello’s assertion of the sympathetic 
imagination enables us to share with other lives in a community, we need to further examine 
the limitations of the sympathetic imagination through Deleuze’s and Hume’s theories. In 
his reading of Hume’s Treatise, Deleuze proposes that “Hume’s project entails the 
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substitution of a psychology of the mind by a psychology of the mind’s affections”.21 In 
other words, for Deleuze, the sympathetic imagination is here a question of how the mind, 
as a site of subjectivity can be constituted as an extensive and associative relation to the 
being of another. Drawing on Hume’s theory, Deleuze explains sympathy as a faculty of 
extension, whilst describing the imagination as a corrective and reflective rule. Thus, in 
Deleuze’s account, sympathy, on the one hand, constitutes a faculty of extension within the 
subject. On the other hand, sympathy needs to be corrected and reflected through the 
process of the imagination, because it can generate an expansion of the same, in the forms 
of identification or integration. In this regard, sympathy needs to be corrigible through the 
function of the imagination. This point is important in relation to Costello’s assertion of the 
limit of the sympathetic imagination, as it enables us to consider how humans may think of 
the being of another beyond the limits of anthropological thought.    
In his reading of Hume, Deleuze notes that sympathy can function as partiality and 
egoism. In fact, sympathy makes us give up our own point of view and thereby merge with 
the Other. Yet, sympathy can also function as partiality in a community. This point is 
associated with the paradox of sympathy. Sympathy, on the one hand, allows us to reach 
agreement with the Other, which embodies an openness to the future: “In fact in order to 
be moral, sympathy must extend into the future and must not be limited to the present 
moment”.22 On the other hand, Deleuze’s account of sympathy has a tendency toward 
partiality, as an “inequality of affection” that “sympathy bestows upon us as a characteristic 
of our nature, ‘so as to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a degree of 
partiality, either by too great an enlargement, or contraction of the affections, as vicious 
                                           
21 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s theory of human nature, 
translation and introduction by Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991), 21.  
22 Ibid., 37.  
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and immoral’”.23 Through this paradox, the partiality of sympathy belongs to the nature of 
humans, since it is incorrigible. Thus, it seems natural that “We condemn the parents who 
prefer strangers to their own children”.24 From this, we cannot criticize Nagel’s denial of 
thinking a bat, as argued by Costello, who says that “To Nagel a bat is a fundamentally 
alien creature, not perhaps as alien as a Martian but certainly more alien than any fellow 
human being” (76). Thus, because of this partiality, we can hardly have sympathy with 
animals, or different species.  
The partiality of sympathy is, according to Deleuze, opposed to the social. Deleuze 
thus proclaims that sympathy is “no less opposed to society than egoism is. ‘… [S]o noble 
an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them, as the 
most narrow selfishness’. No one has the same sympathies as another; given the plurality 
of partialities, we are confronted with contradiction and violence”. 25  In Hume’s and 
Deleuze’s accounts, sympathy can merely function as the most narrow selfishness, which 
implies an extension of the self towards one’s own groups: families, relatives and even 
species. Also, the extension of sympathy to individuals’ groups ironically results in 
contradictions and violence, since individuals have their own partialities. Accordingly, 
drawing on Hume’s perspective, Deleuze poses a question regarding the ways humans 
extend sympathy beyond the limits of partiality. Deleuze goes on to say:  
 
Consequently, a contradiction explodes inside nature. The 
problem of society, in this sense, is not a problem of limitation, but rather 
a problem of integration. To integrate sympathies is to make sympathy 
transcend its contradiction and natural partiality. Such an integration 
implies a positive moral world, and is brought about by the positive 
                                           
23 Ibid., 38.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
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invention of such a world.26   
 
Thus, Deleuze’s question regarding sympathy is precisely linked to the association between 
mutual exclusions: “Partialities or particular interests cannot be naturally totalized, because 
they are mutually exclusive. One can only invent a whole, since the only invention possible 
is that of the whole”.27 For this reason, Deleuze claims that we need to artificially create 
what Hume refers to as a “general rule”. Drawing on Hume’s account, Deleuze suggests a 
common point of this general rule: “The function of the rule is to determine a stable and 
common point of view, firm and calm, and independent of our present situation” (ES 41). 
General rules thereby enable us to reach a convergence of divergent perspectives.  
Nevertheless, this general rule makes possible the lack of vividness in thinking the 
being of another. Moreover, the being of another cannot be included in the common points 
of the general rules. How then can we grasp the object vividly? In answer to this, it is 
important to consider the relationship between the imagination and sympathy. Firstly, from 
Deleuze’s perspective, Hume describes the function of the imagination in thinking the 
general rule. Hume’s notion of the imagination is, as Deleuze articulates, considered as an 
assemblage of ideas:  
 
The collection of ideas is called “imagination”, insofar as the 
collection designates not a faculty but rather an assemblage of things, in 
the most vague sense of the term: things are as they appear—a collection 
without an album, a play without a stage, a flux of perceptions. (ES 22)  
 
From this, it seems that the imagination comprises a flux of perceptions without a specific 
location or order. Moreover, Hume’s notion of the imagination is identified with the mind 
                                           
26 Ibid., 39-40.  
27 Ibid., 40.  
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and ideas (ES 22). It is important to note that the imagination has, for Hume and Deleuze, 
an equal function to ideas, but ideas are only in the imagination (ES 23). Deleuze says, 
“Nothing is done by the imagination; everything is done in the imagination” (ES 23). Yet, 
there is no constancy or uniformity in the way in which ideas are connected through the 
imagination. For Hume, ideas are linked by the principle of association, and “association 
with three principles (contiguity, resemblance, and causality) transcends the imagination, 
and also differs from it” (ES 23). From the principle of association, Deleuze puts forward 
important questions: “how to go beyond partialities, how to pass from a ‘limited sympathy’ 
to an ‘extended generosity’, how to stretch passions and given them an extension they don’t’ 
have on their own”.28 Association affects the imagination, which also inspires sympathy 
to be corrigible. In this way, through the processes of associations, Deleuze’s notion of the 
imagination can make sympathy reflective beyond the limits of partiality and the present.  
The vividness of thinking and imagining the being of another is suggested in 
Deleuze’s own concept of sympathy. Compared to Deleuze’s early work on Hume, Deleuze, 
in his dialogue with Claire Parnet, explains sympathy as an assemblage. Furthermore, this 
assemblage is co-functioning: “The assemblage is co-functioning, it is ‘sympathy’, 
symbiosis”. 29  Thus, Deleuze goes on to express sympathy as interactions between 
corporeal sensations of bodies:  
 
Sympathy is not a vague feeling of respect or of spiritual 
participation: on the contrary, it is the exertion or the penetration of 
bodies, hatred or love, for hatred is also a compound, it is a body, it is no 
good except when it is compounded with what it hates. Sympathy is 
bodies who love or hate each other, each time with populations in play, 
                                           
28 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, intro. John Rajchman and trans. Anne 
Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 46.  
29 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogue II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 52.  
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in these bodies or on these bodies. Bodies may be physical, biological, 
psychic, social, verbal: they are always bodies or corpora. (52)  
 
In this way, Deleuze says, “There is no judgement in sympathy, but agreements of 
convenience between bodies of all kinds” (52). In this sense, Deleuze explains the notion 
of sympathy as the continuous interaction between things and bodies: “This is assembling, 
being in the middle, on the line of encounter between an internal world and the external 
world” (52). In this context, Costello’s assertion of becoming a bat is made possible through 
sympathy: a corporal assemblage and interaction between a human and a bat, which is 
neither a human’s identification with a bat, nor a human’s instinctive partiality to exclude 
another life.  
An affinity between Deleuze’s and Costello’s sympathetic imagination can also be 
examined through Costello’s mentioning of Ted Hughes’s poem “Jaguar”. Costello 
articulates how we can imagine and sympathize with an animal in the poem. According to 
Costello, the poem makes us imagine and perceive the movement of the jaguar’s body as a 
manifestation of its vital life, prior to its internment in the zoo:  
 
In the poem we know the jaguar not from the way he seems but 
from the way he moves. The body is the body moves, or as the currents 
of life move within it. The poems ask us to imagine our way into that 
way of moving, to inhabit that body. (96)  
 
Thus, in reading the poem, we do not think of the idea of the jaguar’s movement but rather 
imagine our way into its way of moving. Costello goes on to say:  
 
“With Hughes it is a matter—I emphasize—not of inhabiting another mind 
but of inhabiting another body. That is the kind of poetry I bring to your 
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attention today: poetry that does not try to find an idea in the animal, that is 
not about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement with him”. 
(96)  
 
The poem of the jaguar, as Costello articulates, brings us not into the abstractive idea of the 
living animal, but into the embodiment of the jaguar within ourselves. Thus, Costello 
claims: “When we read the jaguar poem, when we recollect after in tranquility, we are for 
a brief while the jaguar. He ripples within us, he takes over our body, he is us” (98). As a 
result, reading the poem is “about the jaguar, about jaguarness embodied in this jaguar” 
(98). This poem triggers corporeal interactions between humans and animals via the 
sympathetic imagination. Subsequently, from Costello’s notion of the sympathetic 
imagination, we are able to expand our sympathy to the being of another beyond the limit 





Despite Costello’s assertion of the connection between the sympathetic imagination 
and the being of another, there is no sense of agreement between Costello and her audiences. 
This failure to reach an agreement is found in John’s response to her lecture: “A strange 
ending to a strange talk, he thinks, ill gauged, ill argued” (80). No one appears to be affected 
by Costello’s lectures on animals. In this respect, Michael Funk Deckard and Ralph Palm 
point out an ironical effect produced by the opposing viewpoints of Costello and the other 
characters:  
 
Through the portrayal of her contradictory manner of expression and the 
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responses of other characters (e.g. pity, doubt, indifference), through the 
description of her desire to have an effect and the repeated frustrations of that 
desire. Elizabeth Costello the novel says something that Elizabeth Costello 
the character cannot.30  
 
In this way, Costello’s lecture on animals does not merely aim (and fail) to impress upon 
audiences an ethos for both human and non-human beings, but also places its own usage of 
language in an ironic situation. However, my contention here is that this tension between 
Costello’s intention and the audience’s reaction exposes her to an experience of becoming-
animal instead of the irony that produces what Costello cannot say. I will later explore this 
becoming-animal through Costello’s idea of “belief” in the final lesson “At the Gate”. This 
exploration will be connected to the questions of literature and the writer that Coetzee offers 
in this novel.  
In order to examine Costello’s transformation, it is necessary to look more closely 
at Costello’s comparison of herself with Red Peter in Franz Kafka’s short story, “Report to 
an Academy”, which I have previously mentioned. The issue of Costello’s transformation 
has a close relation to the question of the relationship between the writer, character and 
audience. Costello’s analogy between herself and Red Peter serves to alienate her from her 
audiences, which results in her inability to convey any meanings or significations to them. 
Costello’s differentiation of herself from her audience drives her to experience a process of 
becoming-animal. It is necessary to note Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of 
becoming-animal in order to examine Costello’s becoming-animal. Firstly, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal implies a process by which the body enters into 
continuous relations of affects, which also leads to an interrelational and intersubjective 
                                           
30 Michael Funk Deckard and Ralph Palm, “Irony and Belief in Elizabeth Costello”, J.M. Coetzee 
and Ethics, eds. Anton Leist and Peter Singer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 343.  
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interplay between bodies based on the milieu of affective relations. Because of the 
characteristic of affects, Deleuze and Guattari highlight a sense of contagion between 
human and animal: the “pact” is “animal reality and the reality of the becoming-animal of 
the human being; contagion is an animal peopling, and the propagation of the animal 
peopling of the human being”.31  Yet, as Deleuze and Guattari assert, “Man does not 
become wolf, or vampire, as if he changed molar species; the vampire and werewolf are 
becomings of man, in other words, proximities between molecules in composition, 
relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between emitted particles”.32 Secondly, 
Deleuze and Guattari propose a process of becoming-animal in Kafka and his works by 
focusing his literature on deterritorization and thus aiming to produce a becoming-minority 
in social and political contexts. It is here that I will examine Costello’s becoming-animal 
by drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Kafka’s works. Concerned with Kafka’s 
works, Deleuze and Guattari describe becoming-animal as the deterritorialization of 
language in order to create a flux of non-signifying signs.   
 
To become animal is to participate in movement, to stake out the 
path of escape in all its positivity, to cross a threshold, to reach a 
continuum of intensities that are valuable only in themselves to find a 
world of pure intensities where all forms come undone, as do all the 
significations, signifiers, and signifieds, to the benefit of an unformed 
matter of deterritorialized flux, of nonsignifying signs.33  
 
Deleuze and Guattari draw on the example of Gregor Samsa, the central character in 
                                           
31 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 242.  
32 Ibid., 275.  
33 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan and 
forward. Reda Bénsmaïa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 13.  
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Kafka’s Metamorphosis, and the sounds he makes in the process of becoming-cockroach 
to illustrate their point:  
 
In the becoming-insect, it is a mournful whining that carries 
along the voice and blurs the resonance of words. However, Gregor 
becomes a cockroach not to flee his father but rather to find an escape 
where his father didn’t know to find one, in order to flee the director, the 
business, and the bureaucrats, to reach that region where the voice no 
longer does anything but him: ‘Did you hear him? It was an animal 
voice’, said the chief clerk.34  
 
In this way, Gregor becomes an insect, entering the zone in which his sound does not have 
any significations produced by the world of paternal and bureaucratic procedures, since his 
sound is “generally monotone and always nonsignifying”, drawing on “an unformed 
material expressions”.35 Thus, the sound of non-signification forces him to escape from 
the human voice and humanity. In this sense, the notion of becoming-animal implies neither 
humans’ imitation of animal sounds nor humans’ search for the resemblance between 
humans and nonhuman animals. Gregor’s becoming-animal rather engages with his 
entering a proximity between human and animal.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Kafka’s works provides us with a perspective for 
approaching Costello’s transformation into an inhuman being. Thus, it is important to look 
at Red Peter’s performance in Kafka’s “Report to an Academy” before examining 
Costello’s comparison between herself and the ape, in the lecture. Trained to be a human, 
Red Peter recounts his story to the members of the academy. With a human language, he is 
able to tell them about “his life—of his ascent from beast to something approaching man” 
                                           
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid., 6. 
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(62). In relation to this, Deleuze and Guattari describe the becoming-human of an ape in 
Red Peter’s performance as follows:  
 
It is no longer a question of a becoming-animal of man, but a 
becoming-man of the ape; this becoming is presented as a simple 
imitation and if it is a question of finding an escape (an escape, and not 
“liberty”), this escape doesn’t consist in fleeing—quite the contrary. 
Flight is challenged when it is useless movement in space, a movement 
of false liberty; but in contrast, flight is affirmed when it is a stationary 
flight, a flight of intensity (“No, freedom was not what I wanted. Only a 
way out; right, or left, or in any direction; I made no other demand”).36  
 
In the above passage, in order to find an escape from the cage on the ship, Red Peter imitates 
a human being. Yet, Red Peter’s imitation of human behaviours leads him to find a way out: 
“[T]here was no attraction for me in imitating human beings; I was imitating them because 
I needed a way out, and for no other reason”. According to Deleuze and Guattari, Red Peter 
“captured by the man finds itself deterritorialized by human force”.37 In this context, Red 
Peter’s way out implies neither a search for freedom from his capture, nor a search for any 
direction for his escape. As Red Peter asserts, “Only a way out; right, or left, or in any 
direction”. As a result, as Deleuze and Guattari observe, Red Peter’s escape demonstrates 
that “the deterritorialized animal force precipitates and intensifies the deterritorialization 
of the deterritorializing human force”.38 In this way, becoming-animal is a metamorphosis, 
which embodies “a sort of conjunction of two deterritorializations”.39   
Given Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Red Peter’s deterritorialization of 
                                           
36 Ibid., 13.  
37 Ibid., 14.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., 35.  
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deterritorialization, Costello’s creation of a comparison between herself and Kafka’s ape 
can be considered as her becoming-animal, which I will now explore in terms of two 
aspects: sound and the search for a way out. Firstly, both Red Peter and Costello make 
sounds rather than vocalizations that hold any meaning. Red Peter, although speaking 
before the scholars, does not present his story like a human being, because his language 
just imitates that of a human. For this reason, Red Peter’s story, according to Costello, is 
about what education costs, “through the ironies and silence of the story” (72). In other 
words, Red Peter’s story serves to express an unformed material that he cannot signify in a 
human language. Thus, a gap exists between content and expression in Red Peter’s speech. 
Subsequently, when he stays with his ape mate as a half-animal, Red Peter can see “the 
insane look of the bewildered half-broken animal” in his mate’s eyes. Red Peter is neither 
a human, nor an animal, but a being between a human and an animal.  
Similarly, in front of scholars in Appleton College, Costello says, “On that occasion 
I felt a little like Red Peter myself and said so. Today that feeling is even stronger, for 
reasons that I hope will become clearer to you” (62). Speaking of Red Peter, Costello says:  
 
“If Red Peter had any sense, he would not have any children. For 
upon the desperate, half-mad female ape with whom his captors, in 
Kafka’s story, try to mate him, he would father only a monster. It is as 
hard to imagine the child of Red Peter as to imagine the child of Franz 
Kafka himself. Hybrids are, or ought to be, sterile; and Kafka saw both 
himself and Red Peter as hybrids, as monstrous thinking devices 
mounted inexplicably on suffering animal bodies. The stare that we meet 
in all the surviving photographs of Kafka is a stare of pure surprise: 
surprise, astonishment, alarm. Of all men Kafka is the most insecure in 
his humanity”. (75) 
    
In this passage, Red Peter’s becoming-human amounts to his becoming a monster. This is 
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why Red Peter cannot imagine being a father. Also, Costello observes that Red Peter’s 
sterility is comparable to Kafka’s becoming an inhuman being. From Costello’s perspective, 
this demonstrates the affinity between the writer Kafka and his characters. Costello refers 
to Kafka’s “stare of pure surprise: surprise, astonishment, alarm”, which we can read as 
indicating Kafka’s becoming inhuman: “the most insecure in his humanity”. From 
Costello’s assertion that a strong connection exists between Red Peter and Kafka, it is 
suggested that Costello herself becomes an inhuman, monstrous being. Therefore, the 
question of the relationship between the writer Coetzee and the character Costello can be 
applied to the connection between Kafka and his ape. In fact, as James Meffan asserts, 
“Elizabeth Costello’s surname is graphically similar to Coetzee’s; less superficially, she 
shares his métier, and some of his principles (his ethical vegetarianism, for instance)”.40 
However, rather than the resemblance between the writer and the character, an interaction 
between them needs to be more importantly considered on the grounds that both Coetzee 
and Costello draw on this in the two lectures on animals, to differentiate themselves from 
their audiences and to invent a “minorization, or a kind of foreign language within 
language”.41  
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, we can further consider Costello’s 
becoming an inhuman being in relation to the minority literature of Kafka. As I have 
mentioned earlier, Kafka’s becoming-animal creates a conjunction between the movements 
of two deterritorializations that Kafka imposes on the animal, but also that the animal 
imposes on the human. Similarly, Costello thinks of Kafka and his ape as hybrids of human 
and animal, created through their forced transformations. In fact, Red Peter was wounded, 
                                           
40 James Meffan, “Elizabeth Costello (2003)”, A Companion to the Works of J.M. Coetzee (New 
York: Camden House, 2011), 180.  
41 Gilles Deleuze, Essays: Critical and Clinical, trans. Danial W. Smith and Michael A. Greco 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 5.  
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when human beings captured him. Thus, physically, he becomes a wounded ape, with a 
large red scar on his cheek, from which his name is derived. Also he has a serious wound 
in his hip, which causes him to limp a little. In this way, Costello says,  
 
“Red Peter was not an investigator of primate behavior but a 
branded, marked, wounded animal presenting himself as speaking 
testimony to a gathering of scholars. I am not a philosopher of mind but 
an animal exhibiting, yet not exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, a 
wound, which I cover up under my clothes but touch on in every world 
I speak”. (70-1)  
 
Like Red Peter, Costello finds herself wounded, because her sympathetic imagination with 
Red Peter causes her to be affected by Red Peter and his wound. She says: “Yes, I’m not 
dreaming. I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, and I see only kindness, 
human kindness. Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. 
Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t you? (115).” Costello’s 
sympathetic imagination enables her to differentiate herself from other human beings, 
which forces her to transform into an inhuman being.    
Costello’s metamorphosis can also be examined through her concept of “belief”, 
which will be rethought of in relation to the questions of the writer and literature. Costello, 
in the final lesson, “At the Gate”, is forced to confront the question of her belief. As if she 
is at the boundary between life and death, Costello tries to pass the gate. The title of the 
lesson apparently alludes to Kafka’s allegory of the same title. Similar to K in Kafka’s 
allegory, Costello becomes a petitioner before the gate. Yet, she must write a statement of 
her belief, as the man at the gate says, “For each of us there is something we believe. Write 
it down, what you believe. Put it in the statement” (194). However, Costello rejects his 
assertion that she must write a statement of her belief, claiming the rights of her position 
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as a writer: “It is not my profession to believe, just to write. Not my business. I do imitations, 
as Aristotle would have said” (194). Costello adds, “In my work a belief is a resistance, an 
obstacle. I try to empty myself of resistances” (200). It is here that we need to think the 
contrary concepts of belief, drawing on Deckard and Palm’s account of the two concepts 
of belief: “knowledge” and “probability”. According to Deckard and Palm, on the one hand, 
“belief has been “closely tied with knowledge, where ‘belief’ is the same thing as 
‘judgement’. According to this view, if a belief is justified by reason, then it becomes 
knowledge”.42 On the other hand, drawing on Hume’s conception of belief, Deckard and 
Palm assert that belief is connected to probability, which “requires nothing other than a 
firm or steady feeling, and this steadiness ‘gives them [belief] a superior influence on the 
passions and imagination’”.43 From Deckard and Palm’s perspective, Costello’s thoughts 
concerning belief are closer to the latter, since they assert a steady feeling rather than a 
sense of knowledge and judgement. Nevertheless, the judges require her to write a 
statement of belief based on knowledge.  
Deckard and Palm’s perspective of “belief” can be rethought through Deleuze’s 
concept of “disjunctive synthesis”. Deleuze, in The Logic of Sense, describes the 
disjunctive synthesis in a way that the sense contains two disparities or two reducible sides 
of reality. Yet, the sense is “not reducible to a conjunction”, but rather “it is left as a 
disjunction”.44 The notion of disjunctive synthesis allows us to affirm the paradoxical logic 
of containing both and neither, which creates a continuous divergence of the world. In the 
novel, Costello is required to prove her belief in front of the judges and eventually states 
her belief in little frogs, as she remembers their joyous sounds from her childhood. As she 
                                           
42 Deckard and Palm, “Irony and Belief in Elizabeth Costello”, 344.  
43 Ibid., 345. 
44 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 174.  
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mentions, “In my account, for whose many failings I beg your pardon, the life cycle of the 
frog may sound allegorical, but to the frogs themselves it is no allegory, it is the thing itself, 
the only thing. What do I believe? I believe in those little frogs” (217). Costello thus 
believes that the little frogs exist regardless of her belief: “They exist whether or not I tell 
you about them, whether or not I believe in them” (217). In this context, it seems that 
Costello believes in the existence of living beings. However, it is not sufficient to merely 
understand Costello’s singular belief in frogs. Costello’s further explanation of why she 
believes in the frogs highlights this: “It is because of the indifference of those little frogs to 
my belief” and “it is because of their indifference to me that I believe in them” (217). 
Costello’s belief in the frogs indicates a belief in an object beyond her knowledge. This is 
relative to what Costello says: “I have beliefs but I do not believe in them” (200). Moreover, 
when she explains her belief in the existence of living beings, Costello realizes that she has 
a supporter in the courtroom, a cleaning woman. After finishing her statement, the cleaning 
woman responds to her by clapping her hands:  
 
From behind her, the sound of gentle handclapping, from a single 
pair of hands, the cleaning woman’s. The clapping dwindles, ceases. It 
was she, the cleaning woman, who put her up to it—this flood of words, 
this gabble, this confusion, this passion. Well, let us see what kind of 
response passion gets. (The original emphasis, 218) 
 
In fact, in the eight lessons and the Postscript, nobody, except the cleaning woman, appears 
to be moved by Costello’s statements. Yet, the cleaning woman’s interest leads Costello to 
change her view in relation to the connection between belief and her position as a writer. 
She changes from being an imitator to a sympathizer with living beings and the Other. Yet, 
it is crucial to conceive Costello’s belief in the “becoming” of all living beings as well as 
her becoming as a writer. The judge further asks Costello about her belief as a storyteller: 
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“These Australian frogs of yours embody the spirit of life, which is what you as a storyteller 
believe in” (218-9). Costello ultimately comes to assert her belief in “becoming”:  
 
“‘You ask if I have changed my plea. But who am I, who is this 
I, this you? We change from day to day, and we also stay the same. No, 
I, no you is more fundamental than any other. You might as well ask 
which is the true Elizabeth Costello: the one who made the first statement 
or the one who made the second. My answer is, both are true. Both. And 
neither. I am an other’”. (221)  
 
As a result, we can find an affinity between Costello’s belief in the little frogs and her 
position as a writer in affirming the two reducible sides of reality, or “both and neither” 
through Deleuze’s concept of “disjunctive synthesis”. Costello’s assertion that “Both. And 
Neither.” thus does not merely imply an aporia as an emptiness of signification, but rather 
as an affirmation of the logic of disjunctive synthesis. Her affirmation of both and neither 
creates her becoming-other in a way of “I am an other”.  
Subsequently, we need to reflect on what Coetzee and Costello mean by a writer in 
the novel. As I have mentioned earlier, alluding to Kafka’s fable, “Before the Law”,45 
Coetzee describes Costello at the gate petitioning for the judge to let her pass through. The 
setting “at the gate”, is an allegorical mix of reality and fantasy, compared to the former 
seven lessons. Like the man praying for admittance to the Law in Kafka’s fable, Costello’s 
petition for her passing through the gate is denied, but then suspended. In this context, 
Costello, as a writer, is considered as a petitioner who is never allowed to pass through the 
gate, since the world in which she lives is “a court out of Kafka or Alice in Wonderland, a 
court of paradox” (223). The writer Costello is situated at a threshold between life and 
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death, or reality and fantasy. 
 
 
V. Conclusion     
 
In this chapter, I have examined ways of thinking animals through the eponymous 
protagonist’s notions of analogy, the sympathetic imagination and becoming, in Coetzee’s 
novel Elizabeth Costello, drawing on Deleuze’s theories. Framed as eight lessons and a 
Postscript, the novel discusses discontinuous issues, as Costello gives lectures in diverse 
spatio-temporal circumstances. Amongst these, I have focused on the two lectures on 
animals, discussing both the importance and limitations of our sympathetic imagination to 
think about animals. Firstly, I have examined Costello’s analogy between humans and 
animals. Costello’s analogy between the suffering of victims of the European Holocaust 
and slaughtered animals provokes Abraham Stern’s criticism that the conventional 
comparison’s inversion is an insult to the death of the Jews. Marjorie Garber in The Lives 
of Animals similarly alludes to the risks embodied in Costello’s comparison, through its use 
of a false metaphor that, from her perspective, naturalizes and defaces the differences 
between the compared objects. However, I have argued that Stern’s and Garber’s insistence 
on the abuse of analogy problematically reinforces unequal and hierarchical differences 
between humans and animals, which results in diminishing the massive victimization of 
non-human animals. In contrast to Stern’s and Garber’s criticisms of analogy, Deleuze’s 
analysis of Francis Bacon’s paintings of “Meat” provides us with a dismantling of the 
identities of humans and animals in terms of analogy. The meat in the painting represents 
neither the dead flesh of humans, nor that of animals, but rather highlights their proximity. 
Subsequently, I argue that Costello’s analogy neither seeks to highlight an identification 
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nor a resemblance between humans and animals, but rather offers a conjunction and 
interaction between them by dismantling the representation of their differences.  
Secondly, I have examined another way of thinking about animals by drawing on 
Costello’s notion of the sympathetic imagination as an extensive capacity to feel and think 
the being of another. Quoting Thomas Nagel’s question of “what is it like to be a bat?”, 
Costello exposes the limitations of our sympathetic imagination. This is approached 
through the Nazis’ annihilation of the Jews, since they could not sympathize with the 
position of the victims. In the novel, this is reflected in Costello’s thought of sympathy as 
a “seat of faculty that allows us to share at times the being of another”. Nevertheless, given 
Deleuze’s reading of David Hume’s sympathy and imagination, sympathy is not sufficient 
to bring an interaction between humans and the other, because sympathy can function 
socially as partiality and acts in opposition to the social. As Deleuze emphasizes, sympathy 
thus needs to be accompanied with imagination, since it is through the imagination that 
sympathy can be corrigible. A conjunction between sympathy and the imagination 
proliferates continuous interactions between humans and animals, rather than expanding 
sympathy within the homogeneous groups. 
Finally, I have discussed a writer’s becoming-inhuman. Costello’s comparison 
between herself and Franz Kafka’s ape, Red Peter generates a becoming-inhuman by 
differentiating herself from human audiences. Costello’s becoming-inhuman is closely 
related to her thought of herself as a writer. In the last lesson, “At the Gate”, Costello is 
forced to confront the question of her “belief” at the gate, as if she is at the boundary 
between life and death. As a writer, Costello believes and affirms the two reducible sides 
of reality, or the paradoxical logic of being both and neither, which generates a space of 
literature. Subsequently, analogy and the sympathetic imagination, as methodologies of 
thinking animals that Costello provides in her two lectures, offer new formulations that 
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allow us to sympathize with others’ lives instead of bringing about an identification or 
resemblance between humans and animals. This way of thinking animals, thereby, leads to 
a becoming-inhuman. The literature that Costello shows at the gate, thus demonstrates a 
becoming between humans and animals, life and death, writer and reader. This can be 






The aim of this thesis was to present the affective and impersonal power of 
corporeal frailty in the selected novels of J. M. Coetzee through an approach based on 
Gilles Deleuze’s theory of corporeality. The South African writer, Coetzee, whose oeuvre 
was the subject of this thesis, attempts to articulate the suffering of bodies produced by the 
biopolitics of (post)colonial circumstances. Despite the fact that Coetzee stresses the 
undeniable authority of suffering bodies, their suffering is denied and rendered invisible 
through the diverse mechanisms of biopolitical regimes. Because these mechanisms 
construct the impossibility of interactions of pain between the subject and the Other, or the 
colonizer and the colonized, an ethical and political question is raised in relation to the 
subject’s capability of empathizing with the suffering bodies of the Other. This question is 
crucial in Coetzee’s six novels, Waiting for the Barbarians, Life & Time of Michael K, Age 
of Iron, The Master of Petersburg, Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello, which has been 
discussed in this thesis. I have argued these novels convey an encounter and affectedness 
between the bodies of the subject and the Other. Through attention to these six novels, I 
have analyzed how this affectedness, driven by corporeal weakness thereby entails a 
dynamic of self-differentiating difference, opening up the process of the subject’s 
becoming-impersonal. In particular, I have focused on how the subject is touched and 
affected by the corporeal frailty of the racial, economic and sexual Other and by non-human 
animals, while examining ways in which the corporeal frailty of the subject can have ethical, 
political, and ontological implications in (post)colonial contexts. Rather than adopting a 
psychoanalytic view of corporeal pain, with its focus on repression and trauma, a Deleuzian 
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approach proposes inorganic and collective forces of corporeal frailty, as the basis for 
affective relations with other bodies. Thus, drawing on these Deleuze’s theories of 
corporeality, this thesis has articulated a new configuration of corporeal frailty as 
represented in a selection of Coetzee’s novels and a new vision for a community to come 
in its political, ethical and ontological dimensions.   
Drawing on Deleuze’s view of corporeal weakness and illness, this thesis has 
investigated how corporeal frailty functions as a blockage of habitual life and a crack in the 
self. Deleuze’s vantage point on corporeal weakness and illness does not involve their 
negative connotations but rather provides the subject with the possibility of “health” 
beyond his or her self and of transformation into the dimension of the impersonal. In 
Deleuze’s thought, the body foregrounds corporeal frailty in order to create its auto-
affection and modification, on the grounds that the body is a mode of inorganic and 
affective relations, which promotes the subject’s interaction with the bodies of the Other. 
This is why Deleuze’s conception of the body can also be understood in terms of its capacity 
to affect and be affected by other bodies. Specifically, based on Deleuze’s theories of 
“masochism”, “exhaustion”, “corporeal and incorporeal deaths”, “the ridiculous sublime”, 
“meat”, “the sympathetic imagination” and “becoming”, this thesis has investigated how 
Deleuze’s theories highlight the body’s dynamic of the self-differentiation of difference 
and its ability to become impersonal. More specifically, the suffering of bodies, as a kind 
of limit, yet enables the subject to experience him/herself as disjunctive from his/her self, 
which also leads to a collective and synthetic process of becoming with other bodies. It is 
notable that this affective and collective process of corporeal frailty is neither a dialectic 
synthesis of the subject and the Other, nor a resemblance or identification between them, 
but rather embodies their becomings, or the movements between them, entailing a 
movement towards the impersonal dimension.  
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Within the framework of Deleuze’s thoughts on corporeal frailty, I discussed the 
protagonists’ suffering and their metamorphoses in (post)colonial contexts in Coetzee’s 
novels. In the first chapter on Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate as the colonizer 
becomes a masochist by dismantling his likeness to the Empire. In the second chapter, the 
eponymous protagonist of Life & Times of Michael K, exhausts a marker of the racial and 
economic Other and becomes imperceptible in apartheid South Africa. In the third chapter 
on Age of Iron, Mrs. Curren dissolves her position as a white liberal humanitarian in 
apartheid South Africa and enables herself to develop an inter-subjective relation with 
black people in the dimension of impersonal death. In the fourth chapter on The Master of 
Petersburg, Dostoevsky becomes the mourner as a living-dead by interacting with the 
memory of the dead. In the fifth chapter on Disgrace, David Lurie experiences the 
ridiculous effect of the sublime and thereby transforms into an inhuman being through his 
sensation of animal suffering. In the sixth chapter, the eponymous protagonist of Elizabeth 
Costello differentiates herself from humans and becomes animal by using analogy and 
sympathetic imagination. Accordingly, it is noteworthy that, among the transformations of 
the protagonists in these six novels, Michel K alone, as the colonized, is not affected by the 
other characters but rather continues to escape from the discourse and practice of biopolitics. 
The other protagonists, as the colonizers, experience the processual waves and intersections 
between the subject and the Other due to their sensation of the suffering of the Other. 
Because of their memory of suffering bodies and the dead in the colonial history of 
exploitation and humiliation, they become the living-dead as a way of dissolving their 
subjectivities and of interacting with the dead in the corporeal and incorporeal dimensions.  
However, the protagonists’ transformations into inhuman beings could also be seen 
to embody their political and practical limitations. Firstly, Coetzee does not foreground the 
ways in which the colonized are affected by or interact with the colonizer, but only focuses 
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on the colonizer’s transformations into the becoming-other. In this sense, the possibility of 
building a new community is limited, in the absence of the affective and transformative 
power of the colonized. Rather, the potential for violence and conflicts remains. Secondly, 
because of this limitation, the protagonists’ becoming-inhuman can be seen as seeking a 
utopia in the non-present tense of the ontological dimension rather than providing 
reconciliation between black people and white people in an alternative mode of community. 
Nevertheless, the becoming-inhuman of the characters can be seen as containing the 
potential for political and ethical transformations, since they engage with the process of 
becoming-democracy, escaping the given discourse and practice, in particular, the frames 
of sacrifice and revenge in (post)colonial contexts. According to Paul Patton, utopianism 
can be considered as “becoming-democracy” in the Deleuzian sense, so far as it “serves the 
utopian task of political philosophy by probing the limits of democratic processes in 
contemporary society”.1 An encounter between Coetzee’s and Deleuze’s corporeal frailty 
thus generates new ethical, political and ontological figurations of becoming-impersonal, 
where one can become a masochist, an exhauster, an impersonal crack, a living-dead, meat 
and an animal. As a result, Coetzee’s figuration of corporeal frailty provides us with an 
affirmation of the affective relations between the subject and the Other in its impersonal 
dimensions, while opening the potential for the radical shift in (post)colonial situations by 
suggesting the “not yet” of affect as its promise for the community to come.   
My thesis of corporeal frailty is also connected to Coetzee’s conception of 
“autrebiography”, as exemplified in his autobiographical trilogy, Boyhood(1997), 
Youth(2002) and Summertime(2009), which I will explore in my futrue research. 
“Aurebiography” refers to the writing of memories in the third person present tense. The 
                                           
1 Paul Patton, “Deleuze’s political philosophy”, The Cambridge Companion to Gilles Deleuze, eds. 
Daniel W. Smith and Henry Sommers-Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 214.  
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term has its genesis in an interview with David Attwell, where Coetzee claims that “all 
writing is storytelling, all writing is autobiography”2 in that a writer’s life interacts with 
and is permeated by his/her fictions. Specifically, with regards to Coetzee’s trilogy, Andrew 
Van der Vlies points out that we can “recognize the first two sets of initials as belonging to 
Coetzee’s mother and father” in the term “autrebiography”.3 Additionally, Vlies asserts 
that Coetzee’s dedications of his fictions to his dead family members, for examples, Age of 
Iron to his dead son, Nicholas and Scenes from Provincial Life (2011) to his late brother 
David Keith Coetzee, are a way of memorializing the dead.4  
With regards to the issue of autrebiography in Coetzee’s trilogy, Laura Wright also 
points out its different manifestations: “While the first two volumes [Boyhood and Youth] 
corresponds to factual elements of Coetzee’s life as a child in South Africa and later as a 
computer programmer in England, the events described in Summertime are clearly 
contrafactual: Coetzee is neither dead nor did he live with his father in South Africa during 
the period of 1972”. 5  Wright further attests that “Summertime’s engagement with a 
posthumous biography of John Coetzee forces us to consider the nature of ‘truth’ in the 
previous two volumes of the series”.6 However, rather than examining autrebiography and 
its connection to “Roland Barthes’s death of the author” in that “the work[Summertime] 
fully embraces the fictive nature of autobiography and biography”,7 I plan to research how 
the author’s affective life and death could interact with the memories of others in the 
dimension of the impersonal by drawing on Deleuze’s theories of affect, autopoiesis, 
                                           
2 J.M. Coetzee, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews, ed. David Attwell (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 391. 
3  Anderw Van der Vlies, “‘[From] Whom This Writing Then?’: Politics, Aesthetics, and the 
Personal in Coetzee’s Age of Iron”, Approaches to Teaching: Coetzee’s Disgrace and Other Works, 
eds. Laura Wright, Jane Poyner and Elleke Boehmer (New York: The Modern Language Association 
of America, 2014), 101.  
4 Ibid., 101-4.  
5 Laura Wright, “Introduction”, Approaches to Teaching, 23.  




writing, personal and impersonal death. According to Deleuze, “Writing is a question of 
becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the 
matter of any livable or lived experience. It is a process, that is, a passage of Life that 
traverses both the livable and the lived”. 8  From Deleuze’s perspective on writing as 
becoming, Coetzee’s autrebiography is also connected to the notion of the impersonal that 
I have discussed in my thesis. Specifically, given Coetzee’s describing on his life in the 
University of Texas, the concept of autrebiogaphy has relevance to Deleuze’s concept of 
the impersonal, which refers to neither the subject nor the Other: “The discipline within 
which he (and he now begins to feel closer to I: autrebiography shades back into 
autobiography) had trained himself/myself to think brought illuminations that I can’t 
imagine him or me reaching by any other route”.9 In this context, my future research will 
be concerned with Coetzee’s writings as “autrebiography” in Boyhood(1997), Youth(2002), 
and Summertime(2009), which I will relate to the processes of the writer’s differentiation 






                                           
8 Gilles Deleuze, Essays: Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1997), 1.  






I. Primary Texts 
    1. Coetzee’s Works 
Coetzee. J.M. Waiting for the Barbarians (1980). London: Vintage Books, 2004.    
--------. Life & Times of Michael K (1983). London: Vintage Books, 2004.  
--------. Foe (1986). London: Penguin, 1986.  
--------. White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1988.  
--------. Age of Iron (1990). New York: Penguin Books, 1990.  
--------. Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews. Ed. David Attwell. Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1992.  
--------. The Master of Petersburg (1994). London: Vintage Books, 2004.  
--------. Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996.  
--------. Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life (1997). London: Vintage Books, 1998.  
---------. Disgrace (1999). London: Vintage Books, 2000.  
--------. The Lives of Animals (1999). Ed and Intro. Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999.  
--------. “Critic and Citizen: A Response”, Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies, 9:1 
(2000), 109-11.  
--------. Youth (2002). London: Vintage Books, 2003.  
253 
 
---------. Stranger Shores: Essays 1986-1999. London: Vintage Books, 2002.  
--------. Elizabeth Costello (2003). London: Vintage Books, 2004.  
--------. Slow man (2005). London: Vintage Books, 2006.  
--------. Diary of a Bad Year (2007). London: Vintage Books, 2007.  
--------. Inner Workings: Literary Essays 2000-2005. Intro. Derek Attridge. London: 
Vintage Books, 2008.  
--------. Summertime (2009). London: Vintage Books, 2010.  
 
2. Secondary Texts on Coetzee’s works 
 
Aaltola, Elisa. “Coetzee and Alternative Animal Ethics,” J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: 
Philosophical Perspective on Literature. Eds. Anton Leist and Peter Singer. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010, 171-196. 
Anker, Elizabeth Susan. “Elizabeth Costello, Embodiment, and the Limits of Rights”, New 
Literary History, 42: 1 (Winter, 2011), 169-192. 
Attridge, Derek. J.M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading: Literature and Event. Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.  
--------. The Singularity of Literature. London and New York: Routledge, 2004. 
--------. “Against Allegory: Waiting for the Barbarians, Life & Times of Michael K, and the 
Question of Literary Reading”, J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual. 
Ed. Jane Poyner. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006, 63-82. 
--------. Reading and Responsibility: Deconstruction’s Traces. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011.  
Attwell, David. J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993. 
254 
 
--------. “J.M. Coetzee and South Africa: Thoughts on the Social Life of Fiction”, J.M. 
Coetzee’s Austerities. Eds. Graham Bradshaw and Michael Neill. Surrey: Ashgate, 
2010, 163-176.  
--------. J.M. Coetzee and the Life of Writing: Fact-to-Face with Time. New York: Viking, 
2015.  
Beckett, Samuel. Texts of Nothing, in Collected Shorter Prose 1945-1980. London: Calder, 
1984.  
--------. The Selected Works of Samuel Beckett. New York: Grove Press, 2010.  
Boehmer, Elleke. “Sorry, Sorrier, Sorriest: The Gendering of Contrition in J.M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace”, J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual. Ed. Jane Poyner. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006, 135-147.  
--------. “J.M. Coetzee’s Australian Realism”, Strong Opinions: J.M. Coetzee and the 
Authority of Contemporary Fiction. Eds. Chris Danta, Sue Kossew and Julian 
Murphet. New York: Bloomsbury, 2011, 3-17. 
Ciobanu, Calina. “Coetzee’s Posthumanist Ethics”, Modern Fiction Studies, 58-4 (Winter 
2012), 668-98.  
Creedon, Genevieve. “Analogical Animals: Thinking through Difference in Animalities 
and Histories”, Configurations, 22 (2014), 307-335.  
Danta, Chris. “‘Like a dog…like a lamb’: Becoming Sacrificial Animal in Kafka and 
Coetzee”, New Literary History, 38:4 (Autumn 2007), 721-737.  
--------. “Introduction”, Strong Opinions: J.M. Coetzee and the Authority of Contemporary 
Fiction. Eds. Chris Danta, Sue Kossew and Julian Murphet. New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2011, xi-xx.  
--------. “The Melancholy Ape: Coetzee’s Fables of Animal Finitude”, Strong Opinions: 
J.M. Coetzee and the Authority of Contemporary Fiction. Eds. Chris Danta, Sue 
Kossew and Julian Murphet. New York: Bloomsbury, 2011, 125-140.  
Deckard, Michael Funk and Ralph Palm. “Irony and Belief in Elizabeth Costello”, J.M. 
Coetzee and Ethics. Eds. Anton Leist and Peter Singer. New York: Columbia 
255 
 
University press, 2010, 337-356.  
Dickinson, Philip. “Feeling, Affect, Exposure: Ethical (In)capacity, the Sympathetic 
Imagination, and J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace”, Mosaic, 46:4 (December 2013), 1-19.  
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Crime and Punishment. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1988.  
--------. Demons. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Yolokhonsky. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994.  
Dovey, Teresa. “Waiting for the Barbarians: Allegory of Allegories,” Critical Perspectives 
on J.M. Coetzee. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, 138-190.  
Drichel, Simone. “Disgrace (1999)”, A companion to the works of J.M Coetzee. Ed. Tim 
Mehigan. New York: Camden House, 2011, 148-171,  
Durrant, Sam. Postcolonial Narrative and the Work of Mourning: J.M. Coetzee, Wilson 
Harris, and Toni Morrison. New York: State University of New York Press, 2004.  
--------. “J.M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, and the Limits of the Sympathetic Imagination,” 
J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual. Ed. Jane Poyner. Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2006, 118-134.  
Fitzgerald, F. Scott. The Great Gatsby. New York: Scribner, 2004.  
--------. My Lost City: Personal Essays, 1920-1940. Ed. James L. W. West III. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
Gal, Noam. “A Note on the Use of Animals for Remapping Victimhood”, African Identities, 
6:3 (2008), 241-252.  
Gallagher, Susan VanZanten. A Story of South Africa: J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction in Context. 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991.  
Gordimer, Nadine. “The Idea of Gardening”, The New York Review of Books (February 2, 
1984).  
--------. Essential Gesture. Ed. Stephen Clingman. London: Penguin Book, 1989.  
256 
 
Hamilton, Grant. “Becoming-Nomad: Territorialisation and Resistance in J.M. Coetzee’s 
Waiting for the Barbarians,” Deleuze and the Postcolonial. Eds. Simone Bignall 
and Paul Patton. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010, 183-200. 
Hayes, Patrick. J.M. Coetzee and the Novel: Writing and Politics After Beckett. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010.  
Head, Dominc. J.M. Coetzee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
--------. The Cambridge Introduction to J.M. Coetzee. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
--------. “A Belief in Frogs: J.M. Coetzee’s Enduring Faith in Fiction”, J.M. Coetzee and 
the Idea of the Public Intellectual. Ed. Jane Poyner. Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2006, 100-117.  
Helgesson, Stefan. Writing in Crisis: Ethics and History in Gordimer, Ndebele and Coetzee. 
South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004.  
Herron, Tom. “The Dog Man: Becoming Animal in Coetzee’s Disgrace”, Twentieth-
Century Literature (51:4, Winter 2005), 467-490. 
Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. London: 
Routledge, 1988.  
Huggan, Graham. “Evolution and Entropy in J. M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron,” Critical 
Perspectives on J.M. Coetzee. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, 191-212. 
Kafka, Franz. Franz Kafka: The Complete Short Stories. Ed. Nahum N. Glatzer. London: 
Vintage Books, 1999.  
Kelly, Michelle. “The Master of Petersburg (1994),” A companion to the works of J.M. 
Coetzee. Ed. Tim Mehigan. New York: Camden House, 2011. 132-147.  
Klopper, Dirk. “‘We are not made for revelation’: Letters to Francis Bacon in the Postscript 
to J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello”, English in Africa 35:2 (October 2008), 119-
132.  
Kossew, Sue. Pen and Power: A Post-Colonial Reading of J.M. Coetzee and André Brink. 
257 
 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996.  
McDonald, Peter D. “The Writer, the Critic, and the Censor: J.M. Coetzee and the Question 
of Literature,” J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual. Ed. Jane Poyner. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006, 42-62. 
Marais, Mike. “Death and the Space of the Response to the Other in J.M. Coetzee’s The 
Mater of Petersburg,” J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual. Ed. 
Jane Poyner. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006, 83-99.  
--------. Secretary of the Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee. 
Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2009.  
--------. “Waiting for the Barbarians (1980),” A Companion to the Works of J.M. Coetzee. 
Ed. Tim Mehigan. Rochester and New York: Camden House, 2011, 65-75. 
--------. “Violence, Postcolonial Fiction, and the Limits of Sympathy,” Studies in the Novel, 
43: 1 (Spring 2011), 94-114.  
May, Brian. “J.M. Coetzee and the Question of the Body”, Modern Fiction Studies, 47:2 
(Summer 2001), 391-420.  
Meffan, James. “Elizabeth Costello (2003)”, A Companion to the Works of J.M. Coetzee. 
New York: Camden House, 2011, 172-191. 
Mulhall, Stephen. The Wounded Animal: J.M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of Reality in 
Literature and Philosophy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2009.  
Melville, Herman. Billy Budd, Bartleby and Other Stories. New York: Penguin, 2016.  
Murphet, Julian. “Diary of a Bad Year: Parrhesia, Opinion and Novelistic Form,” Strong 
Opinions. Eds. Chris Danta, Sue Kossew and Julian Murphet. New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013, 63-80.  
Nashef, Hania A. M. The Politics of Humiliation in the Novels of J.M. Coetzee. New York: 
Routledge, 2009. 
--------. “Becomings in J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for The Barbarians and Jose Saramago’s 
258 
 
Blindness”, Comparative Literature Studies, 47: 1 (2010), 21-41. 
Negri, Antonio. “The Political Subject”, Theology and the Political. Creston Davis, John 
Milbank and Slavoj Zizek. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005.  
Neill, Michael. “The Language of Heart”: Confession, Metaphor and Grace in J.M. 
Coetzee’s Age of Iron,” J.M. Coetzee’s Austerities. Ed. Graham Bradshaw and 
Michael Neill. Surrey: Ashgate, 2010, 79-106.  
Norris, Andrew. “Introduction: Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead”, 
Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer. Ed. 
Andrew Norris. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005, 1-30.  
Oliver, Kelly. “What is Wrong with (Animal) Rights?”, The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy, 22:3 (2008), 214-224.  
Patton, Paul. “Becoming-Animal and Pure Life in Coetzee’s Disgrace”, Ariel, 35: 1-2 
(2004), 101-119. 
Poyner, Jane. J.M. Coetzee and the Paradox of Postcolonial Authorship. Surrey: Ashgate, 
2009. 
Robinson, Forrest G. “Writing as Penance: National Guilt and J.M. Coetzee”, Arizona 
Quarterly, 68: 1 (Spring 2012), 1-54.  
Saunders, Rebecca. “The Agony and the Allegory: The Concept of the Foreign, the 
Language of Apartheid, and the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee”, Cultural Critique, 47 
(Winter 2001), 215-264.  
Segall, Kimberly Wedeven. “Pursuing Ghosts: The Traumatic Sublime in J.M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace”, Research in African Literatures, 36:4 (Winter, 2005), 40-54.  
Spivak, Gayatri. “Theory in the Margin: Coetzee’s Foe, Reading Defore’s Crusoe/Roxana”, 
English in Africa, 17:2 (October, 1990), 1-23.  
Uhlmann, Anthony. “Realism and Intertextuality”, Strong Opinion: J.M. Coetzee and the 
Authority of Contemporary Fiction. Eds. Chris Danta, Sue Kossew and Julian 
Murphet. New York: Bloomsbury, 2011.  
259 
 
--------. “Excess as Ek-Stasis: Coetzee’s The Master of Petersburg and Giving Offense”, 
The Comparatist, 38 (October 2014), 54-69.  
Van der Vlies, Andrew. South African Textual Cultures: Black, White, Read All Over. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.  
---------. J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace: A Reader’s Guide. New York: Continuum, 2010.  
--------. “‘[From] Whom This Writing Then?’ Politics, Aesthetics, and the Personal in 
Coetzee’s Age of Iron”, Approaches to Teaching Coetzee’s Disgrace and Other Works. 
Eds. Laura Wright, Jane Poyner and Elleke Boehmer. New York: The Modern 
Language Association of America, 2014, 96-104.  
--------. Present Imperfect: Contemporary South African Writing. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017.  
Wolfe, Cary. “Introduction: Exposures”, Philosophy and Animal Life. Eds. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008.  
Wright, Laura. Writing “Out of All the Camps”: J.M. Coetzee’s Narratives of Displacement. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 
--------. “Introduction: Teaching with/out Authority”, Approaches to Teaching Coetzee’s 
Disgrace and Other Works. Eds. Laura Wright, Jane Poyner and Elleke Boehmer. 
New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 2014, 19-30. 
Yoshida, Kyoko. “Eating (Dis) Order: From Metaphoric Cannibalism to Cannibalistic 
Metaphors”, J. M. Coetzee in Context and Theory. Eds. Elleke Behmer, Katy 
Iddiols, and Robert Eaglestone. New York and London: Continuum, 2009, 135-
146. 
Zamora, Lois Parinson. “Allegories of Power in the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee”, Journal of 
Literary Studies 2:1 (March), 1-14.  
 
 
II. Critical and Theoretical Texts  
260 
 
Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993 (1990).  
--------. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998 (1995).  
--------. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
New York: Zone Books, 1999.  
--------. “On Potentiality”, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Ed., Trans. and 
Intro. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, 177-184. 
--------. “Absolute Immanence,” Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Ed., Trans. 
and Intro. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, 220-239. 
--------. “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Ed., 
Trans. and Intro. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, 
243-271. 
--------. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004 (2002).  
--------. State of Exception. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2005.  
Al-Kassim, Dina. “Resistance, Terminable and Interminable”, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Psychoanalysis. Ed. Gabriele Schwab. New York and Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 2007, 105-141. 
Arsić, Branka. “Active Habits and Passive Events or Bartleby,” Between Deleuze & 
Derrida. Eds. Paul Patton and John Protevi. London and New York: Continuum, 
2003, 135-157. 
--------. “The Rhythm of Pain: Freud, Deleuze, Derrida”, Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis. 
Ed. Gabriele Schwab. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 142-170.  
Attell, Kevin. “Potentiality/Impotentiality”, The Agamben Dictionary. Eds. Alex Murray 
and Jessica Whyte. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 159-162.  
261 
 
Badiou, Alain. Deleuze: The Clamor of Being. Trans. Louise Burchill. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000.  
Barker, Joseph. “Against ‘vital materialism’: The Passive Creation of Life in Deleuze”, 
Mosaic, 48:4 (December 2015), 49-62.  
Beaulieu, Alain. “The Status of Animality in Deleuze’s Thought,” Journal for Critical 
Animal Studies, IX:1/2 (2011), 69-88. 
Beistigui, Miguel De. Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012.  
Bennington, Geoffrey. “Political Animals”, Diacritics, 39:2 (Summer 2009), 21-35. 
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and Scott Palmer. New 
York: Dover, 1912.  
Bignall, Simone. “Affective Assemblages: Ethics beyond Enjoyment”, Deleuze and the 
Postcolonial. Eds. Paul Patton and Simone Bignall. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010, 78-102. 
--------. Postcolonial Agency: Critique and Construction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010.  
--------. “Dismantling the White-Man Face: Racialisation, Faciality and the Palm Island 
Riot”, Deleuze and Race. Eds. Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013, 73-92. 
Blanchot, Maurice. The Space of Literature. Trans and Intro. Ann Smock. Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982.  
---------. The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1995.  
Blanchot, Maurice. The Gaze of Orpheus and other literary essays. Trans. Lydia Davis. 
New York: Station Hill, 1981.  




Blanchot, Maurice and Jacques Derrida. The Instant of My Death and Demeure. Trans. 
Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.  
Blaños, Paolo. “Nietzsche, Spinoza, and the Ethological Conception of Ethics”. Minerva—
An Internet Journal of Philosophy II (2007): 113-127.  
Bogue, Ronald. Deleuze and Guattari. London and New York: Routledge, 1989. 
--------. Deleuze on Literature. New York and London: Routledge, 2003.  
--------. Deleuze on Cinema. New York and London: Routledge, 2003.  
--------. “The Landscape of Sensation”, Image and Text. Eds. Eugen W. Holland, Daniel W. 
Smith and Charles J. Stivale. London: Continuum, 2009, 9-26. 
Braidotti, Rosi. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002.  
--------. Transpositions: Nomadic Ethics. Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 2006. 
--------. “Nomadic Ethics”, Deleuze. Eds. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 170-197.  
--------. The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity, 2013.  
Bruns, Gerald L. “Becoming-Animal: Some Simple Ways”, New Literary History, 38 
(2007), 703-20.   
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.  
--------. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London and New York: 
Verso, 2004. 
Calarco, Matthew. Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
Cheah, Pheng. “Nondialectical Materialism”, Diacritics, 38:1-2 (Spring-Summer, 2008, 
143-157.  
Chrulew, Matthew. “Feline Divinanimality: Derrida and The Discourse of Species in 
Genesis,” The Bible and Critical Theory, 2: 2 (2006), 1-23. 
263 
 
Colebrook, Claire. “From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings: The Feminist 
Philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz, and Gatens”, Hypatia, 15:2 (Spring 2000), 76-96.  
--------. Gilles Deleuze. London: Routledge, 2002.  
---------. Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed. London and New York: Continuum, 2006. 
---------. “Time and Autopoiesis: The Organism has no future”, Deleuze and the Body. Eds. 
Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 9-
28. 
---------. “Anti-Vitalism: Kaufman’s Deleuze of Inertia”, Postmodern Culture, 23:1 
(September 2012), 1-4.  
Critchley, Simon. Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance. 
London: Verso, 2007.  
Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983.  
--------. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1983). Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.  
--------. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988.   
--------. Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.  
--------. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. Ed. Constantin V. 
Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.  
--------. Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature (1953). 
Trans. Constantin V, Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.   
--------. Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty. New York: Zone Books, 1991.  
---------. Essays: Critical and Clinical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Grace. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.  
264 
 
--------. “The Exhausted,” Essays: Critical and Clinical. Trans. Anthony Ulhmann. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 152-174.  
---------. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994. 
--------. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Trans. and Intro. Daniel W. Smith. 
Afterword Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2003.  
---------. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Zone 
Books, 2005. 
--------. Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life. Intro. John Rajchman. Trans. Anne Boyman. 
New York: Zone Books, 2005.  
--------. The Fold.  London and New York: Continuum, 2006. 
--------. Proust and Signs. Trans. Richard Howard. London and New York: Continuum, 
2008.  
--------. Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. 
London and New York: Continuum, 2008.  
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan. 
Foreword. Réda Bensmaïa. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986.  
--------. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Preface. Michel Foucault. Trans. 
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. London: The Athlone Press, 1983.   
--------. What is Philosophy?. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994.  
--------. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. and Foreword. Brian 
Massumi. Minnesota and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.  
Derrida, Jacques. Memoires for Paul de Man. New York: Columbia University press, 1986.  
--------. The Instant of My Death and Demeure. Trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000 
265 
 
--------. Writing and Difference. Trans. and Intro. Alan Bass. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001.  
--------. The Politics of Friendship. Trans. George Collins. London and New York: Verso, 
2001.  
--------. The Works of Mourning. Eds. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Nass. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2001.  
--------. “The Transcendental “Stupidity” (“Bêtise”) of Man and the Becoming-Animal 
According to Deleuze”. Edited by Erin Ferris. Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis. 
Ed. Gabriele Schwab. New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007, 
35-60. 
--------. The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret. Trans. David Wills. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2008.  
--------. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2008.  
Derrida, Jacques and Maurice Blanchot. The Gift of Death & Literature in Secret. Trans. 
David Wills. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1995.  
Diamond, Cora. “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy”, Philosophy 
and Animal Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
Edkins, Jenny. “Whatever Politics”, Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty & Life. Eds. Matthew 
Calarco and Steven DeCaroli. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 70-91.  
Egginton, William. “Affective Disorder”, Diacritics, 40:4 (Winter 2012), 25-43.  
Engelbert, Lynn Hughey. “‘Wild’ Freudian Psycho-Analysis: Ingestion, Incorporation, and 
Mourning in Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari,” Mosaic, 44:4 (December 2011), 
161-176.  
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1979.  




Freud, Sigmund. “Mourning and Melancholia,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14. Ed. and Trans. James Strachey. 
London: Hogarth Press, 237-260. 
--------. “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 19. Ed. and Trans. James Strachey. 
London: Hogarth Press, 157-74.  
Genosko, Gary. “A Bestiary of Territoriality and Expression: Poster fish, bower birds, and 
spiny lobsters”, A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari. Ed. 
Brian Massumi. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 47-59.  
Gibson, Andrew. Beckett & Badiou: The Pathos of Intermittency. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006.  
Gilson, Erinn Cunniff. “Zones of Indiscernibility: The Life of a conception from Deleuze 
to Agamben,” Philosophy Today. Spep Supplement, 2007, 98-106.  
--------. “Responsive Becoming: Ethics between Deleuze and Feminism”, Deleuze and 
Ethics. Eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011, 63-88.  
Girard, René. Violence and the Sacred. Trans. Patrick Gregory. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1979.  
Goh, Irving. “Becoming-Animal: Transversal Politics”, Diacritics, 39:2 (Summer 2009), 
37-57. 
Grosz, Elizabeth. Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the framing the earth. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008.  
--------. Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2011.  
Guattari, Félix. Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Trans. Paul Bains and Julian 
Pefanis. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995. 
267 
 
Hägglund, Martin. Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2008.  
--------. Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf, Nabokov. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2012.  
Hallward, Peter. Absolutely Postcolonial: Writing Between the Singular and the Specific. 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001.  
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2000.  
--------. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Penguin Press, 
2004.  
Harris, Sam. The End of Faith. New York: Norton, 2005.  
Hughes, Joe. Difference and Repetition. London and New York: Continuum, 2009.  
--------. “Introduction”, Deleuze and the Body. Eds. Laura Gullaume and Joe Hughes. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 1-6. 
Hutchinson, Phil. Shame and Philosophy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.  
Jun, Nathan. “Introduction”, Deleuze and Ethics. Eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 1-4.   
--------. “Deleuze, Value, and Normativitity”, “Introduction”, Deleuze and Ethics. Eds. 
Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 89-
107. 
Jurecic, Ann. Illness as Narrative. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012.  
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007.  
Kaufman, Eleanor. Deleuze. The Dark Precursor: Dialectic, Structure, Being. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.  
Kirkby, Joan. “‘Remembrance of the Future’: Derrida on Mourning,” Social Semiotics 16:3 
268 
 
(September 2006), 461-472.  
Klein, Julie R. “Nature’s Metabolism: On Eating in Derrida, Agamben, and Spinoza”, 
Research in Philosophy, 33 (2003), 186-217. 
LaCapra, Dominick. History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2009.  
Lawlor, Leonard. The Implications of Immanence: Toward a New Concept of Life. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2006.  
--------. “Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari”, Substance, 117: 
37-3 (2008), 169-187.  
--------. This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007.  
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. 
Pittsburgh and Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969.  
Malabou, Catherine and Adrian Johnston. Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, 
Psychoanalysis, and Neurosciences. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.  
Maturana, H.R and F.J. Varela. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. 
Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980.  
May, Todd. “Badiou and Deleuze on the One and the Many”, Think Again: Alain Badiou 
and the Future of Philosophy. Ed. Peter Hallward. London and New York: Continuum, 
2004.  
Miller, J. Hillis. “Absolute Mourning: It is Jacques You Mourn For”, Re-reading Derrida: 
Perspectives on Mourning and Its Hospitalities. Eds. Tony Thwaites and Judith 
Seaboyer. New York: Lexington Books, 2013, 9-21.  
Norris, Andrew. “Introduction: Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead”, 
Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer. Ed. 
Andrew Norris. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005, 1-30.  
Noys, Benjamin. The Persistence of the Negative: A Critique of Contemporary Continental 
269 
 
Theory. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.  
Noys, John K. “Postcolonial Theory and the Geographical Materialism of Desire”, Deleuze 
and the Postcolonial. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010, 41-61.  
Patton, Paul. “Future Politics”, Between Deleuze and Derrida. Eds. Paul Patton and John 
Protevi. London and New York: Continuum, 2003, 15-29. 
--------. Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010.  
--------. “Deleuze’s Political Philosophy”, The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze. Eds. 
Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012.  
Pearson, Keith Ansell. Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. London 
and New York: Routledge, 1999.   
Protevi, John. “Laval Subject, Autonomous System and E. Coli Chemotaxis”, Deleuze and 
the Body. Eds. Laura Guillaume and Joe Hughes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011, 29-52. 
Reynolds, Jack. “Sadism and Masochism—A Symptomatology of Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy”, Parrhesia, No.1 (2006), 88-111.  
--------. Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Analytic Philosophy, 
and Phenomenology. New York and Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2012.  
Robinson, Andrew and Simon Tormey. “Living in Sooth Space: Deleuze and 
Postcolonialism and the Subaltern”, Deleuze and the Postcolonial. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010, 20-41.  
Shaviro, Steven. Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics. 
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009.  
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985.  
Schwartz, Louis Georges. “Typewriter: Free Indirect Discourse in Deleuze’s Cinema,” 
270 
 
Substance, Issue 108, 34:3 (2005), 107-135.  
Shaviro, Steven. “Interstitial Life”, The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and 
Philosophy. Ed. Peter Gaffney. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010, 133-46.  
Sontag, Susan. Illness as Metaphor & Aids and its Metaphors. New York: Penguin Books, 
1990.  
Smith, Daniel W. “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions 
in Recent French Thought”, Between Deleuze & Derrida. Eds. Paul Patton and John 
Protevi. London and New York: Continuum, 2003, 46-65.  
--------. “Introduction”, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003, vii-xxvii.  
--------. Essays on Deleuze. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.  
Sussman, Henry. “Deterritorializing the Text: Flow-Theory and Deconstruction”, MLN, 
115:5 (December 2000), 974-996. 
Sontag, Susan. Illness as Metaphor & Aids and its Metaphors. New York: Penguin Books, 
1990.  
Stivale, Charles J. Gilles Deleuze’s ABCs: The Folds of Friendship. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008.  
Schwab, Gabriele. “Introduction: Derrida, Deleuze and the Psychoanalysis to Come”, 
Derrida, Deleuze and Psychoanalysis. Ed. Gabriele Schwab. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008, 1-34. 
Tynan, Aidan. Deleuze’s Literary Clinic: Criticism and the Politics of Symptoms. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.  
Uhlmann, Anthony. “Deleuze, Ethics, Ethology, and Art,” Deleuze and Ethics. Eds. Nathan 
Jun and Daniel W. Smith. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 154-170.  
Vighi, Fabio. On Žižek’s Dialectics: Surplus, Subtraction, Sublimation. London: 
Continuum, 2010.  
271 
 
Wetherell, Margaret. Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding. Los 
Angeles and London: Sage, 2012.  
Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2003. 171-187.  
--------. “Never Too Late? On the Implications of Deleuze’s Work on Death for a Deleuzian 
Moral Philosophy,” Deleuze and Ethics. Eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011,  
--------. Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011.  
Wolfe, Cary. “Introduction”, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal. Ed. Cary Wolfe. 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, ix-xxiii.  
--------. “In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion”, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal. 
Ed. Cary Wolfe. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 1-57.  
--------. Philosophy & Animal Life. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
Žižek, Slavoj. The Plagues of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997.  
--------. Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. London: Profile Books, 2008.  
Ziarek, Ewa Plonowska. “Encounters possible and impossible: Derrida and Butler on 
Mourning,” Philosophy Today, 50 (2006), 144-155.  
Žukauskaité, Audronė. “Ethics between Particularity and Universality,” Deleuze and Ethics. 
Eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 
188-206. 
 
 
